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Introduction 
 
  Sophia is a graduate student from Shanghai University (China). She came to the 
University of Siena (Italy) to study the history of Renaissance art through the Marco Polo 
Programme. She communicates frequently with her culture-loving friends in Shanghai 
about things in Italy through WeChat (the Chinese version of Whatsapp). She enjoys 
being the local guide for Chinese travelers who visit Sienna and even gives them some 
hospitality. 
 
  One day, a friend in Shanghai asked Sophia if it was possible to import some Sassicaia 
wine to China. Sophia found some wine agents through searching engines, one of them is 
a small company set up by some Chinese students in Italy. The service they provide 
includes the purchase, customs declarations and logistics of importing Italian wine to 
China. The company also provides competitive prices in order to attract more business. 
Sophia contacted the company’s sales representative, who was very keen to make the 
deal. Sophia was required to pay half the value of the contract as a deposit. She was not 
sure how much she should trust a firm set up by some students. 
 
  Sophia used to purchase some products through Wenzhou Merchants in Italy. With a 
long history of doing business in Italy, businesspeople from Wenzhou have established an 
informal network of gossip and social sanctions, so those who cheat on their clients may 
loss their reputation and even suffer from group boycotts enforced by their peers. 
However, the firm set up by Chinese students doesn’t work the same way. Eventually, 
Sophia and this firm reached an agreement that she should pay the deposit to Paypal. 
Therefore, the deposit will only be transferred to the firm when the transaction is 
completed. A third-party payment system solves the trust issue. 
 
  Inspired by this little story, I produce three independent chapters to investigate three 
relevant questions in the dissertation. In the first Chapter, I study whether formal legal 
enforcement, such as using an impartial third-party payment system to enforce a payment 
agreement, can enhance the levels of trust and trustworthiness of contracting parties. The 
second Chapter examines how people who lack the protection of an effective legal 
system can establish informal institutions that depend on social sanctions to facilitate 
mutually advantageous exchanges. The third Chapter investigates whether highly trustful 
people, such as the heroine of the above story, are more or less sensitive than skeptical 
ones to cues on potential violations of trust (i.e. deliberate breach of contract).               
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  The three chapters contribute to our understanding of how law, informal institutions 
and trust affect economic transactions. Simultaneous commercial exchange, which avoids 
disputes between parties over the date of payment and the conditions of delivery, leaves 
no space for legal intervention (Volckart and Mangels, 1999). Not many transactions, 
however, are carried out simultaneously, especially in the context of globalization where, 
on the one hand, contracting parties might never meet in person, and, on the other hand, 
they might not even be subject to the same legislative body. In sequential transactions, 
such as the story described above, after receiving goods or money, the second party may 
not give the first party something in return. Anticipating the potential exploitation, the 
first party may never enter the contractual relationship, and potential gains from trade are 
lost. To facilitate mutually advantageous transactions, contracting parties must find 
effective mechanisms ex ante to restrain temptation to renege ex post (Greif, 2006).  
 
  The medieval Law Merchant provides a good historical example of how merchants in 
transnational exchange use private-ordering institutions to mitigate commitment 
problems. In the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, while long-distance trade was 
emerging in Europe, merchants created, without the intervention of the state, an effective 
system of private enforcement – lex mercatoria (the Law Merchant) – to secure their 
transactions (Trakman, 1983).1 In the absence of a centralized public authority with 
effective coercive power, merchant courts were established in several merchant 
communities or merchant fairs (the Champagne Fairs, for instance) to resolve legal 
disputes arising between merchants. The law merchants in courts kept account of those 
merchants who defaulted, and disseminated this information about cheating publicly. 
Their decisions could initiate group boycotts that collectively punished merchants with a 
public record of cheating, and “the threat of boycott of all future trade ‘proved, if 
anything more effective than physical coercion’”(Benson, 1989, p.649). As a 
consequence, the Law Merchant, “far from being substitutes for the reputation 
mechanism, is to make the reputation system more effective as a means of promoting 
honest trade” (Milgrom et al., 1990, p.3). Besides medieval merchants, law-and-norm 
scholars find that other social groups also establish similar social sanction norms that 
depend on gossip networks to regulate their members’ behavior: American fish 
wholesalers (Ellickson, 1989), Shasta County’s ranchers (Ellickson, 1986; 1991), 
Mexican California’s gold miners (Clay and Wright, 2005; Zerbe and Anderson, 2001), 
Wisconsin businesspeople (Macaulay, 1963) and many other merchant communities 
develop effective social norms (Bernstein, 1992, 2001; Greif, 1993; Landa, 1981; 
Richman, 2006).2 
                                                        
1 Based on their historical investigation, Kadens (2012; 2015) and Sachs (2006) reveal that local authorities 
also contribute to the enforcement of commercial contracts. 
2 In law and economics literature, scholars usually use customary law, social norms and informal 
institutions interchangeably. 
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  Social norms are widely recognized as effective mechanisms of social control 
alternative to a centralized coercive authority (Blocher, 2012). They are “not merely 
regularities of behavior, but obligatory regularities, the deviation from which incurs 
disapproval and other (non-legal) sanctions” (McAdams, 1996, p.2241).3 This definition 
of social norm can reach back to the Medieval Ages, in which the medieval jurists 
believed that customary norm “consisted of a repeat behavior to which the relevant 
majority of the community had tacitly consented to be bound to perform” (Kadens, 2012, 
p.1163). The repetition of behavior, and “tacitus consensus” (i.e. “tacit consent”), which 
is later reinterpreted as “opinion iuris” (i.e. “a normative obligation”, see Parisi, 1998), 
now become two essential elements necessary to construct a social norm in a variety of 
social science disciplines (Bicchieri, 2006; Cooter, 1998).  
 
  In recent years, social norms have received widespread attention among law-and-norm 
scholars,4 and economic analysis of norms has provided several important insights. One 
might be termed the “shadow of the law” hypothesis dating back to Macaulay’s (1963) 
work: law and norms are alternative means of social control, and contracting parties 
maximize their welfare within the law’s shadow (Richman, 2012). In his seminal study of 
economic transactions between Wisconsin companies, Professor Macaulay (1963) finds 
that businesspeople tend to build trust-based relationships and resolve their disputes 
through non-legal means, particularly if potential litigation is much more expensive. 
Following Macaulay’s work, many law-and-norm scholars investigate whether informal 
norms or institutions are more efficient than legal mechanisms. While some scholars 
advocate that, since informal norms or institutions spontaneously evolve as a result of 
merchants’ dealings or industry consensus, they can respond more quickly to changing 
commercial environments and are thereby preferable to formal legal enforcement (Cooter, 
1996, 1997; Kraus, 1997), other authors take a more critical view of norms and provide 
examples to justify the implementation of formal legal rules (Feldman, 2006; Mahoney 
and Sanchirico, 2001; Posner, 1996).  
 
  In addition to the “shadow of the law” hypothesis, law-and-norm scholars present 
another extralegal mechanism of informal norms or institutions – “order without law” – 
originating from Ellickson’s (1986; 1991) work. In his influential anthropological field 
                                                        
3 Posner and Rasmusen (1999) divide non-legal sanctions into six categories: “automatic sanctions”, 
“guilt”, “shame”, “informational sanctions”, “bilateral costly sanctions”, and “multilateral costly 
sanctions”. 
4 A series of prominent symposia is a good sign of the growing scholarly interest in this subject. See, e.g., 
Themed Issue, Social Norms: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory and Field, Journal of the European 
Economic Association, Volume 11, Issue 3 (2013); Symposium Issue, Custom, Texas International Law 
Journal, Volume 46, Issue 3 (2013); Special Symposium Issue, Custom and Law, Duke Law Journal, 
Volume 62, Number 3 (2012); Symposium Issue, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic 
Analysis of Law, Journal of Legal Studies, Issue 27, Number S2 (1998); Symposium, Law, Economics, and 
Norms, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 144, Number 5 (1996).  
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study on the cattle-control norms in rural Shasta County, California, Ellickson (1986; 
1991) shows that informal norms may work as an effective mechanism of social control: 
ranchers reject the county’s formal legal rules and resolve their disputes through an 
informal network of gossip and social sanctions in which those who violate the 
community’s norms suffer from social disdain and ostracism. Inspired by Professor 
Robert Ellickson’s work, many researchers study important historical examples, which 
include Medieval Iceland (Hadfield and Weingast, 2013), Gold rush California (Clay and 
Wright, 2005) and Medieval merchants (Greif, 1993; Milgrom et al., 1990), in order to 
examine how alternative extralegal mechanisms achieve economic governance and social 
order at a time when centralized coercive nation-states do not exist. They find that in 
close-knit communities there exists a publicly accessible information center - such as the 
Law Merchant in medieval merchants’ communities, and it helps to coordinate collective 
sanctions in order to secure deterrence of norm violation and promote cooperation. 
Similar social sanction norms are also observed in modern-day communities in 
developing countries where the governments fail to provide a sufficiently strong system 
of contract enforcement, and even abuse their authority to engage in profit-seeking 
punishment (Fafchamps, 1996; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). 
 
  In much of the world, formal legal institutions that impartially enforce contract 
performance and impose sanctions on breaching party mitigate opportunism problems in 
non-simultaneous exchanges. Such institutions are costly to build and cumbersome to 
enforce, however, and parties frequently seek non-legal mechanisms to enforce their 
agreements even though they know that there are formal legal rules on which they can 
rely (Dixit, 2004). In addition, when transacting parties lack the protection of an effective 
legal system, they tend to establish informal norms or institutions to facilitate exchange. 
Two research questions are naturally arising: how do legal and non-legal mechanisms 
interact to sustain economic transactions? And how do social norms emerge in 
commercial communities where no formal legal institutions exist?  
 
  The “shadow of the law” hypothesis mainly focuses on the relative efficiencies of 
norms and legal rules for regulating contracting behavior. The issue of how formal legal 
mechanisms affect informal norms or institutions, however, is much less explored. The 
first Chapter, “Law and Trust,” contributing to this literature, explores how formal 
contract enforcement affects norms of good conduct, such as trust and trustworthiness. 
This chapter first shows the macro-economic evidence that both good legal rules and high 
trust are crucial for economic exchange and development, but how legal mechanisms and 
trust interact is much less clear. It then considers the relationship between trust and 
formal contracts at the firm levels, finding that firms are inclined to adopt formal 
contracts when their performance is verifiable ex post but not necessarily observable ex 
ante, while contracting parties tend to build trust-based relationships and resolve their 
disputes through non-legal means when their performance is observable but costly to 
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verify. Since firms can freely choose trust-based relationships or formal contracts to do 
business with their partners, the causal effect of formal contracts on trust is still difficult 
to identify based on happenstance data from firms.  
 
  To identify a causal link between formal contract enforcement and trust, this chapter 
also surveys the evidence from relevant experimental studies. The experimental results 
generally show that formal contracts initiated by the principal crowd out the agent’s 
intrinsic trustworthiness and reduce her beneficial behavior towards the principal. 
However, when the content of formal contracts is mutually agreed or recognized as 
legitimate by parties, or when the parties are involved in a highly heterogeneous market 
where no predominant norm of fairness exists, formal legal mechanisms work as 
complements for non-legal means. In addition, when commercial environment becomes 
extremely uncertain, parties are inclined to rely on both legal and non-legal mechanisms 
to facilitate their economic transactions, thereby increasing their economic welfare. Many 
subjects seem to anticipate the possible perverse effects of formal contracts, and as a 
consequence, they deliberately include indefinite clauses in their contracts to mitigate 
possible detrimental outcomes.  
 
  While many theoretical and empirical studies on “order without law” try to uncover the 
mechanism of how existing social norms coordinate collective punishment on 
norm-violators in order to secure social cooperation, few studies explore how social 
norms emerge in the absence of formal legal institutions. The second Chapter, “A Fine 
Rule from a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and 
Trust,” filling the gap in this literature, examines whether people who lack the protection 
of formal legal institutions are willing to endogenously adopt a collective punishment 
institution, and whether the endogenous adoption of collective punishment mechanism 
can help a society to coordinate an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust 
and trustworthiness. This chapter first introduces a theoretical analysis of the 
consequences of the introduction of a collective punishment institution, which is based on 
Anderlini and Terlizzese (2012). In the model, trustees can choose to breach trust and 
grab the entire surplus, or to repay trust with a trustworthy action. Their decision depends 
on the “cost of cheating”, which has two components: one is idiosyncratic; the other one 
increases with the number of trustworthy trustees present in the society, and can be 
interpreted as reflecting a social norm, which is exogenously given. The introduction of 
the mechanism transforms the trust game into a coordination game with a high-trust and a 
low-trust equilibrium, which are Pareto-ranked. 
 
  We build on this model, to study whether and how the endogenous adoption of the 
mechanism through majority voting can affect the equilibrium outcome. Our model 
predicts that all subjects, regardless of their preferences and expectations, should vote in 
favor of collective punishment, hence the mechanism should be endogenously introduced. 
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As a consequence, the outcome of the vote cannot be interpreted as a signal of others’ 
intentions, and it should not matter whether the mechanism is exogenously imposed or 
endogenously adopted. An alternative, behavioral hypothesis is that voting can instead 
work as a coordination device. The endogenous adoption of collective punishment 
mechanism that punishes untrustworthy behavior could be taken as a signal for the 
general willingness to coordinate on a high-trust, high-trustworthiness equilibrium. 
 
  The theoretical model informs our empirical analysis, which is based on a laboratory 
experiment. The experiment comprises three games. The first is a binary trust game, in 
which the only equilibrium strategy is not to trust, and not to reciprocate. The second 
game is identical to the first one, but we exogenously introduce a collective punishment 
mechanism under which cheating is sanctioned and the severity depends on the number 
of other trustees in society who choose not to cheat. This creates a coordination game 
with a second, Pareto superior equilibrium with full trust and full trustworthiness. The 
third game is designed to study whether the possibility of endogenously adopting 
collective punishment by means of a majority-voting system facilitates coordination on 
the efficient equilibrium.  
   
  In line with the model, we find that the introduction of the collective punishment 
mechanism induces a significant increase in the levels of trustworthiness, and to a lesser 
extent also of trust. The endogenous introduction of the mechanism by means of a 
majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient 
equilibrium. In contrast with our theoretical predictions, not all subjects seem to be able 
to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of collective punishment, 
and a majority of them vote against it. Subjects seem to be unable to endogenously adopt 
an institution which, when exogenously imposed, proves to be efficiency enhancing.  
       
  Besides well-functioning formal institutions and effective social norms, individual 
characteristics, particularly subtle psychological states, may also be crucial for 
establishing social trust, and even for recovering trust from a deliberate breach of contract. 
The standard efficient breach hypothesis, originating from the Holmesian “option view” 
of contract, suggests that a contractual obligation is merely an option: the promisor can 
freely choose the option to breach or pay damages equal to the difference between the 
value of performance and the contract price, leaving no space for psychological factors 
(Markovits and Schwartz, 2011; 2012). A series of experimental studies conducted by 
law and economics scholars, however, have shown that individual heuristics and moral 
intuitions can significantly influence contract compliance (Eigen, 2012), contract breach 
(Wilkinson-Ryan, 2010; 2011), the performance of assigned contracts (Wilkinson-Ryan, 
2012), and the selection of alternative remedies for contract breach (Bigoni et al., 2014; 
Depoorter and Tontrup, 2012; Rachlinski and Jourden, 1998; Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron, 
2009). In line with these experimental results, social psychologists have also found that 
 7 
psychological mechanisms contribute to the enforcement of contracts (Robinson and 
Rousseau, 1994) and trust recovery following a breach of contract (Kuwabara et al., 2014; 
Lount et al., 2008; Schilke et al., 2013).  
 
  While previous experimental studies have considered how individual heuristics and 
moral intuitions affect economic transactions in short term, few studies focus on the 
effect of psychological factors on individuals’ dynamic contracting behavior. To fill the 
gap in this literature, the third Chapter, “Who Are More Naïve? High or Low Trustors,” 
explores whether high-trustors are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions 
aroused by the potential betrayal and engage in acquiring useful information about their 
partners, thereby predicting others’ trustworthiness more correctly than low-trustors. 
Butler et al. (2012) find that people tend to form beliefs on others’ trustworthiness based 
on their own, which implies that high-trustors who hold relatively optimistic default 
expectation of others’ trustworthiness easily trust more than they should and thereby are 
often cheated. In contrast with Butler et al.’s (2012) findings, Yamagishi (2011) 
experimentally show that, instead of being gullible, high-trustors are more sensitive to 
information that potentially reveals others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness.  
 
  Yamagishi (2011) presents two potential explanations for a positive relationship 
between generalized trust and social intelligence. In the first hypothesis, he assumes that 
social intelligence is inherently heterogeneous between individuals in a society. Those 
who are socially intelligent can afford to expect that most people are trustworthy since 
they are highly sensitive to untrustworthiness cues, while socially unintelligent people 
who are less sensitive are better off assuming that unknown others are generally 
untrustworthy. His second hypothesis is that high-trustors tend to take more social risks 
and are, therefore, more vulnerable to exploitation, which pushes them to invest cognitive 
resources in cultivating social intelligence for detecting others’ trustworthiness. After 
acquiring social intelligence to discern others’ trustworthiness, they can afford to have a 
high level of generalized trust. In contrast, those who have not made such cognitive 
investments are slow in detecting the cues of untrustworthiness in their partners and thus 
are frequently betrayed in trust relations. The frequent experience of misplaced trust can 
lead to a progressive withdrawal from potentially fruitful, but risky interactions. As a 
result, they will be trapped in an “equilibrium of mistrust”, thereby maintaining low 
default expectations of the trustworthiness of others. 
 
  We investigate this issue by means of a trust game experiment in which subjects 
repeatedly face opponents belonging to a high- or a low-trustworthiness group (i.e. either 
group A or B). We manipulate the feedback subjects receive on their partner’s behavior, 
varying across treatments. In the Baseline treatment, we allow subjects to receive 
feedback from their partner unconditionally after they decide whether or not to trust. In 
the Free Endogenous Feedback treatment, subjects are allowed to decide whether to 
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acquire feedback about their partner’s action after they decide whether to trust. In the 
Contingent Feedback treatment, subjects could be informed their partner’ choice only if 
they decide to trust their partner. In all these three treatments, subjects are told whether 
their partner belongs to group A or B, but they don’t know which of the groups contains 
the higher proportion of trustworthy people. In the Ex-ante Feedback treatment, however, 
trustors are told whether their partner belongs to the high or low trustworthiness group, 
before they make their choice.  
 
   This setup allows us to examine whether high-trustors are better than low-trustors at 
predicting others’ trustworthiness, and identify the underlying mechanism that generates 
the behavioral difference between high- and low-trustors. The experimental results show 
that high- and low-trustors are equally able to distinguish which group is more 
trustworthy, and to condition their trust accordingly. Moreover, compared to their 
counterparts, high-trustors learn whom to trust or distrust faster not because they are 
better at processing the trustworthiness-related information, or that they deliberately 
collect differentiating social data through trusting more, but only because they are less 
susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and 
thereby are more keen to acquire the useful information about their partner’s actions.  
 
  Chapter 1 is single-authored. Chapters 2 and 3 have been written together with 
co-authors. My personal contributions to the co-authored Chapters are summarized in 
Table A. 
 
 
 
Table A: Personal contribution to co-authored Chapters 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Idea Leading Leading 
Experimental Design  Proportional Leading 
Data Collection Proportional Minor 
Data Analysis Proportional Leading 
Writing Leading Leading 
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Chapter 1 
Law and Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract.  This survey addresses the question of whether formal legal enforcement 
crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. Based on a review of 
relevant empirical studies in the literature on macroeconomics, inter-firm cooperation 
and laboratory experiments, it can be concluded that find that formal legal 
mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally 
work as substitutes for trust, rather than complements, except when they are perceived 
as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population 
in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which 
repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain.   
 
Key words: Crowding-out, Legal Rule, Contract Enforcement 
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1.1  Introduction 
 
  Interpersonal trust is an essential feature of social life, which pervades friendship 
relations, family relations, and commercial relations. During the past decades, trust 
has received widespread attention across disciplines,5 and researchers have shared 
consensus on the importance of trust in the conduct of human affairs.  
 
  Indeed, trust is the keystone for successful economic development. Nobel laureate 
economist Kenneth Arrow (1972, p.357) has emphasized that “virtually every 
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust,” and that “much of the 
economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual 
confidence.” A growing body of literature has revealed that aggregate measures of 
trust at the country level are positively correlated with important economic variables 
such as the GDP growth, the provision of public goods, or the size of firms. Knack 
and Keefer (1997) find positive correlations between a country’s average annual GDP 
and a measure of trust from the World Values Survey for a sample of 29 market 
economies between 1980 and 1992. Within a specific country - the U.S., Dincer and 
Uslaner (2010) find a robust relationship between trust and economic growth across 
American states. Recently, a series of studies conducted by Guiso and his coauthors 
provide fruitful microeconomic evidence on the role of trust in economic activities. 
Guiso et al. (2004, 2008a) show that a larger share of trusting people is positively 
correlated with the development of financial market across countries. Less trustful 
individuals are less likely to participate in stock market and, conditional on buying 
stock, they purchase less, which limits the size of a country’s stock market. Guiso et 
al. (2009) use data on bilateral trust between European countries, and find that higher 
bilateral trust tends to breed more trade between two countries. In addition, they also 
find that the effect is stronger for more trust-intensive goods.  
 
  While there is a clear consensus in the literature that trust is crucial to economic 
success, the question of how a society achieves a high level of trust is less clear. In 
closed communities or specific industries, high trust and trustworthiness levels are 
easily self-sustained between parties without legal interventions because long-term 
payoffs conditional on cooperation within the existing relationship exceed gains from 
short-term defection. In his seminal study of agreements between Wisconsin 
companies, Macaulay (1963, 1985) finds that many agreements are non-contractual, 
with no legal enforcement. Businesspeople trust and honor each other because they 
want to sustain their long-term business relationships. By contrast, the problem of 
                                                        
5 In the past decades, trust, especially among strangers, has become a vital topic in sociology (Coleman, 
1990; Fukuyama, 1995; Gambetta, 1988), psychology (Deutsch, 1958, 1962; Sullivan and Transue, 
1999), economics (Arrow, 1974; Zak and Knack, 2001), political science (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 
2002), neuroscience (King-Casas et al., 2005; Kosfeld, et al., 2005; Zak et al., 2004), medical and 
bioethics studies (Hall, 2002; Hall et al., 2004), management science (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; 
Zaheer, et al., 1998, 2003) and legal studies (Blair and Stout, 2001; Mitchell, 2001; Rose, 1995). 
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trust in others is relatively pronounced in large, anonymous societies, where effective 
contract enforcement is highly demanded in order to promote mutually advantageous 
transactions. As Nobel laureate economic historian Douglass North argues, the ability 
of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most 
important source of national prosperity (North, 1990). But, how or in what way do 
formal legal mechanisms, in particular formal contract enforcement, affect the levels 
of trust and trustworthiness in a society? How do law and trust interact to sustain 
economic exchanges? 
 
  Many economic transactions are non-simultaneous. After receiving goods or 
money, the second party is supposed to give the first party something in return. In the 
absence of formal contract enforcement, the second party has incentive to renege. 
Anticipating the potential exploitation, the first party may never enter the exchange 
relationship, and potential gains from trade are lost. Trust and formal contracts are 
two fundamental approaches to solve the commitment problem and to facilitate 
mutually advantageous transactions. In particular, parties may reach a mutual 
agreement on an exchange and enforce the agreement without centralized coercive 
enforcement, because the threat of losing future transaction opportunities or informal 
sanctions makes parties comply with the mutually agreed arrangement. Alternatively, 
parties may rely on formal legal mechanisms to enforce their partners’ performance 
and to impose remedies in case of a breach. The expectation of enforcement of 
remedies for breaches induces parties more likely to be trustful and trustworthy (Baird, 
1990). Besides the rules on remedies for contract breach, there are other types of 
contract rules that may secure profitable transactions, like the rules on fraud: a 
contract is void when a seller lied about the quality of the goods. A buyer will be 
more willing to enter a transaction when he knows that the law will void the contract 
when it turn out that the seller was dishonest.  
 
  While some scholars advocate that relying on legal mechanisms to regulate 
business relationships may signal lack of trust and reduce the intrinsic trustworthiness 
(Macaulay, 1963; Gulati, 1995), other researchers argue that formal legal rules can 
establish a mutually shared belief about contract obligations between contracting 
parties and facilitate to coordinate their behavior, which enhances the levels of trust of 
parties (Das and Teng, 1998). This chapter contributes to the literature on law and 
trust, and aims to address the question of whether and on what conditions formal 
contract enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in an economy for 
the purposes of facilitating efficient economic transactions and economic growth.  
 
  To achieve the research goal, I first present the basic concept of trust on which our 
main discussion is based in the following section. In Section 1.3, I then investigate 
how trust and formal legal enforcement influence economic growth and development, 
and how they interact to sustain economic exchanges. Besides the macroeconomic 
evidence, I also discuss the firm-level evidence on the interaction effect of trust and 
formal contracts in Section 1.4. Since the existing empirical evidence can not provide 
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precise causal link between legal enforcement and trust, in Section 1.5 I show how 
relevant experimental evidence can help us to solve the current ambiguity in the 
literature. Section 1.6 provides concluding remarks.  
 
 
1.2  The Concept of Trust 
 
1.2.1  Definition  
 
  Before entering the debate about law and trust, one must first answer the question 
of how “trust” is to be defined and measured, which is not an easy task.6 The 
literature in social sciences offers many definitions of trust, depending on the specific 
context and content of the study. In his influential book, Uslaner (2002) specifies two 
types of trust: strategic trust and moralistic trust. Strategic trust occurs when people 
have past experience with their current partner and also the expectation of payoffs 
conditional on long term cooperation, or when some effective external enforcement 
mechanism (such as an arbitrator, or the courts) regulates the behavior of transaction 
parties. Strategic trust reflects people’s expectations about how others will behave 
under legal and non-legal mechanisms. According to the perspective of strategic trust, 
people trust others if and only if it is in their material self-interest to do so, which can 
also been defined as “calculative trust” (see Williamson, 1993). Besides the strategic 
or calculative aspect of trust, Uslaner (2002) suggests that trust also has a moral 
dimension. When involved in an economic transaction, people treat their partners as 
part of the moral community to which they belong. As a result, they are morally 
required to hold optimistic beliefs about others’ trustworthiness and thereby trust 
undoubtedly. In the psychological literature, moralistic trust is also called 
“affect-based trust” or “altruistic trust” (see McAllister, 1995).  
 
  To capture an effective definition of trust, which accommodates two essential 
aspects of trust discussed above, I follow Rousseau et al. (1998, p.395) and define 
trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or the behavior of another,”7 a definition 
based on a review of definitions in different social sciences. According to this 
definition, the non-contractible expectation of positive reciprocity on the part of the 
trustee is essential to the concept of trust. In particular, forming an entirely new 
exchange relationship can create the possibility of mutual benefit if the trustee is 
trustworthy; a decision to trust also implies the risk of substantial loss to the trustor if 
the trustee acts in an untrustworthy manner. In addition, the willingness to take such 
                                                        
6 Although there are different kinds of trust (for example, trust in government, or trust in strangers) in 
the literature, I only concern about the interpersonal trust in this paper. In the interaction between firms, 
I presume that the decision to trust is made by real persons (CEO, for instance), based on their 
expectations about others’ trustworthiness. 
7 Similarly, Mayer et al. (1995, p.712) define trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.” 
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social risks is also required for trust to emerge, which may be related to one’s attitude 
toward general risk (Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Karlan, 2005; Schechter, 2007).8 
 
1.2.2  Measures  
 
  Although Rousseau et al. (1998)’s definition of trust well captures the behavior 
people engaged in social interactions on fiduciary issues, it does not answer the 
question of how to precisely measure trust. In the last two decades, experimental 
method has become the basic tool to measure trust and trustworthiness. A trust game 
designed by Berg and his coauthors (Berg et al., 1995) has come to dominate the field. 
In the trust game experiment, two parties are involved in a sequential exchange in 
which there is no contract to enforce agreements. Subjects are endowed with $10, 
anonymously matched and assigned to either the role of trustor or trustee. At stage 
one of the game, the trustor may either pass nothing, or any portion x of the 
endowment (0 ! x ! 10) to the trustee. The trustor then keeps 10 – x, and the 
experimenter triples the remaining money so that 3x is passed onto the trustee. In 
stage two, the trustee may either pass nothing, or pass any portion y of the money 
received (0 ! y ! 3x) back to the trustor.9 Given the fact that the trustee in the game 
is under no obligation to return anything, the amount sent by the trustor has been seen 
as a proxy for “trusting” behavior; the greater is the amount sent, the more trustful is 
the trustor. Similarly, the amount returned to the trustor by the trustee is used as a 
measure of “trustworthiness”.10 
 
  This behavioral measure captures two main dimensions of trust - the 
non-contractible expectation about an unknown partner’s trustworthiness and the 
willingness to be vulnerable to possible exploitation. At its core, the trust game 
mirrors a basic moral hazard problem, and reflects many different real world settings 
such as making investments in a company, or lending money to someone. The 
non-simultaneous exchange relationship can be represented by the sequence of 
choices in this game: the first player, like the promisee, has to decide whether to enter 
the relationship, not knowing whether the second player will perform. The second 
player, like the promisor, has already received the benefit of the deal and must decide 
whether to reciprocate the first player’s trust. In the literature, this two-stage trust 
game has become a popular and frequently replicated measure of trust and 
trustworthiness.11 
                                                        
8 Recent experimental evidence (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008) shows that the 
decision to trust is not only determined by risk aversion, but also by betrayal aversion, that is, the fear 
of being betrayed or exploited by another in a social exchange.    
9 Variations of this game are common. For example, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) adopt a binary 
format, as above, in which the trustor must keep or give all the endowment and the trustee must keep 
all or give half back. 
10 Recently, legal scholars (e.g. Wilkinson-Ryan, 2012) have adopted the trust game experiment to 
model contractual exchange, and then to test the effect of reciprocity norms on contract performance. 
11 Johnson and Mislin (2011) collect data from 162 replications of the Berg et al. (1995)’s trust game 
involving more than 23,000 subjects, and then conduct a meta-analysis of these games to identify the 
effect of experimental protocols and geographic variation on this behavioral measure of trust and 
trustworthiness, finding robust evidence that subjects always give some amount to their partner and are 
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  Albeit reliable, experimental measures of trust suffer from major limitations: they 
are time consuming and expensive to conduct, and consequently they can involve 
only a small and often non-representative sample of the population. This makes them 
unsuitable for empirical studies based on large datasets, such as those in the literature 
on economic growth. An alternative approach is that of relying on attitudinal survey 
questions, such as those asked in the American General Social Survey (GSS) which 
has measured trust annually since 1972, the World Values Survey (WVS) which has 
been widely used to measure cross-cultural differences in trust, and the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) (see Glaeser, et al., 2000; Sapienza, et al., 2013; Naef 
and Schupp, 2008). The trust question in the GSS or in the WVS, which has been 
most widely used, asks: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? The survey 
respondents can answer in a binary way to this question by agreeing either with “Most 
people can be trusted” or with “Can’t be too careful.” This trust measure has been 
seriously criticized by many social science scholars (Miller and Mitamura, 2003; Fehr, 
2009) pointing out that a risk-averse or cautious person may share the view that 
“Most people can be trusted” but that at the same time prudence or risk aversion may 
induce the person to say “Can’t be too careful” because the person engages in 
avoiding small probability risks that have large payoff consequences.  
 
  To rule out having reasonable people agree with both answer categories, many 
social science scholars turn to “one-dimensional” questions that directly distinguish 
between trust and distrust (Miller and Mitamura, 2003; Yamagishi et al., 1998; 
Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). For example, Yamagishi and his colleagues ask 
questions such as “do you agree that most people are trustful of others” with five 
answer categories (agree fully, agree somewhat, neutral, disagree somewhat, disagree 
fully). In view of the problems inherent in the GSS question, these new measures of 
trust are likely to be better.  
 
  The positive answers to trust questions in the survey are always interpreted as 
generalized trust, that is, the default expectation of other people’s trustworthiness in a 
society (Rotter, 1980). And participants in the trust game decide whether to trust their 
partner often based on their general expectation of the trustworthiness of unknown 
others. Therefore, subjects’ trustful behavior in the game should be positively 
correlated with measures of generalized trust towards strangers. Indeed, Sapienza et al. 
(2013) observe a positive relationship between stated beliefs in the trust game and 
responses to trust questions in the survey. In addition, several experimental studies 
have also found that trust as measured by the survey is a significant predictor of 
trusting behavior in the trust game (Fehr et al., 2003; Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007).12  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
positively reciprocated. 
12 However, Glaeser et al. (2000) find that the association between survey and behavioral measures of 
trust is weak. One possibility is that student subjects used in the experiment already knew each other 
before playing the game while trust questions measure their generalized trust towards strangers.  
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1.3  The Role of Trust, Law in Economic Growth 
 
  In the macroeconomic literature on development, while there is a clear consensus 
that both good formal institutions and high societal trust are crucial to promote trade 
and development, the question of how legal institutions and trust interact and 
co-evolve is much less clear. In this section I briefly introduce evidence about the 
roles of trust and legal institutions in economic performance, then I focus on how 
their interaction affects economic growth.  
 
1.3.1  Trust and Growth 
 
  Recent empirical studies have yielded evidence of a sizable variability in the extent 
to which people trust others across countries as well as within countries (Algan and 
Cahuc, 2013; Tabellini, 2010). In general, northern European countries lead the 
ranking with high average levels of interpersonal trust, whereas people in African and 
south American countries are less likely to trust others. Substantial variability in the 
levels of trust also emerges within countries, for example, the trust level of Italians is 
almost twice as high in Trentino Alto Adige as it is in Sicilia (Tabellini, 2010). A 
main stylized fact from the studies of trust and economic development across 
countries is that income per capita is positively correlated with the level of trust in a 
country, where trust is measured by survey techniques (Guiso et al., 2008b; Knack 
and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Tabellini, 2008).  
 
  In this literature, trust is argued to improve economic development through several 
channels. Markets in the real world always face many trading frictions since contracts 
are not perfectly enforceable, which generates demand for regulation even when 
people realize that the government is corrupt (Aghion et al., 2010). High levels of 
trust and trustworthiness work as a lubricant to reduce social frictions without 
investing resources in monitoring and contract enforcement, and thus permit more 
investment in production (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997). In addition, 
high social trust also expands the scope of exchange and increases efficiency by 
diverting trade to less connected but more efficient traders (Guiso et al., 2009; La 
Porta et al., 1997).   
 
  Interestingly, in the seminal paper by Knack and Keefer (1997) the authors 
unexpectedly find that the interaction effect of trust and initial income per capita on 
economic growth is statistically significant, indicating that trust has a stronger effect 
on growth in poor countries than in higher income countries. One explanation is that 
low-income countries lack credit markets and enforceable legal rules, and thus trust is 
especially important for growth. The studies on the relatively new market economies 
of Russia and Eastern Europe have confirmed this hypothesis (Hendley et al., 2000; 
Johnson et al., 2002): as the law becomes prevalent in dealing with commercial 
transactions, the importance of long-term relationship between parties disappears, i.e. 
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relation-based trust is less necessary, implying that trust and law are substitutes. 
 
  While exogenous environmental factors such as climate variability (Durante, 2009) 
and the quality of institutions such as legal enforcement (Buggle, 2013; Becker et al., 
forthcoming) are likely to shape trust, both of them have also been found to affect 
economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999). Therefore, 
identifying the causal relationship between trust and economic growth by field data 
becomes difficult. The most common strategy to establishing this causality in the 
literature is using instrumental variables for trust.13 Some instruments have included 
the degree of “ethno-linguistic homogeneity” in a country (Knack and Keefer, 1997), 
the prevalence of “hierarchical religions”, such as Catholicism, in a country (La Porta 
et al., 1997), or historical events such as quality of education and past political 
institutions in the history of Europe (Tabellini, 2010) and slave trade in the history of 
Africa (Nunn, 2008). While all of these variables are strongly correlated with trust, 
they may plausibly have a direct impact on growth, which induces us to interpret the 
previous results with some caution. A more recent approach is using the trust levels of 
different waves of immigrants to the US, as time varying instruments for trust in the 
home countries of the immigrants (Algan and Cahuc, 2010). This approach makes the 
instruments reasonable, because the trust levels between immigrants and the peers in 
their home countries are highly correlated but the trust levels of immigrants are less 
likely to directly affect the economic performance in their home countries.    
 
1.3.2  Legal Systems and Growth 
 
  Another branch of growth literature emphasizes the impact of institutions such as 
legal systems on economic performance. There is much evidence that different past 
legal systems do have long-term effects on economic development (Acemoglu et et., 
2001).14 Specifically, La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) document empirically that common 
law countries have better property rights and more developed financial markets than 
countries with civil law, and thus achieve more successful economic performance. 
They argue that common law is more likely to protect minority shareholders strongly 
and to allow entrepreneurs to establish a business easily, and thereby intrinsically 
superior to civil law.15  
 
  Next step to be addressed is to examine the role of trust in the relationship between 
legal systems and economic growth. To exploit this point, researchers often focus on 
the effect of law on trust. Cross (2005) uses the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) to estimate the “rule of law” for nations. After controlling for other 
                                                        
13 In economics, the method of instrumental variables (IV) is used to estimate causal relationships 
when controlled experiments are not feasible. Generally, there are two main requirements for using an 
IV: first, the IV must be correlated with the explanatory variable(s) concerned by researchers; second, 
the IV must have no direct impact on the explained variable. 
14 For recent survey papers, see Ogilvie and Carus (2014) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013).  
15 According to Posner (1973), case law in the common law framework allows for dynamic adaptation 
to innovation in economic activities, thereby achieving economic performance more successfully than 
civil law. 
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demographic factors, it shows that the rule of law is associated with significantly 
higher levels of generalized trust. This result is consistent with a series of studies on 
trust across countries (Algan and Cahuc, 2014) showing that trust has a strong 
positive correlation with the quality of the legal system, and that the correlation is 
robust to using different measures of institutional quality often used in economic 
literature, such as the rule of law, the strength of property protections, the control of 
corruption, and the enforcement of contracts.   
 
  Based on macro data, however, it is still difficult to identify whether high trust is 
the cause or the consequence of a good legal system. One possibility is that high trust 
may simply reflect better institutional design, because the traditional survey questions 
on trust are usually context-free, i.e. without mentioning legal protection in a country, 
and people are highly likely to estimate the level of trustworthiness in a society based 
on their heuristics about legal enforcement (Guiso et al., 2011; Ho and Huffman, 
2013). Another opposite possibility is that trust allows parties to exploit extra surplus 
that would otherwise need to be spent on monitoring (Posner, 2002), and these 
resources can in turn be used not only for investment in physical capital, but also 
potentially for investment in better legal environments. With more efficient and 
effective legal institutions, higher trust levels will be supported. Therefore, more 
evidence is needed to provide a definitive answer.  
 
 
1.4  The Role of Trust, Law in Inter-firm Cooperation 
 
  Since firms work as engine for economic growth, it is interesting to investigate the 
relationship between trust and legal enforcement at the firm level. In this section I 
briefly summarize the evidence of the active roles of trust and formal contracts in 
inter-firm cooperation 16  and examine the conditions under which these two 
enforcement strategies are substitutes or complements. 
 
1.4.1 Trust and Formal Contracts 
 
  Relation-based trust and formal contracts are two fundamental approaches to 
promote the inter-firm cooperation. In business relationships, contracting parties 
usually choose between these two approaches to encourage performance of contract 
obligations. The relative efficiency of these two approaches depends on the specific 
circumstances. The formal contracts rely on enforcement of the written agreements by 
courts and threaten contractually specified damages against the breaching party for 
non-performance. To achieve this goal, courts must collect reliable information 
required to rule on contractual disputes and adjudicate claims lawfully, thus properly 
reflecting the parties’ rights and duties. Since courts cannot directly observe the 
                                                        
16 During the past decades, there has been many studies discussing inter-firm cooperation, especially in 
management research, see Arrighetti et al. (1997), Badawi (2010), Das and Teng (1998, 2001), Dyer 
(1997), and Mellewigt et al. (2007).  
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detailed interactions between firms, they have to rely on information offered by the 
firms. In practice, therefore, the costs of formal verification limit the applicable scope 
of contractual-based approach.17 The trust-based approach, in contrast, depends 
entirely on private behavior - each party’s ability to directly observe the other’s 
actions and willingness to punish misbehavior and/or reward good deeds directly as 
soon as they are noted.  
 
  In the literature, two different and competing views can be distinguished: trust and 
formal contracts are substitutes (Macaulay, 1963; Gulati, 1995) or trust and formal 
contracts are complements (Schmidt and Schnitzer, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
According to the “substitution” view, greater trust would manifest itself through less 
complete contracts, whereas according to the “complementation” view, greater trust 
would manifest itself through more detailed contracts. There are two possible reasons 
why having access to state-backed contracts could crowd out trust. One is the 
preference-based explanation: since parties involved in a commercial relationship are 
interdependent, they may be highly altruistic towards each other and value their 
partner’s payoff seriously. Introducing a detailed contract could signal lack of trust 
and generate negative reciprocity, thereby crowding-out the pre-existing trust in their 
relationship. The other is the norm-based explanation: there may exist a norm of 
social sanctions in a specific industry, and people are willing to punish those who 
abuse their commercial partner’s trust through ostracism or boycott (Greif et al., 1994; 
Greif, 2006). Requesting to sign formal contracts enforced by coercive authorities 
may destroy the prevalent norm, thereby spreading distrust among parties. 
Alternatively, in the perspective of complementarity, the detailed contracts reflect 
mutual expectations, and establish a common understanding about actions that are 
deemed wrongful, thereby serving as a coordinating device to complement trust (Das 
and Teng, 1998). In addition, formal contracts can also reduce the gains from 
short-term defection and secure the value of relation-based transactions (Baker et al., 
1994; Baker and Choi, 2015).  
 
1.4.2 Empirical Evidence 
 
  To examine how the relation-based trust and contract damages are likely to interact, 
Badawi (2010) collects a sample of 89 franchise documents from the Uniform 
Franchise Offering Circulars (UFOCs) in 2007. The empirical evidence supports the 
view of substitution, indicating that when trust-based approach is likely to be effective, 
franchisors tend to forgo the enforcement of formal contracts, and vice versa. 
Specifically, when relational punishments successfully induce the franchisees to 
comply with contract obligations and save transaction costs compared to formal 
enforcement, the franchisors do not heavily rely on credible damage threats – in his 
sample, only 20 of the 89 contracts include liquidated damages. Liquidated damages 
                                                        
17 For example, as Ben-Shahar and Bernstein (2000) argued, secrecy consideration may deter 
aggrieved parties from offering detailed information to courts, leading to under-deterrence of parties in 
breach. 
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become attractive only when trust-based mechanisms are difficult to be implemented. 
The author finds that the contract damages are most prevalent in motel and real estate 
brokerage franchises, because in these industries the franchisees can easily switch 
their assets to another franchise, which undermines the franchisor’s ability to threaten 
his/her franchisees by potentially informal punishments (for example, terminating the 
relationships). 
 
  Contrary to Badawi’s findings, Mellewigt et al. (2007) use survey data on human 
resource management from 600 randomly selected companies of a variety of 
industries, and demonstrate that contractual control does not crowd out trust. In their 
study, they find that the parties often use formal contracts to respond to outside 
contingencies. In addition, formal contracts also serve to clarify parties’ duties and 
coordinate their behavior. As a consequence, formal contracts and relation-based trust 
are complementary and mutually reinforcing. This result reflects the recent emerging 
commercial practice called “braiding” (Gilson et al., 2010): in order to improve the 
collaboration in the contemporary commercial environment characterized by high 
holdup risk and outcome uncertainty, firms tend to write complex contracts that 
integrate formal and informal arrangements in a way that allows each to assess the 
capability and characteristics of the other, thereby facilitating both parties to respond 
better to unforeseen circumstances.18  
 
  The issue of how trust impacts the business world becomes, without doubt, very 
important, especially in the context of globalization where, on the one hand, 
contracting parties might never meet in person, and, on the other hand, they might not 
even be subject to the same legislative body. There is a need for identifying the causal 
effect of formal contracts on trust between firms. The previous empirical evidence 
based on happenstance data that is collected through the survey or firms’ records, 
however, is ambiguous. In the next section, it is investigated whether the ambiguity in 
the literature can be disentangled by looking at experimental evidence.   
  
 
1.5 Lessons from Experimental Evidence 
 
  Both formal contract enforcement and trust are very important to economic 
development and inter-firm cooperation, however, the interaction effects of these two 
mechanisms on economic performance are still highly debated: while many studies 
show that formal contract enforcement may enhance trust in a economy, other 
scholars find that formal contracts tend to reduce intrinsic trustworthiness and lead to 
less trust and a worse outcome. Identifying the causal effect of formal contract 
enforcement on trust with happenstance data is difficult because not only contract 
enforcement can influence the levels of trust in societies, but also people’s trust 
                                                        
18 Recently, Barnett (2015) have found that, in the Hollywood motion-picture industry, a hybrid 
instrument intertwining formal and informal contracts is widely adopted to respond to the transactional 
hazards of an environment where neither formal contract nor reputation effects can effectively enforce 
parties to perform their contract obligations.    
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beliefs can induce a demand for legal intervention.       
 
  Economic experiments allow us to disentangle the competing explanations and 
identify the detailed conditions under which formal contracts may crowd in or out 
societal trust. In this section, I review most of relevant experimental evidence, and 
find that using formal contracts to increase trust may have the opposite effect except 
when there are no salient social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in an 
environment is highly diverse), or when formal contracts are perceived as legitimate, 
or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place 
becomes highly undetermined, which is consistent with the empirical evidence 
described in the previous sections. 
 
1.5.1  Basic Evidence of Crowding-out Effect 
 
  The role of formal contract enforcement can be introduced into the trust game in 
different ways, such as punishments, rewards, or monitoring, but has typically been 
done so through restrictions on the choice set of the trustee. In their influential study, 
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) make use of a two-stage principal-agent game. The agent 
invests her effort in a productive activity, which is costly to her but beneficial for the 
principal. Before the agent makes her decision, the principal determines the agent’s 
choice set: he can either restrict the agent’s choice set, in which case he requires the 
latter to invest at least a minimal level of effort, or he can leave the choice set 
unrestricted. In this experimental setting, leaving the decision completely up to the 
agent mirrors the principal’s trust as defined by Rousseau et al. (1998): a decision 
about whether to become vulnerable to another person’s possible exploitation. The 
authors find that control entails hidden costs caused by the existence of agents who 
choose a lower level of effort if controlled than otherwise, and the hidden costs 
outweigh the benefit of control.19 This substitution effect, that contracts enforcing 
trustworthy behavior may undermine the intrinsic trustworthiness of the trustees, has 
received the name “motivation crowding out” in economics (Frey and Jegen, 2001). 
 
  Other studies have also replicated the results of crowding-out found by Falk and 
Kosfeld (2006) in a variety of other contractual settings. Fehr and Gaechter (2002) 
study whether explicit contract incentives may create a hostile environment of threat 
and distrust undermining the agent’s reciprocity. They conduct a standard 
principal-agent experiment under two treatments, a trust treatment (TT) and an 
incentive treatment (IT). In TT, subjects play a three-stage game: in the first stage, the 
principal makes a contract offer, which consists of a fixed wage and a desired effort 
demand; in the second stage agents decide whether to accept the offer; if agents 
accept the offer, they enter the third stage and then choose their effort levels. The IT 
is identical to the TT, with the exception that the principal can punish shirking agents. 
They find that principals in TT offer higher wages and demand higher effort levels 
                                                        
19 Ziegelmeyer et al. (2012) replicate the Falk and Kosfeld’s experiment and confirm the existence of 
hidden costs of control. 
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than in IT, resulting in higher actual average effort. This result implies that the 
explicit punishment scheme could undermine agents’ intrinsic motivation.  
 
  Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) examine the trustee’s negative response to the fines 
imposed by the investor in the trust game. In their experiment, German students in the 
role of “investors” are given the opportunity to transfer an amount to the other player, 
called the “trustee”. When the investor transfers money to the trustee, he or she also 
specifies a desired level of back-transfer, which is non-binding. The transferred 
amount is then tripled by the experimenter. Knowing the investor’s choice and desired 
level of back-transfer, the trustee could in turn “back-transfer” some (or all, or none) 
of this tripled amount. Two treatments are conducted. In the fine treatment, the 
investor could impose a fine if the trustee’s back-transfer is less than the desired 
amount. The investor could also decline the use of the fine, the choice of using or 
declining the fine option being known to the trustee and taken prior to the trustee’s 
decision. In the trust treatment, no such incentives are available to the investor. The 
authors find that trustees reciprocate generous initial transfers by investors with 
greater back-transfers, but that the use of the fine reduces back-transfers conditional 
on the investor’s transfer, while renouncing the use of the fine when it is available to 
the investor increases return transfers. Overall, their study implies that refraining from 
the threat of fine, although the threat is available, could itself be perceived as a kind 
intention, which induces trustees to increase their reciprocity, while using the sanction 
to enforce an unfair distribution of income may be perceived as a bad action, inducing 
trustees to respond negatively.20 
 
  The issue of whether monitoring may induce the crowding-out effect on agent 
effort and thus backfire on the principal is addressed in Dickinson and Villeval (2008). 
To explore this principal-agent issue, they consider an employer-worker type 
relationship where the worker engages in a real-effort task. An employer can monitor 
a worker by choosing the probability with which the worker’s output is audited. After 
being informed about the employer’s monitoring choice, the worker then performs the 
task. They run this principal-agent game under two different conditions. In the 
stranger treatment, the authors match subjects as strangers in each round and preserve 
the anonymity of the pairs over the experiment, while in the partner treatment, they 
use a partner matching protocol and the same matching pairs play the game for ten 
rounds. They find evidence in the partner treatment that increased monitoring 
crowds-out agents’ effort, implying that the crowding-out effect is more likely to 
occur in close relationships.21 
 
                                                        
20 To separate the roles of incentives and negative intentions in undermining cooperation in Fehr and 
Rockenbach’s data, Houser et al. (2008) add another treatment where trustees face threats of fines 
imposed (or not) by nature, and find that sanctions have statistically indistinguishable effects on 
trustees regardless of whether trustees are threatened intentionally by investors or randomly by nature, 
implying that the detrimental effect is mainly driven by the incentive itself. 
21 Similar results are also found in Masella et al. (2014), showing that contract incentives may crowd 
out pro-social behavior more strongly among subjects who share the same group identity. 
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1.5.2  Robustness and Extension of the Crowding-out Effect   
 
1.5.2.1 Subject Pool 
 
  The basic experimental evidence of the crowding-out effect of the explicit contract 
discussed above is typically based on observing the behavior of undergraduate 
students. This is often criticized because students’ behavior may not be representative 
of behavior in naturally occurring environments where many important commercial 
decisions are normally made by corporate managers. Fehr and List (2004) replicate 
the Fehr and Rockenbach’s protocol (2003) using two types of subject pool, Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) and students. They replicate evidence of the hidden cost of 
punishment in both types of subject pool: the majority of CEO and student principals 
use the punishment option in the incentive condition, as a result, they obtain lower 
back-transfers by agents than do their peers who do not adopt the punishment option 
even when it is available. Interestingly, it is also found that CEO principals transfer 
more money and use the punishment option less often than students. Moreover, for 
any given transfer level, CEO agents pay back more money than students. 
Consequently, CEOs consistently achieve higher efficiency levels.  
 
1.5.2.2 Framing 
 
  Fehr and Gaechter (2002) have shown that the punishment option adopted by the 
principal crowds out agents’ pro-social behavior. One possible reason is that people 
may naturally dislike the punishment since it evokes negative feelings. To test 
whether the negative effect of explicit incentives is mainly driven by a “natural 
aversion” to punishment, Fehr and Gaechter introduce an additional bonus treatment 
(BT) where a shirking agent, instead of paying a fine, does not receive a bonus if their 
actual efforts do not reach the desired levels demanded by the principal. The incentive 
structure is exactly the same in IT and BT. Overall, it is found that with the material 
incentive framed as bonus, effort levels are significantly higher than when it is framed 
as punishment, although the efficiency in BT is still lower than in TT (i.e. the hidden 
cost of incentive still exists in BT). Similar contract framing manipulation is also 
implemented in other experimental studies (e.g. Brooks et al., 2012; Hannan et al., 
2005; Hossain and List, 2012), suggesting that effort provision is very sensitive to 
incentive framing.  
 
  Schnedler and Vadovic (2011) build on Falk and Kosfeld’s findings (2006) by 
using the basic experimental design as their baseline treatment (BT) and introduce an 
additional condition, endowment treatment (ET). In this new treatment, the game is 
formally equivalent to that in BT. However, they relabel the principal’s strategies: 
control by the principal is now labeled as preventing stealing. Their results show that 
in ET the share of agents that punish the principal for controlling is lower than in BT, 
and their reduction in effort is smaller too. Interestingly, in ET principals control more 
often than in BT. Since hidden costs of control are significantly lower in ET, 
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principals are not worse off when they control than when they do not control in ET.  
 
  The hidden cost of control may be affected by the mere wording in the 
experimental instructions. To test this, Hagemann (2007) replicates Falk and 
Kosfeld’s experiment (2006) as her baseline treatment (BT) and complements it with 
two new treatments. In Falk and Kosfeld’s protocol, they use the phrase “participant 
B can decide to force participant A to give at least 10 points or to leave him 
completely free to decide”. In fact, these instructions strongly accentuate the negative 
meaning if the principal decides to control the agent and therefore might influence the 
agents’ transfer decision. Avoiding the wording “to force” and “to leave him 
completely free to decide”, in the constrain treatment (CT) the author rephrases the 
wording: the principal now has the possibility “to constrain or not to constrain the 
agent”, while in the neutral treatment (NT), the author lets the principal just “offer 
one out of two kinds of contract that allow the agent to choose his transfer from 
different ranges”. The negative impact of control is replicated in BT. However, this 
negative impact of control disappears in CT. Furthermore, a hidden benefit of control 
is surprisingly observed in NT, where the principal obtains more profits when 
deciding to control than when deciding not to control. Hence, this study implies that 
instructions can trigger a demand effect that pushes the participants’ attention in a 
certain direction, naturally generating the hidden cost of control.  
 
1.5.2.3 Social Norms 
 
  Most of the previous studies revealing the hidden cost of control usually find high 
effort in the absence of explicit incentives, suggesting that a strong social norm may 
govern behavior in these settings (Sliwka, 2007). To make the social norm salient, 
Kessler and Leider (2014) allow subjects to make a non-binding agreement on 
playing the mutually beneficial actions before being assigned the roles in the 
principal-agent game. If the agreement is formed, a fairness norm is established. Then 
the authors introduce four treatments. In the baseline treatment (BT), the roles of 
principal and agent are assigned immediately after the players are told whether they 
have made an agreement. After that, the principal is given the option of whether to 
impose control. After the principal chooses, the choice is revealed to the agent. The 
agent then chooses his effort. In the mutual minimum treatment (MT), before 
assigning the roles of principal and agent, the authors randomly give one of the 
players the option to impose control on whichever player becomes the agent (i.e. 
control is imposed symmetrically). Once the player decides whether to impose control, 
the researchers assign the roles of principal and agent and ask subjects to play the 
principal-agent game. In the unknown agent treatment (UT), before assigning the 
roles, the authors randomly give one of players the option to impose control on the 
other player if that other player becomes the agent (i.e. control is imposed 
asymmetrically). Then the subjects are assigned the roles and play the principal-agent 
game. In the last treatment, the consent treatment (CT), before assigning the roles, the 
authors allow both players to suggest whether or not control should be imposed on 
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whichever player becomes the agent. Thus, each player can suggest control or no 
control and control works only if both players suggest control. After making a 
decision, the players are told who suggests the control and whether control works. 
Then the players are assigned their roles and play the principal-agent game. 
 
  Their study shows that most subjects (i.e. about 85%) are strongly in favor of 
having an agreement across all four treatments, with very little difference between 
treatments; offering to make an agreement significantly increases agents’ effort levels 
in all treatments. When there is no agreement, i.e. the fairness norm is relatively weak, 
there is no hidden cost of control and imposing control is even profitable for 
principals. However, when there is an agreement, i.e. the fairness norm is salient, the 
cost to the principal of imposing control depends on the treatment. Cost is very high 
in BT and UT, but it is eliminated in the MT and is reversed in CT. Therefore, this 
new study implies that the hidden cost of incentive schemes is very sensitive to the 
social norm variation. When the social norms of fairness become more salient, it is 
more costly to impose control on the agent.22 However, the mutual consent between 
principal and agent could legitimize the control, and make it seem less distrustful, 
unexpectedly generating the hidden benefit of control.23  
 
  In the real world, new employees usually are not aware of the prevalent norms in 
their corporation, but they could infer the existing work norms in their organization 
based on owners or managers’ incentive schemes, because explicit contracts can 
signal the private information held by the principal. To explore this idea, Danilov and 
Sliwka (2013) implement a simple one-shot principal-agent game. In the baseline 
treatment (BT), the principal can choose between a fixed wage contract and a 
performance-based contract. After the principal chooses one of contracts, the agent 
then determines his effort. They elicit the agents’ efforts for both contract types using 
the strategy method. In the norms treatment (NT), they replicate the BT with one 
addition: they show the principals a table containing the effort levels chosen by 
participants in a preceding baseline session and inform the agents that their principal 
has seen such a contributions table (the agents do not know its content). Hence, the 
agents do not know the behavior of others, but they are aware that the principals had 
this information prior to the contract choice.  
 
  Their results show that when a fixed wage is chosen by an informed principal in 
NT, effort levels are nearly 50% higher than in BT even though the incentive 
structures for agents are completely identical in both treatments. However, when the 
informed principal selects the performance-based contract in NT, the agent responds 
with lower effort levels than in BT. Furthermore, the authors find that the agents’ 
beliefs about the prior information of their principal are substantially affected by the 
                                                        
22 Similar results are observed in Kessler and Leider (2012), finding that mandatory minimum rules 
produce worse results than do the unenforceable handshake contracts when the norms are salient. 
23 Related results have also been found by Saaksvuori (2013). The author presents results from trust 
games run among college students in Germany, and reports that endogenously formed centralized 
sanctioning institutions significantly increase trust and trustworthiness.  
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principal’s contract choice, i.e. agents correctly gain an understanding of the prevalent 
norms through their principal’s choice, which in turn dramatically affect their own 
decisions.24 
 
1.5.2.4 Repeated Games 
 
  Previous experimental studies have confirmed the crowding-out effect of explicit 
incentives in the non-repeated principal-agent settings; they find that incentive 
contracts usually undermine intrinsic motivation, and thus entail the hidden cost. Few 
experimental studies examine the effect of formal contracts in repeated settings. To 
fill the gap, Lazzarini et al. (2004) study how a formal contract interacts with 
relation-based trust to affect individual behavior in repeated exchanges. In their 
experiment, subjects are randomly matched to play repeated principal-agent games 
where after each period the ongoing relationships between paired subjects continue 
with specific probabilities and the probabilities vary among the different pairs. In each 
period, after knowing the probability of game continuation, the principal decides 
whether or not to choose the formal contract in which the payment is contingent on 
the agent’s choice. The agent then makes the decision. Their study shows that the 
principals are more likely to choose the formal contracts when the probability of 
continuation across periods becomes very low. By enforcing the formal agreements, 
contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of informal agreements. This 
complementarity effect is particularly important when repeated interactions with 
partners are unlikely and thus self-enforcement is very difficult.  
 
  People usually believe that strong contract enforcement induces the trustee to 
reciprocate her partner, and that cooperative behavior in the present then reinforces an 
expectation of cooperation in the future even when contract enforcement is removed 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002). To test this idea, Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) conduct 
a binary trust game under four treatments. In the baseline treatment (BT), all subjects 
act in the role of trustors, and play the game with the same partner for four periods. In 
each period, the trustor chooses to “trust” or “not trust”. If the trustor chooses not to 
trust, the game ends; if the trustor chooses to trust, the trustee has the option of 
honoring or exploiting the trust. Unbeknown to the subjects, their trustee is a 
computer program that always honors the trust. In the partial-contract treatment (PT), 
in the first two periods the trustee (i.e. the computer program) proposes a binding 
contract in which the computer exogenously enforces the option of “trust” without the 
subject’s intention and the trustee is mandated to honor the trust, and then the trustor 
decides whether or not to accept this proposed contract; in the last two periods, the 
contract is not available to the trustee and the subjects play the game presented in the 
BT. The allowed-but-not-chosen treatment (AT) is identical to the BT, with the 
                                                        
24 Similar experimental evidence is found in other studies (Cardinaels and Yin, 2014; Galbiati et al., 
2013). For example, Galbiati et al. (2013) compare the effect of sanction mechanism that is enforced 
exogenously by the experimenter to the same sanction mechanism that is selected by a subject who has 
superior information about the previous behavior of the other players, finding that the endogenous 
sanction mechanism is perceived as a negative signal by subjects and is thereby counterproductive. 
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exception that the trustees are allowed to propose contracts in all four periods but are 
programmed not to activate them in the last two periods. The mentioned treatment 
(MT) is also identical to the BT, with the exception that the possibility for contracts is 
described but the trustees are never allowed to propose them. 
 
  The results indicate that when contracts are no longer allowed, after having been 
allowed previously, trust drops dramatically in PT compared to in BT. Also, trust 
drops even more dramatically in treatment AT, when the trustee chooses not to 
propose a contract, after having proposed contracts twice previously, implying that 
the intention matters. However, merely mentioning but not allowing binding contracts 
does not have a significant effect on trust. Hence, this study implies that trust could 
not develop during the cooperative but contractually mandated interactions, and that 
strong contracts not only impede the development of trust but also diminish the 
existing trust. A similar “Removing The Incentive” paradigm is used by Mulder et al. 
(2006), finding that participants who have experienced the presence of a sanctioning 
system trust fellow group members less than participants who have not.  
 
  In repeated exchanges, the type and extent of contract incentives not only affect 
individuals’ intrinsic motivation in the short term, but may “also influence the process 
of preference-updating by which individuals acquire new tastes or social norms that 
will persist over long periods” (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012, p.374). As a result, 
in the perspective of long periods, explicit contracts may reinforce trust or 
trustworthiness by updating people’s preferences. To explore this idea, Bohnet et al. 
(2001) randomly match participants and ask them to play a two-person contract game 
in which the trustor has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without 
knowing whether the trustee will perform; if the trustee breaches, a chance move 
decides whether he is held liable for the cost of the breach. There are three types of 
contract enforcement probabilities: low, medium and high. The experiment consists of 
two blocks: the first block has three periods, while the second block has six. In order 
to create different legal regimes, the authors vary the contract enforcement probability 
of the first block across sessions. However, subjects in all sessions undergo weak 
contract enforcement during the second block. In both blocks, after each period, 
aggregate information on outcomes is provided, that is, both trustors and trustees 
know how many contracts were offered and performed in the previous rounds. The 
experimental results show that, in the first block, subjects achieve the highest degree 
of efficiency when contract enforcement probability is high; in the second block, the 
differential effects of prior enforcement gradually vanish and all sessions converge to 
a high level of cooperation when all subjects enter into the low-probability 
environment. Hence, this study implies that, in the short term, strong contract 
enforcement help people to establish a relatively high level of cooperation; in the long 
term, when people enter into a weak enforcement environment, they are very sensitive 
to their partner’s previous performance rate and engage in screening of potential 
partners. Naturally, the intrinsic trustworthiness of trustees becomes a key variable in 
the transaction. Consequently, people’s preferences are updated and trustworthiness is 
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crowded in with weak enforcement.25 
 
1.5.2.5 Rational Response 
 
  Previous studies have shown that exerting control, monitoring, and other explicit 
incentives can be counterproductive for principals. Alternatively, delegating decision 
rights to agents (Charness et al., 2012) is often perceived as friendly and helps 
principals to achieve higher profitability. Principals seem aware of the importance of 
agents’ reciprocity motivation, but the reduction in the intensity of explicit incentives 
when their payoff depends primarily on agents’ effort levels is not statistically 
significant. For instance, only 20% to 30% of principals choose the delegation option 
in Charness et al. (2012), although delegating the wage decision significantly 
enhances agent performance and increases the earnings of principals. In the real world, 
however, it is found that contracting parties often deliberately include incomplete and 
usually unenforceable terms in their contracts.26 
 
  To examine whether principals correctly anticipate the detrimental effect of explicit 
contracts and then rationally respond to it, Sloof and Sonnemans (2011) ask subjects 
to play three repeated trust games. For each repeated trust game, subjects will be 
randomly matched with a distinct partner. Then the subject in the role of trustor 
moves first and decides whether or not to trust trustee: if she chooses to trust, the 
trustee then decides whether or not to honor trust; if she does not trust, the existing 
explicit contract will be enforced. The probability of repetition for each repeated trust 
game is different across treatments. And there are two types of explicit contracts, one 
gives trustor high payoff (i.e. “good” contract) and the other gives low payoff (i.e. 
“bad” contract). For each session, in the first repeated trust game a good (or bad) 
explicit contract is exogenously determined and always applicable during this game. 
In the second game another explicit contract (i.e. good or bad contract) exogenously 
replaces the initial one and applies for this game. In the last game the good or bad 
contract is endogenously chosen by the trustor. The main findings are that cooperation 
is more likely when there are more repetitions of the game and only bad explicit 
contracts are available in the repeated trust game. Anticipating this, the majority of 
subjects choose bad explicit incentives to facilitate cooperation.  
 
  Recently, another type of informal incentive has attracted researchers’ attention – 
                                                        
25 Similar argument can be found in Scott (2000, p.1632), claiming that “our putative moral defective 
observes that she loses opportunities because she cannot make credible commitments. The motivation 
to increase her opportunity set stimulates the necessary characterological changes in values. Out of this 
process emerges a ‘new person.’ New and better preferences and values - honesty, loyalty, 
trustworthiness - now form part of the individual’s stock of traits.”  
26 In legal studies, for example, Scott (2003) analyzes a large sample of courts cases litigated between 
1998 and 2002 in the U.S., and finds that contracts that specify an up-front payment plus an 
“indefinite” promise of a bonus payment in case of satisfactory performance are quite common in the 
business world, although these contracts are incomplete and unenforceable in the view of the courts. 
Scott concludes that these deliberately incomplete contracts allow trustors to signal their trusting 
intentions. 
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discretionary incentives, where the game structure allows principals to sanction or 
reward agents discretionarily after observing agents’ effort levels; this implicit 
incentive is not credible and enforceable, and is also costly to principals. However, as 
many experimental studies suggest, the discretionary incentives perform better than 
explicit incentives as the latter are often perceived as a hostile act and crowd out 
intrinsic trustworthiness (Fehr et al., 2007; Fehr and Schmidt, 2007).  
 
  In Fehr et al. (2007), the authors introduce three types of contracts to subjects. In 
the explicit contract the principal offers a wage, a required effort level, and a fine to 
be paid if the agent is caught shirking. In the trust contract, the principal offers a fixed 
wage to the agent and asks for high effort in return. Lastly, the discretionary contract 
is similar to the trust contract, except that the principal announces that she might pay 
a bonus if the agent exerts more effort than required. They then ask principals to 
choose among these three contracts and play the game. In line with the previous 
evidence, discretionary incentives perform better from the firm’s perspective than the 
other two contracts. Interestingly, principals seem to know the crowding-in effect of 
discretionary incentives because this contract is chosen much more often than other 
two contracts. In a subsequent paper, Fehr and Schmidt (2007) examine whether 
combining a discretionary and explicit contract helps to improve efficiency. In their 
new experiment, principals can choose between a purely discretionary contract and a 
combined contract. The data show that the vast majority of principals select the purely 
discretionary contract, which also turns out to be more efficient.  
 
1.5.3  Evidence from Field Experiments 
 
  Compared to econometric or statistical techniques that rely heavily on naturally 
occurring data to answer causal questions, laboratory experimental methodology can 
precisely identify causation via randomization. Even though controlled laboratory 
experimentation provides important insights on causation, the generalizability of 
laboratory experimental outcomes is still highly criticized. One main critique is that 
college students are disproportionately employed as subjects in lab experiments, 
which could not help us make inferences about the behavior of other groups of people 
in the real world. Also, the artificial lab context may potentially bias behavior. For 
example, the nature and extent of the scrutiny associated with the lab may induce 
subjects to distort their real preferences in order to please the experimenter (Levitt and 
List, 2007). To mitigate these methodological problems, field experiments randomly 
implementing an intervention in the real world rather than in the laboratory are 
emerging in economics and other social sciences (Harrison and List, 2004). 
 
  Belot and Schroder (forthcoming) study the effects of monitoring and contract 
incentives on work quality using a field experiment where the subjects do not know 
that they are participants in an experiment. In their experiment, subjects are employed 
to identify the value and country of origin of euro coins that are collected in different 
countries in the euro zone. Subjects have one day to finish the task and are asked to 
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return the coins by an exact deadline. Three treatments are conducted in the 
experiment. In the trust treatment (TT), a fixed wage is offered and no requirement of 
work quality is mentioned. In the monitoring and weak incentives treatment (MW), a 
tolerated number of mistakes is specified, and subjects are informed that a moderate 
penalty deducting from the fixed wage will incur if the number of mistakes exceeds 
the tolerated number. The monitoring and strong incentives treatment (MS) is 
identical to the MW, with the exception that the penalty here is heavier than the one in 
the MW. 
 
  The authors find that weak incentives do not reduce the number of mistakes 
significantly while strong incentives improve work quality. In addition, they reveal a 
negative effect of monitoring. Specifically, they find that when monitoring is 
implemented the fraction of participants who return the coins later increase 
dramatically in both incentive treatments. These findings imply that deliberately 
implementing monitoring in contractual relationships may signal the distrust of 
principals, and thus induce agents to retaliate it with negative reciprocity. 
 
  While the evidence on control aversion presented in Belot and Schroder 
(forthcoming) is pronounced, it is not full clear how well they extend to more realistic 
markets where the contracting parties are formal legal entities. Bengtsson and 
Engstrom (2014) conduct a field experiment to investigate whether implementing 
monitoring crowds out the intrinsic motivation of Swedish non-profit organizations. 
In Sweden, at the beginning of each year various proposals of non-profit 
organizations are submitted to the Swedish foreign aid agency (Sida). Once the 
proposals are approved, Sida will sign contracts with the organizations and distribute 
funds to them. Traditionally, the contracts are based on trust and self-regulation. In 
their experiment, the authors randomly select a sample of non-profit organizations 
and assign threats of audits to them. Specifically, the selected organizations are 
informed that Sida will audit their financial documentation at the end of the fiscal 
year and that they will risk losing future funds if Sida detects any irregularities, while 
non-selected organizations receive no information about Sida’s upcoming audit at all.  
 
  They find that non-profit organizations who are monitored significantly reduce 
their expenditures and are more likely to return unused funds to Sida than 
non-monitored organizations. In addition, the reduction in expenditures does not 
reduce the performance of treated organizations. Specifically, organizations in the 
treatment group extend their outreach more widely and are reported by local media 
more often compared to non-treated ones, implying that monitoring does not crowd 
out the pro-social behavior but actually improves economic efficiency. 
 
  How could we reconcile these controversial findings on monitoring? While many 
studies reveal that strong contract enforcement crowds out intrinsic motivation to 
cooperation and undermines trust (e.g. see Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), few papers 
examine how the nature of power exercised by authorities (or principals) influences 
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the crowding-out effect. According to Turner (2005), there are two kinds of power: 
coercive and legitimate power. Legitimate power can enhance trust, while coercive 
power always reduces trust. Power adopted to improve efficiency may be perceived as 
legitimate rather than coercive (Gangl et al., 2015). Therefore, it is convincing that 
contract control enforced by Sida, a social oriented principal, is more likely to be 
perceived as legitimate than the one implemented by a self-interested principal, 
thereby generating hidden benefits of control. 
 
  Cassar et al. (2014) conduct field experiments in Italy and Kosovo to identify the 
causal effect of formal enforcement on trust and trustworthiness and also to study how 
legal enforcement and preexisting trust interact to influence cooperation. Their 
experiments consist of four stages. In the first stage, subjects are randomly matched to 
play a one-shot trust game (Berg et al., 1995). In the second stage, subjects enter a 
market game of 10 rounds where subjects decide whether to behave honestly, cheat, 
or stay out, in the absence of any legal enforcement. In the third stage, two treatments 
are introduced: in the partial enforcement system (PES) treatment, subjects participate 
10 rounds of the market game in which weak contract enforcement is implemented, 
while in the impartial enforcement system (IES) treatment, subjects play 10 rounds of 
the market game with strong enforcement. In the last stage, subjects play the one-shot 
trust game again with a randomly selected partner. 
 
  The authors show that both PES and IES treatments enhance trust, but the increase 
is more pronounced in the IES treatment. For trustworthiness, the IES treatment 
significantly increases trustworthiness while the PES treatment decreases it. This 
suggests that strong contract enforcement aiming to improve cooperation may be 
perceived as legitimate and therefore trigger internalized norms of cooperation.27 In 
addition, the authors find that the subjects’ preexisting trust is negatively correlated 
with their dishonest behavior in the market game, but only for those who do not 
experience an impartial institution. It implies that trust may act as an alternative to 
formal institutions in promoting mutually advantageous transactions, but only in the 
absence of strong legal enforcement. 
 
 
1.6  Conclusions 
 
  The prevailing view in economics is that a well functioning and impartial legal 
system is the key to development. If governments provide sufficiently strong systems 
of contract enforcement that promote investment and encourage trade, prosperity 
follows. Trust between investors and entrepreneurs (or between firms) is also an 
important facilitator of investment and production. There is strong evidence that 
                                                        
27 Similar findings are reported in Mironova and Whitt (2013). The authors conduct a field experiment 
in Kosovo and allow subjects to play a repeated trust game with intervention, which sometimes 
punishes dishonest subjects (Charness et al., 2008). They find that the possibility of third-party 
punishment increases the levels of trust and trustworthiness and that the positive effect persists even 
after the enforcement mechanism is removed. 
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countries’ average levels of trust are positively correlated with per capital income and 
economic growth, suggesting that trust may generate enduring increases in gains from 
trade. While there is a consensus that both good legal rules and high trust are       
crucial for trade and development, the relationship between them is much less clear. 
On the one hand, formal contract enforcement reduces the benefits of opportunistic 
behavior within the contractual relationship, directly promoting societal trust. On the 
other hand, formal legal mechanisms may undermine the intrinsic trustworthiness of 
people, thereby leading to a low level of trust.  
 
  In order to understand how formal contract enforcement affects trust, I offer a 
survey of the literature on trust and legal mechanisms. I first focus on the macro 
evidence, and find that good quality legal institutions have a positive effect on trust. 
However, a possible limitation to causal identification in these studies is that legal 
institutions are themselves the outcome of societal trust. A recent experimental paper 
(Campos-Ortiz et al., 2012) has confirmed this idea, showing that subjects coming 
from countries with higher levels of trust devote more resources to public good 
production and are more likely to pass a binding majority vote on establishing a 
formal legal institution that facilitates cooperation in a laboratory environment. 
 
  Since most investment and production activities occur between firms, I also 
consider the relationship between trust and formal contracts in inter-firm cooperation. 
In order to regulate each other’s behavior, firms are willing to engage in a formal 
contracting relationship, or enter into an incompletely specified collaboration to 
establish repeated exchanges where the effect of reputation or some combination of 
legal or non-legal mechanisms works. The actual adoption of commercial strategies 
by firms depends on specific conditions. Normally, a formal contract is adopted when 
performance is verifiable ex post but not necessarily observable ex ante, while an 
informal arrangement has an advantage when performance is observable but costly to 
verify. As the contemporary commercial environment is becoming increasingly 
uncertain, many firms establish long term collaboration but with formal contracts. 
Since firms can freely choose between trust-based relationships and formal contracts 
to do business with their partners, it is even more difficult to identify the causal effect 
of formal contracts on trust using happenstance data from firms.    
 
  Identifying a causal link between contract enforcement and trust with happenstance 
data is exceedingly difficult because both may be co-determined in the real world. I 
therefore turn to the experimental studies, which manipulate the exogenous adoption 
of formal contracts and measure their effect on trust. In the experimental literature, 
subjects are usually involved in a standard (or modified) principal-agent game, where 
the principal can introduce incentives to constrain the agent’s behavior or trust and 
delegate decision rights to the agent. The experimental evidence generally shows that 
incentives initiated by the principal crowd out the agent’s intrinsic trustworthiness and 
reduce her beneficial behavior towards the principal. However, when the content of 
formal incentives is mutually agreed or recognized as legitimate by the involved 
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parties, or the parties are involved in a highly heterogeneous market where no 
predominant norm of fairness exists, then formal contracts are preferred and found to 
enhance efficiency. In addition, when environmental factors become extremely 
uncertain during repeated commercial relationships, parties always use formal 
contracts to facilitate their informal arrangements, thereby increasing their economic 
welfare. Many subjects seem to anticipate the possible perverse effects of formal 
incentives, and as a consequence, they deliberately include indefinite clauses in their 
contracts to mitigate possible detrimental outcomes.     
 
  Understanding the relationship between trust and legal rules has important 
implications for understanding how contract enforcement interacts with societal trust, 
and further affects economic development. It also helps us understand why certain 
contracting institutions work in some market environments but not others. Since trust 
beliefs may be formed based on the individuals’ heuristics about the general legal 
environment in a country, it is necessary to manipulate subjects’ initial trust levels in 
future experiments. In this way, not only can we understand whether contracting 
institutions influence societal trust, but we are also able to unravel the underlying 
mechanism of how legal institutions shape the causal effect of trust on economic 
performance.             
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Chapter 2 
A Fine Rule From a Brutish World?  
An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust 
 
 
Huojun Sun, Maria Bigoni 
 
Abstract. By means of a laboratory experiment, we study whether the endogenous 
adoption of a collective punishment mechanism can help a society coordinating on an 
efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The 
experiment comprises three games. The first is a binary trust game, in which the only 
equilibrium strategy is not to trust, and not to reciprocate. The second game is 
identical to the first one, but we exogenously introduce a collective punishment 
mechanism under which cheating is sanctioned and the severity depends on the 
number of other trustees in society who choose not to cheat. This creates a 
coordination game with a second, Pareto superior equilibrium with full trust and full 
trustworthiness. The third game is designed to study whether the possibility of 
endogenously adopting collective punishment by means of a majority-voting system 
facilitates coordination on the efficient equilibrium. In theory, most subjects, 
regardless of their preferences and expectations, should vote in favor of collective 
punishment. As a consequence, the outcome of the vote cannot be interpreted as a 
signal of others’ intentions, and it should not matter whether collective punishment is 
exogenously imposed or endogenously adopted. An alternative, behavioral hypothesis 
is that voting can work as a coordination device. We find that the introduction of the 
punishment mechanism induces a significant increase in the levels of trustworthiness, 
and to a lesser extent also of trust. The endogenous introduction of the mechanism by 
means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the 
efficient equilibrium. In contrast with our theoretical predictions, not all subjects seem 
to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of 
collective punishment, and a majority of them vote against it. Subjects seem to be 
unable to endogenously adopt an institution which, when exogenously imposed, 
proves to be efficiency enhancing. 
Keywords: Coordination, Majority Voting, Social Sanctions, Trust Game 
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2.1 Introduction 
At least since Aristotle’s time, there has been a general consensus among legal 
scholars that the law defined as an obligation backed by powerful state coercion can 
create and maintain social order, such as enforcing property rights, adjudicating 
disputes, and providing an efficient level of public goods through adequately 
collecting a variety of taxes. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that a 
well-functioning and impartial legal system largely enhances societal trust, thereby 
promoting trade and economic development (Algan and Cahuc, 2013; Guiso, et al., 
2008; Tabellini, 2008). Particularly in a standard contractual relationship, better 
enforcement, it is typically assumed, can increase the likelihood of contract 
performance by increasing the probability of the sanction and the cost of breach, 
naturally stimulating all manner of reliance investments that have specific value in the 
contractual relationship (Polinsky and Shavell, 2008).28 Nearly half of the world’s 
governments, however, fail to provide a sufficiently strong system of contract 
enforcement (Leeson and Williamson, 2009), and even abuse their authority to engage 
in profit-seeking punishment, which is detrimental to the country’s economic 
performance (Xiao, 2013). Therefore, it becomes of paramount importance to 
understand how people who lack the protection of an effective legal environment can 
establish private-order institutions (or norms) to facilitate mutually advantageous 
exchanges.  
In his influential anthropological field study on the cattle-control norms in rural 
Shasta County, California, Ellickson (1986, 1991) shows that social norms may work 
as effective mechanisms of social control. He argues that, when the social fabric is 
sufficiently dense and connected, social norms might supersede the legal rules, even if 
transaction costs are high – or precisely for that reason, as it is argued. Social norms 
have long been recognized as having great influence on individual behavior in social 
sciences, such as economics (Elster, 1989), sociology (Hechter and Opp, 2001), social 
psychology (Cialdini, et al., 1990; Schultz et al., 2007) and legal studies (Posner, 
1997; Posner and Rasmusen, 1999). Nonetheless, the definition of a social norm is 
still controversial. One can consider two different meanings of the concept of social 
norm: descriptive norm, and injunctive norm (Cialdini, et al., 2006). The former is 
often adopted by social scientists, and refers to what most people do, to the commonly 
observed behavior, in contrast to what deviants do. The latter, commonly adopted by 
philosophers, refers to what one ought to do in order to gain social approval and to be 
rewarded, or to avoid censure and informal punishment (Cooter, 1998).29 While 
Cooter (1998) places more emphasis on the second type of concept, Bicchieri’s (2006) 
                                                        
28 Introducing a third-party intervention into an investment game, Charness et al. (2008) reveal that the 
incentives (i.e. sanctions or rewards) implemented by an independent third-party significantly increase 
trust and trustworthiness in the investment game.!
29 Krupka and Weber (2013) empirically show that differences in injunctive norms – which they elicit 
by means of a novel approach based on incentivized coordination games – may explain the observed 
behavioral differences that emerge across several previous experimental dictator games. 
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formal definition of “social norm” encompasses both aspects, by stating that a 
behavioral rule is a social norm if (i) people are aware of rule existing and know that 
it applies to the situation under analysis (contingency condition), (ii) they expect that 
the others will conform to the rule (empirical expectations condition), and (iii) they 
believe others to think that people ought to obey the rule (normative expectations 
condition). It will soon become clear that the second condition is the one playing the 
most crucial role in our study. 
Anderlini and Terlizzese (2013) theoretically study the introduction of a social 
norm into a standard contractual relationship, by letting the promisor’s behavior be 
constrained by the average behavior of other promisors in a society. More specifically, 
in their model they represent a bilateral contractual relationship in the absence of 
contract enforcement as a one-shot binary trust game. Think for instance of an 
investor and an agent, strangers to each other. The investor lends some money to the 
agent, who makes an investment, and this investment generates a surplus proportional 
to the invested sum. The agent then decides whether to cheat and keep the entire 
surplus, or to share it with the investor. Cheating entails a cost, characterized by two 
components: one component is idiosyncratic and depends on the exogenously given 
“type” of the agent, while the second component is socially determined and common 
to all agents, and depends on the total number of transactions in a society that go 
through without cheating.30 Hence, the stronger the norm of trustworthiness in a 
society, the higher the cost of cheating for the agents. Anderlini and Terlizzese (2013) 
note that the norm-driven component of the cheating cost can be interpreted as 
reflecting psychological remorse when the agent’s action deviates from average 
behavior (Huang and Wu, 1994), or as resulting from a collective punishment 
mechanism, whose effectiveness depends on average behavior. Our experimental 
design adopts the second perspective, potentially inflicting a sanction on the dishonest 
agents. The introduction of this norm-driven component of the cost of cheating 
transforms the trust game into a coordination game with high-trust and low-trust 
equilibria, which are Pareto-ranked. 
Existing experimental evidence indicates that norms of trustworthiness may differ 
across societies (Buchan et al., 2002), and such a difference might affect individual 
behavior, inducing the emergence of one or other of the equilibria. The issue of how 
social norms emerge in societies, however, remains largely unexplored. Anderlini and 
Terlizzese (2013) assume that the “social sensitivity” to the norm-driven component 
of the cheating cost is exogenously given. In this study we take a further step, and 
investigate the effects of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment 
mechanism whose intensity is proportional to the strength of the norm of 
trustworthiness in society. More specifically, we investigate whether the adoption of 
such mechanism through majority voting can help a society in coordinating on an 
                                                        
30 Previous experimental studies have revealed that individuals involved in social dilemmas are 
heterogeneous in terms of social preferences (Blanco et al., 2011). Anderlini and Terlizzese (2013) 
assume that there are two types of agents, high-type and low-type agents, who differ in their preference 
for honesty and the magnitude of the psychological cost they suffer when abusing their partner’s trust. 
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efficient equilibrium, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness.31 
Starting from a simplified version of Anderlini and Terlizzese’s model, we 
theoretically show that most subjects, regardless of their preferences and expectations, 
vote in favor of the punishment mechanism, hence this mechanism will be 
endogenously introduced. As a consequence, a majority vote in favor of collective 
punishment cannot be interpreted as a signal of subjects’ intentions, and it should not 
matter whether collective punishment is exogenously imposed or endogenously 
adopted. This theoretical prediction contrasts with the findings of recent experimental 
studies, which revealed that the endogenous adoption of institutions induces higher 
cooperation levels in social dilemma situations, relative to the case in which the same 
institutions are exogenously implemented; scholars refer to this phenomenon as “the 
dividend of democracy” (Dal Bo et al., 2010; Markussen et al., 2014; Sutter et al., 
2010; Tyran and Feld, 2006).32 
The theoretical model informs our empirical analysis, which is based on a 
laboratory experiment. In our experiment, each subject plays three one-shot games 
with three different partners. The first game is a standard binary trust game. In the 
second game, a collective punishment mechanism is exogenously introduced, under 
which cheating is sanctioned with a severity that depends on the trustworthiness of the 
others. In the third part of the experiment they have to choose whether to play 
according to the rules of the first, or of the second game, by means of a majority 
voting mechanism. To reduce the risk of spillover effects, the outcomes of these three 
games are not revealed to the subjects until the end of the session. In half of the 
sessions the sequence of the first and the second game is reversed, to control for 
possible order effects. This design allows us to test whether subjects are willing to opt 
for having a collective punishment mechanism in place, and to study how the 
endogenous adoption of such mechanism affects individual beliefs and behavior.  
We report four main findings. First, in line with the model, we find that the 
introduction of collective punishment induces a significant increase in the levels of 
trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also of trust. Second, the endogenous 
introduction of the punishment mechanism by means of a majority-voting rule does 
not significantly change behavior, with respect to what is observed when the 
mechanism is exogenously imposed. Third, in contrast with our theoretical 
predictions, not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior 
induced by the introduction of collective punishment, and a majority of them vote 
against it. We also find that subjects with higher cognitive abilities and with a 
                                                        
31 In real world, we rarely observe that the norm is established through a voting mechanism. However, 
people in a community could publicly express their attitudes towards a specific norm (Kadens and 
Young, 2013). Therefore, we use the voting mechanism as a simple way to capture the essential 
dimension of the public expression of the norm. 
32 Vollan et al. (2013) replicate Tyran and Feld’s (2006) study using a sample of Chinese people. They 
observe that the cooperation rate is higher under an exogenously imposed institution than under a 
democratically selected rule. Their analyses show that this result is mainly driven by the fact that the 
Chinese culture attributes a high importance to obeying authorities. 
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background in statistics are more likely to vote in favor of the punishment mechanism. 
Finally, in an additional treatment, we provide information about the aggregate 
behavior with and without collective punishment; we find that on average this 
additional information does not increase the likelihood of the mechanism being 
adopted.  
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 discusses how our work relates to 
the existing literature. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and testable 
predictions, and describes the experimental design and procedures; Section 4 
illustrates the main results of the experiments; Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Related Literature 
Our paper builds upon a considerable number of studies on the effects of informal 
institutional arrangements on individual behavior in social dilemma situations, in the 
absence of a powerful state (Ostrom, 1990). A variety of decentralized governance 
institutions have emerged in remarkably diverse environments (Bernstein, 1992, 2001; 
Greif, 2006). 
In early trade, Greif (1989, 1993) portrays a well-defined and cohesive group 
based on Jewish religion and family origins in the Maghreb, the “Maghribi traders” 
who engage in long-distance, large-scale trading across the whole Muslim 
Mediterranean. Lacking effective legal institutions, these merchants rely on informal 
sanctions based on collective relationships within an exclusive coalition. Members of 
the Maghribi traders’ coalition always recruit agents from their own coalition, convey 
information about their agent’s misbehavior swiftly to other members, and 
collectively ostracize agents who abused their principal’s trust, thereby successfully 
resolving the problem of commitment in one-shot bilateral contractual relationships, 
even in the absence of binding contracts. Similar social sanction institutions also 
proved to work well in Mexican California before the time of the gold rush in 
1848-1949 (Clay, 1997; Clay and Wright, 2005) and in the practice of group lending 
in the developing countries (Besley and Coate, 1995). 
These anthropological studies on informal sanctioning institutions emphasize the 
role of information-sharing among the investors in regulating the agents’ behavior.33 
By contrast, our research adopts an alternative approach: in our set-up, in order to 
gain the investors’ trust, agents are allowed to adopt a collective punishment 
mechanism whose severity depends on the average behavior of all agents’ in the 
society. Therefore, the effectiveness of our mechanism relies on the agents’ and the 
investors’ beliefs, rather than on information-sharing. 
                                                        
33 In Kimbrough and Rubin (2015), subjects play the trust game under a highly anonymous set-up, 
where the investors only know the group identity of their agents. When the investors are allowed to 
share their transaction experience with other investors, the groups with high percentages of dishonest 
agents are collectively boycotted, which secures the high efficiency of the market.    
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Secondly, our paper is also related to the literature on expressive law (Cooter, 1998; 
McAdams, 2000a, 2000b; Posner, 1998, 2000). The classic “law and economics” 
approach focuses on deterrence: a law enforced by a sanction increases the expected 
costs of the illegal activity and thereby induces compliance (Becker, 1968; Polinsky 
and Shavell, 2000). Despite its success in many cases, this view can hardly explain 
why most people obey legal rules even in a situation where they could improve their 
material payoffs if they violate an obligation (Tyler, 1990). 
The expressive law theories provide several possible explanations. One potential 
reason is that the legitimate rules may influence individual preferences by letting 
people realize which behavior is legally prohibited. Another possible reason is that 
even though legal rules are mild, they may act as coordination devices that help 
people predict what others will do. Announcing an expressive legal rule that does not 
change the equilibrium is a form of “cheap talk”. Despite being “cheap”, some forms 
of talk, especially announced by a powerful authority or determined by a majority 
voting mechanism, have been found to actually coordinate individuals’ behavior in 
social dilemma situations.34 
These theories have increasingly gained momentum among theoretical scholars. 
However, only a handful of experimental studies have examined how mild rules 
actually influence individual behavior (Bohnet and Cooter, 2003; Galbiati and 
Vertova, 2008; McAdams and Nadler, 2005; Tyran and Feld, 2006). Our experimental 
study contributes to this literature in two aspects. First, the social sanction in our 
experiment is not always a deterrent but works only if the majority behaves honestly. 
Therefore, the socially shared beliefs are crucial to affect individual behavior. Second, 
instead of a powerful authority announcing the rule, the rule in our paper is 
determined by a voting mechanism, which enhances the legitimacy of the rule and 
may influence individual behavior through changing people’s preferences or 
coordinating their beliefs. Our study is also related to the experimental literature on 
the trust game with punishment (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; de Quervain et al., 2004; 
Vollan, 2011), however, it departs substantially from that strand of literature, in that 
the activation and size of the punishment in our case depends on the behavior of the 
society as a whole, and not on the individual decision of a trustor, who may sanction 
an untrustworthy trustee.  
A closer relation emerges between our work and the literature concerning the 
endogenous adoption of institutions. Recent experimental studies have revealed that 
an institution established endogenously (e.g. through a voting mechanism) can induce 
higher cooperation levels in social dilemma situations, compared to the same 
                                                        
34 In Kamei (2014), subjects are more likely to contribute to cooperation in the public good game when 
a mild sanction rule is collectively selected even without altering the equilibrium of full free riding. 
Unexpectedly, the author also finds that the positive effect of endogenous selection of the institution 
does not disappear even when subjects enter into an exogenous setting with an identical institution. 
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institution implemented exogenously on an otherwise identical group (Dal Bo et al., 
2010; Markussen et al., 2014; Sutter et al., 2010; Tyran and Feld, 2006).  
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to endogenous institution formation. 
Under the first approach, groups are fixed, and members of each group are asked to 
vote for a specific scheme or to choose one from a broad menu of schemes (Kosfeld 
et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). Previous experimental results indicate that the 
endogenous adoption of informal sanctioning (Tyran and Feld, 2006; Ertan et al., 
2009) or rewarding (Sutter et al., 2010) institutions largely enhances the levels of 
cooperation, relative to the case in which the same institutions are imposed 
exogenously. In addition, subjects tend to converge on the most efficient institutions 
as they gain experience over a course of multiple votes (Putterman et al., 2011).  
The second approach is the “voting by feet” mechanism in open communities 
(Gurerk et al., 2006, 2014; Fehr and Williams, 2013) where subjects can choose 
between different institutions and endogenously form groups with other members 
who also select the same institution. They find that prosocial individuals adopting 
efficient punishment institutions under endogenous selection quickly establish a 
cooperative culture. These institutions increasingly attract other types of subjects to 
migrate to these more cooperative groups and to comply with the prevailing norms. 
Therefore, endogenously chosen institutions induce the whole group to coordinate on 
high cooperation levels, so that in practice there is little or no need to recur to 
punishment. 
Most experimental papers on endogenous formation of institutions are based on the 
framework of public good games, except Dal Bo et al. (2010) who use a prisoner’s 
dilemma game. To the best of our knowledge, no existing empirical research 
addresses the effect of endogenous adoption of social sanction mechanisms on 
individual behavior in the trust game. Compared to the previous studies, our peculiar 
design, i.e. within-subject design without feedback across games, allows us to identify 
the important role of ex-ante beliefs of subjects in equilibrium selection. Furthermore, 
since subjects are exposed to the trust game with and without the collective 
punishment mechanism before voting for the preferred rule governing their 
interactions, we can investigate how different experiences of the effects of collective 
punishment affect individual’s voting behavior. Finally, in line with what argued by 
Markussen et al. (2014), that “the dividend of democracy” is driven by the signaling 
function of voting which promotes coordination on high-contribution outcomes, our 
design also allows us to test whether the endogenous adoption of the punishment 
mechanism could be taken as signal of the general willingness to coordinate on a high 
trust and high trustworthiness equilibrium. 
2.3 Materials and Methods 
In this section, we first present the theoretical model that informs our experimental 
design, and derive the predictions, which will be empirically tested in Section 4. Then 
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we describe the experimental design and procedures.  
2.3.1 Theoretical model 
As a baseline situation, we consider the binary investment (or trust) game depicted 
in Figure 2.1. Each player is initially given an endowment ! ! !. The first mover 
decides whether to trust the second mover or not. If she chooses not to trust her 
partner, both of them keep their endowments and leave the transaction. If instead she 
chooses to trust and transfers her endowment, the second mover efficiently invests the 
money he received, together with his own endowment, to generate a total of !"! !", 
with ! ! !. The second mover now has to choose whether to cheat on the first mover, 
and keep the entire amount leaving the first mover with nothing, or to split it equally 
with her, so that each party gets !! !. We further assume that, in the society, all 
players face equal chances of playing the game in the role of the first or second 
mover. 
Following the Anderlini and Terlizzese’s (2013) approach, we assume that there 
are two types of players in the society, “high” (H) and “low” (L).  H-type players 
have a preference for honesty and suffer a psychological cost !! ! ! when abusing 
their partner’s trust, and the idiosyncratic cost of cheating for the H-type players is so 
high that they will never cheat: !! ! ! ! !. L-type players instead are only interested 
in (expected) monetary payoffs (i.e. !! ! !), so they will always cheat when in the 
role of second movers. For simplicity, we also assume that players are risk neutral.  
 
Figure 2.1: the basic trust game. 
 
At the beginning of the stage game, all players are randomly assigned to the role of 
first or second mover, and matched in pairs. Players choose their strategy before 
knowing their role, and the strategy determines their action both as the first and as the 
second mover. Let p represent the proportion of H-type players in the society, which 
is assumed to be common knowledge. It is straightforward to verify that, regardless of 
his type, a player will trust as a first mover if ! ! !!!!. Let us denote this threshold !. 
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a).  A collective punishment mechanism 
Now consider the introduction of a collective punishment mechanism into the trust 
game, as depicted in Figure 2.2. In this new game, besides possibly suffering the 
psychological cost !!, the player who cheats faces the risk of being punished by his 
peers. This potential punishment !" depends on two elements: the strength z of the 
sanction implemented collectively by the players who do not cheat - which is 
exogenously given - and the fraction q of transactions in society where cheating does 
not take place. The behavior of the H-type players as second movers is not affected by 
the sanction, as they would never cheat, in any case. The behavior of the L-type 
players instead might change, as they may choose not to cheat either, if !! ! !!!! , 
where !! represents player i’s beliefs about q. Let us denote this second threshold !. 
 
Figure 2.2: the trust game with an exogenous collective punishment mechanism. 
 
 
In the following, we assume that ! ! ! ! ! ! !, which is consistent with the 
parameters we adopt in the experiment. If the proportion ! of H-types in society is 
larger than the threshold ! then in the game with collective punishment, any player i 
will never cheat as a second mover and will always trust as a first mover, regardless 
of his own type. If instead ! ! !, this game becomes a coordination game with two 
Pareto-ranked equilibria. In the low-efficiency equilibrium, L-type players cheat in 
the role of second mover, and nobody trusts as a first mover. In the high-efficiency 
equilibrium, instead, neither L-types nor H-types cheat as second movers, and 
everybody trusts as a first mover. There exists, however, the risk of miscoordination, 
as subjects cannot be certain of the strategy the others will adopt.  
Let !! be player i’s belief about the fraction of the other players who adopt the 
cooperative strategy (trust, do not cheat) in the trust game with a collective 
punishment mechanism. Then, we could obtain the belief !! about the total number 
of players who will not cheat, which depends on two elements: the proportion of 
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intrinsically trustworthy players !, and the belief!!!. !! ! ! ! !! ! !! !
To summarize, for any value of !, the introduction of a collective punishment 
mechanism does not decrease trustworthiness with respect to the baseline scenario, 
and might increase both trust and trustworthiness, if the proportion of H-types ! is 
high enough, or if a sufficiently high number of players have high beliefs !! about 
the fraction of the other players who adopt the cooperative strategy.35 
Hypothesis 1: In presence of a collective punishment mechanism, the levels of trust 
and trustworthiness are equal or higher than in the baseline scenario.  
b).  Endogenous adoption of the collective punishment mechanism 
We now consider the case in which, prior to playing the game (and before roles are 
assigned), players express their preference on whether to have or not a collective 
punishment mechanism in place. More specifically, we consider the case in which the 
implementation of the punishment mechanism is determined by a majority voting rule. 
The main question we would like to pursue is whether this mechanism can affect the 
beliefs qi, thus serving as a coordination device to drive the society towards the 
efficient equilibrium.  
Let us consider again the behavior of player ! in the game with a collective 
punishment mechanism in place. Depending on the player i's belief !! , we can 
envisage five possible cases based on the types of players. For the L-type, i.e. selfish 
players, there are three possible scenarios: 
(i.) !! ! ! ! ! ! !: the player chooses the strategy (do not trust, cheat); 
(ii.) ! ! !! ! ! ! !: the player chooses the strategy (do not trust, do not cheat); 
(iii.) !! ! !: the player chooses the strategy (trust, do not cheat).  
 
For the H-type, i.e. intrinsically trustworthy players, there are two possible 
scenarios: 
(iv.) !! ! !! ! !: the player chooses the strategy (do not trust, do not cheat); 
(v.) !! ! !! the player chooses the strategy (trust, do not cheat). 
However, these boil down to the first three scenarios, as (ii) and (iv) coincide, as 
well as (iii) and (v). Let us now calculate the player’s expected profit in the trust game 
with collective punishment, under these three alternative scenarios. Remember that in 
                                                        
35 An alternative, behavioral hypothesis is that the exogenous introduction of a punishment mechanism 
could crowd out intrinsic motivations for trustworthiness (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012; Fehr and 
Rockenbach, 2003). 
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the basic trust game, when ! ! ! ! ! !, player i’s expected profit is equal to !, no 
matter what, while if ! ! ! , then in the basic trust game player ! would trust as a 
first mover, and everyone else does the same. In this case his expected payoff depends 
on his type. 
Scenario (i). As a first mover, player ! will not trust, hence he will be sure to earn !. As a second mover he will earn ! if his partner does not trust, and !! ! !! ! !!! 
if his partner chooses to trust. Because !! is player i’s belief about the fraction of 
other players who adopt the cooperative strategy (trust, do not cheat), he will expect 
the former event to take place with probability !! !!, and the latter with probability !! . Hence, the expected profit a player can obtain in the game with collective 
punishment is: 
! !! ! !! ! ! !! ! !! !! ! !! ! !! ! !!! !! ! ! ! !!! ! ! !! ! !!!  
The expected profit above is greater than ! if !! ! !!!!! , which is true for every !! ! ! ! !!!! . Hence, a selfish player with belief ! ! ! will prefer to have the 
punishment mechanism in place. 
Scenario (ii). As a first mover, the player ! will not trust, hence he will be sure to 
earn !. As a second mover he will earn ! if his partner does not trust, which 
happens with probability !! !!, and ! ! ! if his partner chooses to trust, which 
happens with probability !!. Hence, the expected profit in the game with collective 
punishment is: 
! !! ! !! ! ! !! ! !! !! ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! !!! ! ! ! 
Hence, both a selfish player and an intrinsically trustworthy player with beliefs ! ! !! ! ! will prefer to have the collective punishment mechanism in place. 
Scenario (iii). As a first mover, player ! will trust, hence he will earn ! ! ! with 
probability !! and ! with probability !! !!. As a second mover he will earn ! if 
his partner does not trust, which happens with probability !! !!, and ! ! ! if his 
partner trusts, which happens with probability !!. Hence, the expected profit a player 
can obtain in the game with collective punishment is: 
! !! ! !! !! ! ! ! ! !! ! !! !! ! ! ! ! !! ! !! !!! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!! 
In this case, however, the expected payoff ! !! !in the basic trust game depends on 
player !’s type, and on whether ! ! ! . If ! ! ! ! !! then ! !! ! ! ! !! !!  
and player ! will vote in favor of the punishment mechanism. Indeed, the expected 
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profit in presence of collective punishment is grater than ! if !! ! ! ! ! !!! ! !, 
which holds for every !! ! ! ! !!!!. Hence, both a selfish player and an intrinsically 
trustworthy player with ! ! ! ! !! will prefer to have the punishment mechanism 
in place. 
If instead ! ! !, the preferences of H-type and L-type players will differ. If 
player ! is an H-type, in the basic trust game as a first mover he will trust, hence 
expecting to earn ! ! ! with probability ! and 0 with probability !! !. As a 
second mover he earns ! ! ! because all first movers should trust. Hence, the 
expected profit a player can obtain is: 
! !! ! !!! ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! !! !! ! ! !  
Consider also that if ! ! ! then !! ! !! ! ! for all players. Hence ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! : when ! ! !, H-type players will always vote in favor of collective 
punishment. 
By contrast, if player ! is an L-type, in the basic trust game as a first mover he 
will trust, hence he will earn ! ! ! with probability ! and 0 with probability !! !. 
As a second mover he earns !!! ! !! because all first movers should trust, and he 
will cheat. Hence, the expected profit a player can obtain is: 
! !! ! !!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!  
Hence, when ! ! !, L-type players will vote against collective punishment. 
Hypothesis 2: H-type players will always vote in favor of the introduction of a 
collective punishment mechanism; L-type players will also vote in favor of it, unless 
the proportion of H-types is sufficiently high to induce them to trust in the Baseline 
(! ! !). 
As a consequence, the collective punishment mechanism will always be adopted if ! ! !!!, which is the case in our experiment. Hence, we can state the following 
hypothesis on the effects of the vote on trust and trustworthiness.  
Hypothesis 3: a majority vote in favor of the collective punishment mechanism does 
not reveal anything on the distribution of types and beliefs, hence it should not affect 
trust and trustworthiness levels, as compared to those observed when the mechanism 
is exogenously introduced. 
2.3.2  Experimental design 
Our experimental treatments were based on variants of the binary-choice trust 
game (Bohnet et al., 2008) introduced in the previous section. We adopted a 
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within-subject design, in which each participant was exposed to three treatments: 
Baseline, Exogenous and Voting. At the beginning of the session each subject was 
assigned into a group of six. In each treatment, subjects were paired with one of their 
group's members, to play a one-shot game. Matching across treatments was done so to 
ensure that no two subjects would meet more than once.36 The group composition 
was kept constant during the whole session. 
 
Figure 2.3: the basic trust game, with the parameterization adopted in the Baseline 
treatment. 
 
 
In the Baseline treatment, subjects were asked to play the binary trust game (i.e. 
Baseline game), as parameterized and represented in Figure 2.3. We adopted the 
strategy method (Brandts and Charness, 2011): all subjects had to choose their action 
both as a first mover and as a second mover, before knowing which role they would 
actually be assigned. Once all subjects had made their two choices, roles were 
randomly assigned and subjects were matched in pairs. In each pair, payoffs were 
determined by the choice each of the two players had made for the role he was 
actually assigned. 
In the Exogenous treatment, the strategic environment, the information structure 
and the options subjects had to choose were the same as in the Baseline game but, 
here, a collective punishment mechanism was exogenously introduced, under which 
cheating was sanctioned and the severity depended upon the number of subjects in the 
group, who chose not to cheat as second movers (i.e. Exogenous game, see Figure 
2.4).37 
                                                        
36 With the exception of the Voting-IF treatment, as illustrated below. 
37 In order to be consistent with the theoretical model, in Figure 2.4 the size of the sanction (48*q) is 
expressed in terms of the fraction q of subjects who choose not to cheat, in a group of six. In fact, in the 
experimental instructions, we expressed that variable as a function (8*N) of the number N of 
trustworthy players (see Appendix 2). With the parameters adopted in our set up, we have that !=0.35 
and "=0.53. This implies that trusting is profitable even in the Baseline treatment, if the proportion of 
H-types in the society is higher than 0.53, while if this proportion is as high as 0.35, in the Exogenous 
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Figure 2.4: the trust game with an exogenously imposed collective punishment 
mechanism, with the parameterization adopted in the Exogenous treatment. 
 
After experiencing these two variations of the trust game, subjects entered the third 
treatment (Voting). At the beginning of this last treatment, before roles were assigned, 
subjects were asked to vote for implementing either the Baseline or the Exogenous 
game, then a majority voting mechanism determined which of the two variations of 
trust games would have been ultimately played within the group, in this final phase. 
Abstention was not allowed. Before playing this third trust game, subjects were 
informed of the number of their group members who voted in favor of either option.  
To reduce the risk of spillover effects, the outcomes of these three games were not 
revealed to the subjects, until the end of the session.38 In addition, to control for 
possible order effects, in four sessions subjects were exposed to the Baseline 
treatment first, then they played the Exogenous treatment and finally the Voting 
treatment, while in other four sessions the order of the first two treatments was 
reversed.39 
In order to examine whether having information about the aggregate behavior with 
and without collective punishment affected the individual voting behavior, in four of 
the sessions we introduced one additional treatment, after the Voting treatment. This 
treatment, denoted Voting-IF, was identical to the Voting treatment, with two 
exceptions. First, before voting subjects received information on the aggregate 
behavior of their group members in the Baseline and Exogenous treatments. More 
specifically, they were shown the number of subjects who chose either option, as a 
first and as a second mover, in each of the two treatments. Second, subjects were told 
that their partner might have been be the same person as in one of the previous three 
games. 
                                                                                                                                                               
treatment not cheating becomes more profitable than cheating. 
38 Each part of the instructions was distributed and read just before subjects started to play the 
corresponding game, which implies that subjects had no prior knowledge about the next part of the 
experiment. 
39 For more information on the treatments and sessions, please refer to Table A in the Appendix 1. 
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Since our experiment was relatively complex, to ensure full understanding of the 
instructions, subjects were asked to complete a comprehension quiz with calculations 
and questions before making decisions in each stage game (see Appendix 2). Subjects 
were rewarded with !0.40 for each question they answered correctly at the first try. 
There were six questions per treatment (no questions before the Voting-IF treatment), 
hence subjects could earn in total !7.20 for the comprehension quiz. 
At the end of the session, all subjects had to fill in a questionnaire including 
questions on their individual characteristics (gender, age, education, social status), 
general trust, risk attitudes, social preferences and cognitive abilities (see the 
Appendix 3 for the complete text of the questionnaire). These questions allowed us to 
study how personal characteristics may affect the voting behavior, as well as the 
impact of the endogenous/exogenous introduction of collective punishment on 
individual behavior. 
The experiment involved 96 subjects, divided in 8 sessions (see Table A in 
Appendix 1) and was conducted at the Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social 
Sciences (BLESS). Subjects were mostly undergraduate students at the University of 
Bologna, and were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). About 53 percent of the 
subjects were male; nobody took part in more than one session. The experiment was 
programmed and implemented using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For 
each session, after showing up to the lab at the pre-scheduled session time, the 12 
participants were randomly assigned to cubicles to avoid eye contact, and no 
communication was allowed during the experiment. The average session lasted about 
1 hour and 15 minutes. Subjects were paid privately in cash at the end of the session 
and earned on average 18.25 Euros, including the earnings from the comprehension 
quiz. No show-up fee was given.40 
2.4 Results 
In this section we carry out four steps of analysis. First, we juxtapose data from the 
Baseline and the Exogenous treatments, in order to analyze whether exogenously 
introducing collective punishment enhances the levels of trust and of trustworthiness 
in society. Second, we study subjects’ voting behavior, and test whether a majority of 
subjects vote in favor of collective punishment as predicted in our theoretical model. 
We also investigate who are the subjects who vote in favor of the punishment 
mechanism, and whether they differ from those who vote against it, along any 
significant dimension. Third, we examine whether the endogenous introduction of a 
collective punishment mechanism promotes efficiency by boosting trust and 
trustworthiness with respect to the case in which such a mechanism is exogenously 
                                                        
40 For each session we recruited 15 subjects, to take into account possible no-show-ups, but only 12 
students were randomly selected to participate in the experiments. Supernumerary subjects were paid 5 
Euros and had to leave before the session started. 
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imposed. We also study whether the endogenous choice not to adopt collective 
punishment depresses trust and trustworthiness, as predicted by our model. Finally, 
we examine whether the exposure to information about the aggregate behavior of 
their members in the Baseline and Exogenous treatments affects a subject’s decision 
to vote in favor of the punishment mechanism. 
2.4.1 Effects of collective punishment, when exogenously imposed 
The main difference between Baseline and Exogenous games lies in the way the 
payoff of the player in the role of a second mover (i.e. trustee) depends on the other 
trustees’ behavior, in case he chooses to abuse his partner’s trust. This manipulation 
has a direct effect on trustworthiness and only an indirect effect on trust, because the 
player in the role of a first mover (i.e. trustor) will change her behavior only if she 
expects collective punishment to have a (direct) effect on the others’ levels of 
trustworthiness. For this reason, we first present the results about trustees’ behavior 
and then illustrate trustors’ behavior. 
As shown in Figure 2.5, the fraction of the trustworthy actions is larger when the 
collective punishment mechanism is exogenously imposed. More specifically, only 
38.5% of subjects in the role of trustee reciprocate trust in the Baseline treatment 
while 82.3% of trustees in the Exogenous treatment behave trustworthily. The 
difference is strongly significant (p<0.001). If not specified otherwise, comparisons 
across treatments are performed by means of logit regressions, where the only 
explanatory variable is a treatment dummy, and standard errors are robust for 
clustering at the subject's level. Two-tailed z-tests using each subject as an 
independent observation always confirm the results. 
Figure 2.5: frequency of trustful and trustworthy choices in the Baseline and 
Exogenous treatments.  
 
Notes: One observation per subject, per treatment. The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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The impact of collective punishment on trustees' behavior emerges regardless of 
the order in which subjects are exposed to the Baseline and the Exogenous treatment, 
the level of trustworthiness being almost twice as high in the latter than in the former 
(p<0.001 in both cases, Table B in the Appendix 1). In addition, when we compare 
behavior across subjects, and focus exclusively on the first game played in each 
session, we observe that the difference in trustworthiness remains highly significant 
(p<0.001, Table B in the Appendix 1). 
Figure 2.5 also shows that the overall level of trust is higher in the Exogenous than 
in the Baseline treatment. Specifically, while the average level of trust in the Baseline 
game is 28.1%, it reaches 39.6% in the Exogenous game, and the difference is 
statistically significant (p=0.040). However, if we control for the order effect, we find 
that when Baseline is implemented first the exogenously imposed punishment 
mechanism does not significantly enhance the trust (p=0.784). Conversely, when the 
punishment mechanism is implemented first but removed afterwards, the level of trust 
drops dramatically (p=0.012, see Table C in Appendix 1). We can summarize our 
results as follows. 
Result 1: the presence of a collective punishment mechanism significantly increases 
trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also trust. 
2.4.2 Endogenous adoption of collective punishment 
Our theoretical model predicts that, in the Voting treatment, H-types would always 
vote in favor of the collective punishment mechanism, while L-types would vote 
against it only if the proportion of H-types in society is very high (Hypothesis 2). Our 
data reveal instead that only a minority of subjects (30.2%) vote in favor of the 
mechanism, and that subjects’ voting behavior does not seem to depend on their 
preferences or beliefs. This result does not depend on the order of the first two 
treatments: 29.2% of subjects vote in favor of the mechanism when the Baseline 
treatment is first played, while 31.2% opt for the punishment mechanism when 
subjects are first exposed to the Exogenous treatment, and the difference is not 
statistically significant (p=0.825). 
Since we adopt the strategy method in the experiment, for every subject we 
observe both choices (as a trustor and a trustee) in each treatment. By looking at 
subjects' behavior as trustees in the Baseline treatment, we can classify subjects as 
L-types and H-types: by definition, those who do not cheat in the Baseline are H-types. 
Information on the choice as first movers is also relevant in order to predict voting 
behavior. Indeed, according to our model, L-type players would vote against the 
introduction of the punishment mechanism only if they trust in the Baseline. Table 
2.1 reports the distribution of subjects, along these two dimensions. 
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Table 2.1: subjects' behavior in the Baseline treatment. 
 Trust in Baseline 
Reciprocate in Baseline Yes No Total 
Yes (H-type) 20.8% 17.7% 38.5% 
No (L-type) 7.3% 54.2% 61.5% 
Total 28.1% 71.9% 100.0% 
 
Table 2.1 reveals that, according to our predictions, only 7.3% of the subjects would 
have voted against the adoption of collective punishment, in the Voting treatment, 
while in our experiment this proportion was much higher. 
To better understand the source of this discrepancy between our results and the 
theoretical predictions, we now investigate the determinants of subjects' voting 
decision. First, we divide subjects into two categories, depending on their voting 
decisions: against collective punishment and pro-punishment. We find that these two 
categories of subjects have similar levels of trust and trustworthiness in the Baseline 
treatment, implying that there is no difference in the preferences or ex-ante beliefs 
between them (p=0.165 for the difference in trust level, and p=0.409 for the 
difference in trustworthiness level). P-values in this paragraph are obtained by means 
of logit regressions where the only explanatory variable is a dummy taking value one 
for subjects who voted in favor of the punishment mechanism in the Voting treatment, 
and with standard errors robust for clustering at the subject's level. Results are always 
confirmed by two-tailed z-tests using each subject as an independent observation. 
Figure 2.6: differences in trust between subjects who voted in favor and against 
collective punishment. 
 
Notes: One observation per subject, per treatment. The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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In the Exogenous treatment, as revealed in Figure 2.6, subjects who vote in favor of 
collective punishment are more likely to trust their partners than others (72.4% vs. 
25.4%, p<0.001). We also find that these pro-punishment subjects react more to the 
introduction of the punishment mechanism, i.e. they are more likely to increase their 
level of trust from the Baseline to the Exogenous game, as compared to the subjects 
who voted against the mechanism (p=0.002). 
Table 2.2: Logit regressions on the determinants of subjects' voting behavior. 
Dependent variable: Vote Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Trust-BL 0.126 
(0.109) 
 0.021 
(0.086) 
Trustworthiness-BL 0.022 
(0.106) 
 0.069 
(0.111) 
Trust-EX 
 
 0.342*** 
(0.054) 
0.334*** 
(0.033) 
Trustworthiness-EX 
 
 0.146 
(0.120) 
0.089 
(0.104) 
Controls No No Yes 
Number of Observations 96 96 96 
Notes: Marginal effects from logit regressions (Standard errors robust for clustering at the session level 
are reported in parentheses). Trust-BL (Trustworthiness-BL) equals 1 for subjects choosing to trust 
(reciprocate) in the Baseline treatment; Trust-EX (Trustworthiness-EX) equals 1 for subjects choosing 
to trust (reciprocate) in the Exogenous treatment; Controls indicates the presence of fourteen regressors, 
aimed at controlling for subjects' individual characteristics. These include all the variables listed in 
Table 2.3. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
To dig deeper into these differences, we run a series of logit regressions (Table 
2.2). The dependent variable indicates whether the subject voted in favor of collective 
punishment. In Model 1 we introduce subjects’ choices in the Baseline as explanatory 
variables, finding that subjects’ preferences and their ex-ante beliefs about others do 
not affect their voting behavior. In Model 2, we instead use their choices in the 
Exogenous treatment as explanatory variables. Our result shows that the probability 
that a subject votes in favor of collective punishment is 34.2% higher when she chose 
to trust in the Exogenous. This strongly significant difference reappears in the Model 
3 where we include all four choices of subjects in both the Baseline and Exogenous 
treatments, which suggests that only those who can anticipate the impact of collective 
punishment on others' trustworthiness, and react to it with a higher level of trust, are 
inclined to vote in favor of it. 
Result 2. Only about 30% of subjects vote in favor of the collective punishment 
mechanism, and the voting behavior does not depend on subjects' preferences and 
beliefs. 
Our next step is to explore the question of whether subjects’ individual 
characteristics affect their voting behavior. Table 2.3 reveals that subjects who vote 
in favor of the punishment mechanism have higher cognitive abilities than the others, 
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as supported by an ordered logit regression on the number of correct answers given to 
the three questions of the Cognitive Reflection Test. The result is confirmed if we 
look at the IQ test to measure subjects’ cognitive abilities, which also reveals that 
subjects who vote in favor of collective punishment are significantly more likely to 
answer correctly. Results in Table 2.3 also indicate that, although our experimental 
design is relatively complicated, subjects could answer most of the control questions 
correctly before playing the game and, on average, the subjects who voted against or 
in favor of the punishment mechanism could provide a similar number of right 
answers. This implies that all subjects could well understand the instructions, and that 
differences in the voting behavior are not driven by comprehension problems.  
Table 2.3: Individual characteristics and voting. 
Individual 
characteristics 
Against 
(N=67) 
In favor 
(N=29) 
Significance of the difference 
Male 49.3% 62.1%                p>0.1b 
Age 25.6 24.1                p=0.079a 
Higher education 67.2% 44.8%                p=0.049b 
CRT 1.1 1.6                p=0.093a 
IQ 1.2 1.7                p=0.002a 
Economics 50.7% 48.3%                p>0.1b 
Statistics 44.8% 58.6%                p>0.1b 
Game theory 28.4% 20.7%                p>0.1b 
Trust 17.9% 17.2%                p>0.1b 
Altruism 7.8 8                p>0.1a 
Risk aversion 5.8 5.2                p>0.1a 
RightAnswerBL 5.4 5.2                p>0.1a 
RightAnswerEXO 5.1 5.2                p>0.1a 
RightAnswerVOTE 5.6 5.6                p>0.1a 
Notes: Male is a dummy taking value 1 for males and 0 for females; Age indicates subjects’ age; 
Higher education equals 1 for those who have obtained at least a bachelor degree, and 0 otherwise; 
CRT ranges between 0 and 3 and is calculated by a three-item cognitive reflection test introduced by 
Frederick (2005); IQ ranges between 0 and 3 and is calculated by a three-item IQ test; Economics, 
Statistics, and Game theory are dummies taking value 1 for those who have taken at least one course in 
economics, statistics, or game theory, respectively; Trust equals 1 for those whose answer to the WVS 
on generalized trust is positive, and 0 otherwise; Altruism corresponds to our questionnaire-based 
measure of altruism; Risk aversion indicates subjects’ answer to the risk attitude question; 
RightAnswerBL, RightAnswerEXO, and RightAnswerVOTE indicate the number of the correct answers 
to the control questions in the Baseline, Exogenous, and Voting treatment, respectively. 
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
a Ordered logit regression, with standard errors robust for clustering at the subject's level. 
b Logit regression, with standard errors robust for clustering at the subject's level. 
Table 2.4 reports results from three logit regressions providing further support for 
this result. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value one for the subjects who 
voted in favor of collective punishment. Model 1, where the only explanatory variable 
is CRT, indicates that cognitive abilities measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test 
are not significantly correlated with subjects’ voting behavior. When we measure 
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cognitive abilities based on the IQ questions in Model 2, instead, we find that the 
probability of voting for the punishment mechanism is 24.2% larger among subjects 
with higher cognitive abilities relative to other subjects. In Model 3 we include as 
regressors three dummy variables meant to capture the academic background of the 
subjects. Results indicate that subjects who have some prior knowledge of statistics 
are more likely to vote in favor of the punishment mechanism. These significant 
results still hold in Model 4 where we introduce additional controls for individual 
characteristics (listed in Table 2.3) and for subjects' choices in the Baseline and 
Exogenous treatments (listed in Table 2.2). These regressions suggest that only 
subjects who have higher cognitive abilities, or have a background in statistics, are 
able to fully anticipate the consequences of the introduction of collective punishment, 
hence its profitability. 
 
Table 2.4: Voting behavior and individual characteristics 
Dependent variable: 
Vote  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CRT 0.076 
(0.048) 
  -0.003 
(0.041) 
IQ  0.242** 
(0.102) 
 0.176* 
(0.091) 
Economics 
 
  0.010 
(0.060) 
-0.076 
(0.092) 
Statistics 
 
  0.188*** 
(0.078) 
0.169* 
(0.086) 
Game theory   -0.124 
(0.067) 
-0.123 
(0.089) 
Trust-BL    0.021 
(0.086) 
Trustworthiness-BL    0.069 
(0.111) 
Trust-EX 
 
   0.334*** 
(0.033) 
Trustworthiness-EX 
 
   0.089 
(0.104) 
Controls  No No No Yes 
N. Obs. 96 96 96 96 
Notes: Marginal effects from logit regressions (standard errors robust for clustering at the session level 
are reported in parentheses). CRT ranges between 0 and 3 and is calculated by a three-item cognitive 
reflection test introduced by Frederick (2005); IQ ranges between 0 and 3 and is calculated by a 
three-item IQ test. Economics, Statistics, and Game theory are dummies taking value 1 for those who 
have taken at least one course in economics, statistics, or game theory, respectively; Controls indicates 
the presence of the remaining nine controls for individual characteristics (see Table 2.3).  
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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2.4.3 Effects of the endogenous adoption or rejection of the punishment mechanism 
The existing experimental literature on public good games has shown that there is 
a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that institutions endogenously chosen through 
voting can be more efficient than the same institutions being exogenously imposed on 
decision makers (Dal Bo et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2010). One possible reason is that 
voting for the deterrent (or non-deterrent) institutions that punish uncooperative 
subjects credibly signals an intention to establish a high level of cooperation and 
thereby induces other group members to do the same. Consequently, the voting 
mechanism promotes coordination on the efficient, cooperative outcome (Markussen 
et al., 2014). In this part, we investigate whether “the dividend of democracy” can 
also be observed in our setting. Specifically, we investigate whether the punishment 
mechanism, when endogenously chosen, could significantly increase the levels of 
trust and trustworthiness relative to the case in which it is exogenously imposed. 
Result 3. When subjects vote for (not) introducing collective punishment, the levels of 
trust and trustworthiness are not significantly different from the case in which 
collective punishment is exogenously (not) introduced.  
In our study, only three groups endogenously adopt the collective punishment 
mechanism, while the other thirteen groups play the baseline trust game in the Voting 
treatment. Consider the behavior of subjects in the role of trustee first. When the 
majority of the group members vote against the implementation of collective 
punishment, the average level of trustworthiness does not change substantially, 
decreasing from 34.6% to 33.3%, relative to the Baseline treatment. Similarly, in 
groups where collective punishment is endogenously adopted trustworthiness levels 
decreased from 100% to 94.4%, relative to the Exogenous treatment. Neither 
difference is statistically significant (p=0.318 for the former comparison, and p=0.225 
for the latter).  
Similar results emerge if we focus on trusting behavior: when subjects vote for not 
introducing the punishment mechanism, compared to the Baseline, the level of trust 
drops from 25.6% to 23.1%, while the fraction of trustful behavior remains stable at 
55.6% in groups where the collective punishment mechanism is determined by the 
majority voting mechanism. These two differences are also not statistically significant 
(p=0.286 for the former comparison, and p=0.190 for the latter). 
While “the dividend of democracy” has been often observed in previous 
experimental papers, our study fails to find any positive effect of the voting 
mechanism on the society’s ability to coordinate on an efficient outcome. Part of the 
reason is that the exogenously imposed punishment mechanism had induced a higher 
level of trust and trustworthiness among those who endogenously adopt it, hence there 
is little space for improvement. Another possible reason is that, when the mechanism 
is endogenously chosen, not all subjects positively react to it, but only those who 
voted in favor of it. 
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Indeed, we find that the three groups where the punishment mechanism was 
endogenously activated achieved a higher level of trustworthiness in the Exogenous 
treatment: the average level of trustworthiness is 100% in these three groups and 78.2% 
in the other thirteen groups, and the difference is significant (p<0.001). These three 
groups also exhibit higher levels of trust than other groups in the Exogenous treatment. 
The average level of trust is 55.6% in the three groups where the punishment 
mechanism is endogenously imposed and 35.9% in the other thirteen groups, and the 
difference is significant (p=0.009). In this paragraph, comparisons are based on logit 
regressions where the only explanatory variable is a dummy taking value one for 
subjects belonging to the three groups who adopted the collective punishment 
mechanism in the Voting treatment, and standard errors robust for clustering at the 
subject's level.  
In addition, within these three groups, we could not find that all subjects positively 
react to the collectively determined punishment mechanism. Our results suggest that 
the endogenously chosen mechanism makes those who prefer its activation act more 
trustfully, while other subjects who vote against collective punishment seem to be 
immune to it. In fact, when collective punishment is endogenously chosen, those who 
vote in favor of it increase their trust level from 70% to 80% respect to the Exogenous 
treatment, while others reduce their trust level from 37.5% to 25%. Due to the limited 
sample, however, we cannot detect whether these differences are statistically 
significant. 
2.4.4 Effects of information about others' behavior on voting 
We now turn to the question of whether feedback about the aggregate behavior in 
the group, with and without collective punishment, could help subjects understand the 
effectiveness of the punishment mechanism, thereby changing their voting behavior. 
In the last 4 experimental sessions, we added a fourth game, where subjects received 
information on the aggregate behavior of their group members in the Baseline and 
Exogenous treatments before deciding whether to vote for or against collective 
punishment (see Section 3).  
Result 4. Even though exposed to feedback about others' past behavior, the large 
majority of subjects do not change their vote. Only information about others’ trust 
levels in the Exogenous game positively affects a subjects' decision to vote in favor of 
the punishment mechanism. 
Among the 48 subjects who took part in these additional sessions, only 8 (i.e. 
16.7%) changed their vote after observing the aggregate information about the first 
two treatments. Of them, five subjects voted in favor of collective punishment in the 
Voting-IF treatment, and three voted against it. A logit regression indicates that there 
is no difference in the voting behavior between in the Voting and Voting-IF treatments 
(p=0.438). Only two groups endogenously adopted the collective punishment 
mechanism in the last treatment. To explore subjects' voting behavior in more depth, 
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we run two logit regressions, whose results are reported in Table 2.5. 
The dependent variable is a dummy taking value one when the subject voted in 
favor of collective punishment. N. Trust-BL (N. Trustworthiness-BL) indicates the 
number of the other group members who are trustful (trustworthy) in the Baseline 
treatment; N. Trust-EX (N. Trustworthiness-EX) indicates the number of the other 
group members who are trustful (trustworthy) in the Exogenous treatment; 
Pro-punishment Vote equals 1 if the subject voted in favor of the punishment 
mechanism in the third game. Model 1 shows that observing an additional trustful 
group member in the Exogenous game increased the probability of a subject voting 
for the punishment mechanism by 17.5%. It also highlights the high persistency of 
voting behavior: the probability that a subject votes in favor of the punishment 
mechanism in the Voting-IF treatment is 47.1% higher when s/he preferred to vote for 
the punishment mechanism rather than against it in the Voting treatment. In order to 
examine whether the subjects who voted in favor of the punishment mechanism in 
Voting are more sensitive to the feedback on others’ trust levels in the Exogenous, we 
include the interaction term into Model 2, finding that the pro-punishment subjects are 
not better than the others at using the aggregate information. To sum up, these results 
imply that the additional information could not help subjects to understand the 
effectiveness of the punishment mechanism, regardless of their voting behavior in the 
third game. 
 
Table 2.5: Voting behavior and feedback information. 
Dependent variable: Vote Model 1 Model 2 
N. Trust-BL -0.043 
(0.032) 
-0.043 
(0.032) 
N. Trustworthiness-BL 0.013 
(0.081) 
0.013 
(0.081) 
N. Trust-EX 
 
0.175** 
(0.072) 
0.166*** 
(0.070) 
N. Trustworthiness-EX  0.079 
(0.076) 
0.079 
(0.076) 
Pro-punishment Vote 0.471*** 
(0.105) 
0.424*** 
(0.095) 
N. Trust-EX ! Pro-punishment Vote  0.034 
(0.028) 
N. Obs. 48 48 
Notes: Marginal effects from logit regressions (standard errors robust for clustering at the session level 
are reported in parentheses).  
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 69 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we explore whether the endogenous adoption of a collective 
punishment mechanism can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, 
characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. We first introduce a 
theoretical analysis of the consequences of the introduction of a collective punishment 
mechanism, which largely builds upon Anderlini and Terlizzese’s (2013) work. We 
then design and run an experiment to empirically test the theoretical predictions we 
previously derived. 
We find that subjects exhibit significantly higher levels of trust and trustworthiness 
when a collective punishment mechanism is imposed exogenously. In contrast with 
the previous studies on the “dividend of democracy”, however, we fail to observe that 
the punishment mechanism induces higher level of cooperation when it is 
democratically chosen compared to the case in which it is exogenously activated. One 
potential explanation is that in most previous studies based on the public game the 
subjects could directly inflict punishment on low contributors to enforce the 
endogenously determined rule, or the punishment was fixed and determined ex-ante 
by the experimenter. By contrast, in our trust game, even when the social sanction 
rule is democratically introduced, the severity of punishment depends on the average 
behavior in society, which makes it more unpredictable from the subjects' perspective; 
hence a higher cognitive effort is necessary to anticipate how others will react to the 
rule, and to predict its overall effects on profits and welfare. Further experimental 
studies are needed to more precisely pin down the mechanisms driving these 
differences in results. 
Another important finding is that a majority of subjects vote against the collective 
punishment mechanism, even though from an ex post perspective it would have paid 
off, on average, to vote in favor of it. Previous experimental studies have shown that 
subjects are reluctant to choose a punishment institution when facing alternative 
options. In Sutter et al. (2010), subjects are allowed to vote for a voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM), an institution with reward possibility and an 
institution with punishment possibility. The authors report that under unanimous 
voting, the punishment option is rarely selected. A similar behavior pattern is also 
observed in Botelho et al. (2007). After having experienced both the VCM and the 
VCM with the punishment option, subjects decide to choose the governing institution 
for the final period. Botelho et al. (2007) find that in their experiment 77.8% of 
subjects vote against the punishment institution. One possible reason is that subjects 
may naturally dislike the punishment since it evokes negative feelings. To test 
whether opting against the sanction is mainly driven by a “natural aversion” to 
punishment, in future research we plan to run a follow-up experiment where we 
reframe the game without changing the incentives, and substitute penalties with 
rewards. Another potential explanation is that cognitive limitations may refrain 
subjects from anticipating the positive effect of the introduction of collective 
punishment. Putterman et al. (2011) find that intelligence predicts subjects’ votes on 
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efficient schemes when they are permitted to vote over a menu of sanction rules. Our 
study also confirms that subjects with high cognitive abilities are more likely to 
anticipate the effectiveness of collective punishment and therefore vote in favor of it.  
In an additional treatment, we investigate whether the information about the others' 
aggregate behavior with and without collective punishment affects subjects’ voting 
choices, finding that subjects hardly change their votes respect to the no-feedback 
condition. In Gurerk (2013), before a voting phase in which they choose among 
alternative institutions governing the public good provision, subjects are provided 
with the complete history of a punishment institution which was actually implemented 
in a previous experiment. The author finds that social information significantly 
induces more subjects to accept the punishment option and reach full contributions 
more quickly over time. Our study fails to replicate the positive effect of social 
information, a result which is in line with some previous studies, showing that a high 
percentage of subjects are reluctant to select a relatively efficient mechanism even 
when they are exposed to the complete information on subjects’ behavior under the 
alternative institutional regimes (Dal Bo et al., 2010; Gurerk, et al., 2006; Hilbe, et al., 
2014). One possible reason is that subjects may need repetition to fully understand the 
change in incentives introduced by the collective punishment mechanism, and its 
effects on others' behavior; we see this as an interesting route for future research. 
Another possible way of promoting the endogenous adoption of an 
efficiency-enhancing institution is group communication. Alm et al. (1999) 
investigate the effect of voting on a social norm of tax compliance by letting subjects 
vote via majority rule on different aspects of the fiscal system. They find that, without 
communication, subjects vote against an increase in the levels of sanction 
enforcement imposed on tax evaders. However, when subjects are allowed to 
communicate before voting, they are more likely to select a greater level of 
enforcement, achieving an overall increase in efficiency. Along these lines, we could 
also expand our set-up and examine the question of whether group communication 
before the voting phase facilitates the acceptance of the collective punishment 
institution. All this, however, is left for future research. 
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Supporting Information 
Appendix 1 
Table A: Treatments and sessions 
Session type Baseline-first Exogenous-first Baseline-first 
+Information 
Exogenous first 
+ Information 
Order  BL-EX-VT EX-BL-VT BL-EX-VT-VF EX-BL-VT-VF 
Session dates Dec. 03, 2013; 
Dec. 10, 2013 
Dec.12, 2013 March 20, 2014 
March 24, 2014 
March 20, 2014 
March 24, 2014 
N. Subjects 24 24 24 24 
 
N. Independent 
observations 
24 24 24 24 
Notes: In the table, BL stands for Baseline, EX for Exogenous, VT for Voting, and VF for Voting-IF. 
 
Table B: Order effects on trustworthiness 
 Trustworthiness (%) 
 1st Game  2nd Game 
BL-EXO-VOTE 43.8% <*** 77.1% 
 ?***  ?*** 
EXO-BL-VOTE 77.1% >*** 33.3% 
Notes: BL stands for Baseline treatment, EXO for Exogenous treatment, VOTE for Voting treatment. 
*** indicates the significance at 1% level based on a two-tailed z-test. 
 
Table C: Order effects on trust 
 Trust (%) 
 1st Game  2nd Game 
BL-EXO-VOTE 41.7% ~ 43.8% 
 ~  ?*** 
EXO-BL-VOTE 35.4% >*** 14.6% 
Notes: BL stands for Baseline treatment, EXO for Exogenous treatment, VOTE for Voting treatment. 
*** indicates the significance at 1% level based on a two-tailed z-test. 
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Appendix 2: Experimental instructions (Baseline first + Information) 
 
Welcome. This is a study on how people make decisions. In this study you can earn 
money based on how well you follow the instructions, and on the decisions made by 
you and by the other participants. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of 
the session. 
Please turn off your mobile phone. From this moment on, no form of communication 
among participants is allowed. If you have any question, or need assistance of any 
kind, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to help you.  
Please, follow the instructions carefully. In this study there are four parts, and for each 
part, we will distribute and read the corresponding instructions. In the first three parts, 
after having read the instructions, we will ask you to answer six questions, to verify 
your full understanding. For every question you answer correctly you earn !0.40. So 
you can earn up to !7.2 by answering correctly to all questions for Parts 1, 2 and 3 of 
the study. In addition you will earn money for the decisions you and the other 
participants will make in Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the study.  
Now, I will read instruction for Part 1. 
 
Instructions for Part 1 
In this part of the study, participants are randomly divided into groups of six. In each 
group, three participants will be assigned the role BLUE, while the other three will be 
RED, then the computer will form pairs of subjects belonging to the same group. If 
you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED player, and vice versa. Your 
counterpart will never know your true identity, nor will you know hers/his.  
Your earnings are expressed in tokens that will be converted in Euros at the rate of 1 
Euro for 3 tokens. 
BLUE has to make one choice: between option A and option B. RED has to make one 
choice: between option X and option Y. Table 1 summarizes the earnings 
corresponding to BLUE’s and RED’s choices.  
!"#$%&'(&%")*+*,-&+*&.")/&'&
BLUE chooses RED chooses Earnings 
A 
X BLUE: 0 RED: 30 
Y BLUE: 15 RED: 15 
B Irrelevant BLUE: 8 RED: 8 
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If BLUE chooses option A, earnings depend on the choice made by RED: 
• if RED chooses X, BLUE earns 0 tokens and RED earns 30 tokens; 
• if RED chooses Y, BLUE earns 15 tokens and RED earns 15 tokens. 
If BLUE chooses option B, the choice made by RED has no consequences on either 
BLUE’s or RED’s earnings:  
• BLUE earns 8 tokens and RED earns 8 tokens. 
We ask you to make a decision first as RED, then as BLUE. We will inform you of 
the role you are actually assigned in this Part only at the end of the session. 
If you are assigned the BLUE role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as BLUE, and on the choice made by your counterpart as RED. 
If you are assigned the RED role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as RED, and on the choice made by your counterpart as BLUE. 
You will be informed of the results of this Part only at the end of the session.   
We will now make an example. At the end of the example we will ask you to answer 
two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that you 
earn !0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose X, and 
confirm your choice. Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose 
B and confirm your choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. 
Please, give your answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
If you are not sure about the answer, you can re-read the instructions. Take your time 
and think carefully before answering the question. 
[As RED, you chose X and as BLUE you chose B. You are assigned the BLUE role, 
and your counterpart, who is assigned the RED role, chose Y.  
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
We will now make another example. At the end of the example we will ask you to 
answer two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that 
you earn !0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose X, and 
confirm your choice. Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose 
A and confirm your choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. 
Please, give your answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
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[As RED, you chose X and as BLUE you chose A. You are assigned the RED role, and 
your counterpart, who is assigned the BLUE role, chose A.  
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
You will now read on your screen the last two questions. Please, give your answers by 
pressing the corresponding buttons. 
• How much are 6 tokens worth, in Euros? 
• Will you know if you are RED or BLUE before making your choice? 
If you have any doubts on the instructions, please raise your hand now. Good, then we 
can start with Part 1. 
 
Instructions for Part 2 
In this part of the study, participants are in the same groups of six as in Part 1. In 
each group, three participants will be assigned the role BLUE, while the other three 
will be RED, then the computer will form pairs of subjects belonging to the same 
group. If you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED player, and vice versa. Your 
counterpart will never know your true identity, nor will you know hers/his. Your 
counterpart will NOT be the same person as in Part 1. 
Your earnings are expressed in tokens that will be converted in Euros at the rate of 1 
Euro for 3 tokens. You may also lose tokens. In the unlikely event your total earnings 
at the end of the study are negative, you may lose part of the money you earned by 
correctly answering the questions on the instructions. In any case, we guarantee you a 
minimum earning of !5 for your participation. 
BLUE has to make one choice: between option A and option B. RED has to make one 
choice: between option X and option Y. Table 2 summarizes the earnings 
corresponding to BLUE’s and RED’s choices. Earnings for RED may depend on the 
choices made by the other five members of the group. 
!"#$%&'(&%")*+*,-&+*&.")/&'&
BLUE chooses RED chooses Earnings 
A 
X 
BLUE: 0 
RED: 30 – 8 x number of others who choose Y 
Y 
BLUE: 15 
RED: 15 
B Irrelevant 
BLUE: 8 
RED: 8 
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If BLUE chooses option A, earnings depend on the choice made by RED: 
• if RED chooses X, BLUE earns 0 tokens. Earnings for RED depend on the choices 
made as RED by the other five members of the group. Notice that all members of 
your group make decisions both as RED and as BLUE, before knowing the role they 
are actually assigned.  
o If 0 of the others chooses Y, RED will get 30 tokens. 
o If 1 of others chooses Y, RED will get 22 tokens. 
o If 2 of others choose Y, RED will get 14 tokens. 
o If 3 of others choose Y, RED will get 6 tokens. 
o If 4 of others choose Y, RED will lose 2 tokens. 
o If 5 of others choose Y, RED will lose 10 tokens. 
• if RED chooses Y, BLUE earns 15 tokens and RED earns 15 tokens. 
If BLUE chooses option B, the choice made by RED has no consequences on either 
BLUE’s or RED’s earnings:  
• BLUE earns 8 tokens and RED earns 8 tokens. 
We ask you to make a decision first as RED, then as BLUE. We will inform you of 
the role you are actually assigned in this Part only at the end of the session. 
If you are assigned the BLUE role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as BLUE, and on the choice made by your counterpart as RED. 
If you are assigned the RED role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as RED, on the choice made by your counterpart as BLUE, and on 
the choices made as RED by each of the other five members of your group. 
You will be informed of the results of this Part only at the end of the session.  
We will now make an example. At the end of the example we will ask you to answer 
two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that you 
earn !0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose Y, and 
confirm your choice. Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose 
B and confirm your choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. 
Please, give your answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
If you are not sure about the answer, you can re-read the instructions. Take your time 
and think carefully before answering the question. 
[As RED, you chose Y and as BLUE you chose B. You are assigned the BLUE role, 
and your counterpart, who is assigned the RED role, chose X. Two of the other 
members of your group chose Y as RED.  
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• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
We will now make another example. At the end of the example we will ask you to 
answer two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that 
you earn !0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose X, and 
confirm your choice. Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose 
A and confirm your choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. 
Please, give your answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
[As RED, you chose X and as BLUE you chose A. You are assigned the RED role, and 
your counterpart, who is assigned the BLUE role, chose A. Four of the other members 
of your group chose Y as RED.  
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
You will now read on your screen the last two questions. Please, give your answers by 
pressing the corresponding buttons. 
• Can your counterpart in Part 2 be the same person as in Part 1? 
• How many people are there in each group? 
If you have any doubts on the instructions, please raise your hand now. Good, then we 
can start with Part 2. 
 
Instructions for Part 3 
In this part of the study, participants are in the same groups of six as in Parts 1 and 
2. In each group, three participants will be assigned the role BLUE, while the other 
three will be RED, then the computer will form pairs of subjects belonging to the 
same group. If you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED player, and vice versa. 
Your counterpart will never know your true identity, nor will you know hers/his. Your 
counterpart will NOT be the same person as in Part 1 or in Part 2. 
In Part 3, you will be asked to take 3 decisions. First you will have vote in favor of 
either Situation 1, or Situation 2. Then you will have to make a choice as RED and as 
BLUE, as in Parts 1 and 2. 
Situation 1 is the situation you faced in Part 1 of this study, represented in Table 3. 
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!"#$%&'(&)*+,"+*-./&
BLUE chooses RED chooses Earnings 
A 
X 
BLUE: 0 
RED: 30 
Y 
BLUE: 15 
RED: 15 
B Irrelevant 
BLUE: 8 
RED: 8 
 
Situation 2 is the situation you faced in Part 2 of this study, represented in Table 4. 
!"#$%&0(&)*+,"+*-.&1&
BLUE chooses RED chooses Earnings 
A 
X 
BLUE: 0 
RED: 30 – 8 x number of others who choose Y 
Y 
BLUE: 15 
RED: 15 
B Irrelevant 
BLUE: 8 
RED: 8 
When all participants have casted their vote, you will be informed of how many of 
your group’s members voted for Situation 1, of how many of your group’s members 
voted for Situation 2, and of the outcome of the vote. 
If the majority of the members of your group vote for Situation 1, then the rules for 
the rest of this Part will be the same as in Part 1. If instead the majority of the 
members in your group vote for Situation 2, then the rules for the rest of this Part will 
be the same as in Part 2. If in your group three members vote in favor of Situation 1, 
and three members vote in favor of Situation 2, then the outcome will be randomly 
determined by the computer. 
We ask you to make a decision first as RED, then as BLUE. We will inform you of 
the role you are actually assigned only at the end of the session. 
If you are assigned the BLUE role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as BLUE, and on the choice made by your counterpart as RED. 
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If you are assigned the RED role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as RED, and on the choice made by your counterpart as BLUE. In 
case in your group the outcome of the vote is Situation 2, earnings for RED may also 
depend on the choices made as RED by each of the other five members of your group. 
You will be informed of the results of this Part only at the end of the session. 
We will now make an example. At the end of the example we will ask you to answer 
two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that you 
earn !0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to vote either for Situation 1 or for Situation 2. 
Please, vote for Situation 2, and confirm your choice. 
You can now see on your screen that the majority of your group members voted for 
Situation 1. Hence, the rules for the rest of this Part will be the same as in Part 1.  
You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose Y, and confirm your choice. 
Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose B and confirm your 
choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. Please, give your 
answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
If you are not sure about the answer, you can re-read the instructions. Take your time 
and think carefully before answering the question. 
[Situation 1 has been selected. As RED, you chose Y and as BLUE you chose B. You 
are assigned the BLUE role, and your counterpart, who is assigned the RED role, 
chose X. Four of the other members of your group chose Y as RED. 
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
We will now make another example. At the end of the example we will ask you to 
answer two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that 
you earn !0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to vote either for Situation 1 or for Situation 2. 
Please, vote for Situation 1, and confirm your choice. 
You can now see on your screen that the majority of your group members voted for 
Situation 2. Hence, the rules for the rest of this Part will be the same as in Part 2.  
You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose X, and confirm your choice. 
Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose A and confirm your 
choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. Please, give your 
answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.   
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[Situation 2 has been selected. As RED, you chose X and as BLUE you chose A. You 
are assigned the RED role, and your counterpart, who is assigned the BLUE role, 
chose A. Two of the other members of your group chose Y as RED. 
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
You will now read on your screen the last two questions. Please, give your answers by 
pressing the corresponding buttons. 
• Can your counterpart in Part 3 be the same person as in Part 1 or Part 2? 
• If four members of your group vote for Situation 1 and two members of your group 
vote for Situation 2, in Part 3 your group will play according to the rules adopted in 
Part 1 of the study. True or False? 
  
If you have any doubts on the instructions, please raise your hand now. Good, then we 
can start with Part 3. 
 
Instructions for Part 4 
In this part of the study, participants are in the same groups of six as in Parts 1, 2 
and 3. In each group, three participants will be assigned the role BLUE, while the 
other three will be RED, then the computer will form pairs of subjects belonging to 
the same group. If you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED player, and vice 
versa. Your counterpart will never know your true identity, nor will you know 
hers/his. Your counterpart may be the same person as in Part 1, Part 2 or in Part 3. 
Rules for Part 4 are the same as for Part 3: you will be asked to take 3 decisions. First 
you will have vote in favor of either Situation 1, or Situation 2. Then you will have to 
make a choice as RED and as BLUE, as in Parts 1, 2 and 3. Differently from Part 3, 
in Part 4, before making your decisions, you will receive information on the choices 
that you and your group members made in Parts 1, and 2. 
At the end of this Part, you will receive information on the outcome of Parts 1, 2 
3 and 4 of the study. You will know the role you have been assigned in each Part, 
and the earnings you obtained. 
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Appendix 3  
Questionnaire 
We kindly ask you to complete this questionnaire. The answers you give will not 
affect in any way your earnings. Some of these questions refer to personal 
information, which will help us in this study. Your identity will not be revealed under 
any circumstances in the presentation of the results.  
Please answer carefully. Once an answer is given, you can no longer change it.  
Press OK to begin. Thank you.  
1. Were the instructions you have received for today's activities clear? 
(1) No, not at all (2) No, not so much (3) Yes, enough (4) Yes, very much 
2. Gender (press the corresponding button)  
(1) Male (2) Female 
3. Age (please, give your answer using the slider below and press ok to confirm) 
4. Were you born in Italy? 
(1) Yes   (2) No 
5. Education background 
(1) Middle high school (2) High school    (3) Bachelor degree 
(4) Master degree  (5) Ph.D. or postgraduate degree (6) Other 
6. Occupation 
(1) Student  (2) Self-employed worker (3) Employee  (4) Retired 
(5) Jobless  (6) Others 
6.1 Field of studies (this question is accessed only if the subject gives answer (1) to 
question 6) 
(1) Social sciences   (2) Mathematical, Physical and Natural sciences  
(3) Engineering and Architecture (4) Medicine 
(5) Literature and Philosophy  (6) Others 
7. Have you attended courses in Economics? 
(1) Yes   (2) No 
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8. Have you attended courses in Statistics? 
(1) Yes   (2) No 
9. Have you attended courses in Game Theory? 
(1) Yes   (2) No 
10. Have you previously participated as a volunteer in other researches?  
(choose one or more answers) 
(1) Yes, in the field of economics 
(2) Yes, in the field of psychology 
(3) Yes, in the field of medicine or biology 
(4) No 
11. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 
(1) Most people can be trusted (2) Can’t be too careful (3) No idea 
12. Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to 
avoid taking risk? 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “unwilling to take risks” and 
the value 10 means: “fully prepared to take risk” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
13. In general, do you think it is important to help others, and take care of their well 
being?  
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “not important at all” and the 
value 10 means: “Maximally important” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
14. Which of these diagrams represents the relationship between Orange-Citrus 
Fruit-Fruit? Please select an answer and click OK to confirm. 
 
15.  Select the element that completes the following series.  
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Please select an answer and click OK to confirm. 
 
16. A bat and a ball cost $ 1.10 in total. The bat costs $ 1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
17. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? 
18. In a pond, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire pond, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half of the pond? 
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Chapter 3 
Who Are More Naïve? High or Low Trustors 
 
 
 
Huojun Sun, Yefeng Chen 
 
 
 
 
Abstract.  Whether trustful people are more or less sensitive than skeptical ones to 
cues on others’ trustworthiness is an open question, which only recently attracted 
scholar’s attention. We investigate this issue by means of a trust game experiment in 
which subjects repeatedly face opponents belonging to a high- or a 
low-trustworthiness group. We find that high and low trustors are equally able to 
distinguish which group is more trustworthy, and to condition their trust accordingly. 
However, when subjects can choose whether or not to receive information on the 
outcome of their own past interactions, high trustors learn whom to trust or distrust 
faster. Our interpretation is that they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive 
emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby are more keen to acquire 
useful information about their partner’s behavior.   
 
Key words: False Consensus Effect, Predict Trustworthiness, Betrayal Aversion 
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3.1  Introduction 
 
  While trust in general is crucial to a country’s economic success, high-trustors – or 
individuals with a high level of generalized trust – are often seen as gullible and naïve 
Pollyannas. People seem to believe that high-trustors tend to overestimate their 
partner’s trustworthiness based on incomplete information and have a bias in 
processing the trustworthiness-related information. Using data from the European 
Social Survey, Butler et al. (2012) find that people tend to be subject to “the false 
consensus effect”,41 and to form beliefs on others’ trustworthiness based on their own. 
In particular, highly trustworthy individuals think others are like them and easily tend 
to form beliefs that are too optimistic, which induces them to trust more than they 
should and thereby be often cheated. A further experimental study (Butler et al., 
forthcoming) confirms this evidence, suggesting that subjects playing repeated trust 
games (Berg et al., 1995) tend to extrapolate their opponent’s preferences from their 
own and that subjects keep holding their initial trust beliefs even after several rounds 
of play, implying that high-trustors who hold overly-optimistic default expectation of 
others’ trustworthiness fail to calibrate it through learning.    
 
  Contrary to Butler et al.’s findings, a series of experiments implemented by 
Yamagishi and his co-authors show that, instead of being gullible, high-trustors are 
more sensitive to information that potentially reveals others’ trustworthiness or 
untrustworthiness (Kosugi and Yamagishi, 1998; Kakiuchi and Yamagishi, 1997; 
Yamagishi and Kakiuchi, 2000) and that high-trustors predict others’ trustworthiness 
more accurately than low-trustors (Kikuchi, Watanabe, and Yamagishi, 1997). In 
agreement with Yamagishi’s experimental evidence, Sturgis et al. (2010) find that 
standard measures of intelligence at age 10-11 can explain variability in generalized 
trust in early middle age, even after controlling for a large number of socio-economic 
variables, based on data from two British birth cohort studies. This research is 
replicated by at least three empirical studies using different sources of data. In 
particular, Carl and Billari (2014) find a strong association between generalized trust 
and intelligence in the U.S., Hooghe et al. (2012) find one in the Netherlands, and 
Oskarsson et al. (2012) find one in Sweden.  
 
  Yamagishi (2001) theorizes that generalized trust is a form of social intelligence – 
“the ability to understand [one’s] own and other people’s internal states and use that 
understanding in social situations” (Yamagishi, 2011; p.125), which is distinct from 
standard measures of intelligence (IQ, for instance). He then presents two potential 
explanations for a positive relationship between generalized trust and social 
intelligence. In the first hypothesis, he assumes that social intelligence is inherently 
heterogeneous between individuals in a society. Those who are socially intelligent can 
                                                        
41 In Ross et al. (1977), the false consensus effect is defined as a cognitive bias whereby a person tends 
to overestimate how the extent to which his or her beliefs or opinions are shared by other people. For a 
detailed discussion, see Engelmann and Strobel (2000).  
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afford to expect that most people are trustworthy since they are highly sensitive to 
untrustworthiness cues, while socially unintelligent people who are less sensitive are 
better off assuming that unknown others are generally untrustworthy. His second 
hypothesis is that high-trustors tend to take more social risks and are, therefore, more 
vulnerable to exploitation, which pushes them to invest cognitive resources in 
cultivating social intelligence for detecting others’ trustworthiness. After acquiring 
social intelligence to discern others’ trustworthiness, they can afford to have a high 
level of generalized trust. In contrast, those who have not made such cognitive 
investments are slow in detecting the cues of untrustworthiness in their partners and 
thus are frequently betrayed in trust relations. The frequent experience of misplaced 
trust can lead to a progressive withdrawal from potentially fruitful, but risky 
interactions. As a result, they will be trapped in an “equilibrium of mistrust”, thereby 
maintaining low default expectations of the trustworthiness of others.                
 
  This study examines how individuals with different degrees of generalized trust 
determine whom to interact with and whom to avoid, when they don’t have 
information on others’ individual reputation, they cannot rely on the incentives arising 
from repeated interactions, and there are no contractual mechanisms to deter 
opportunism. Are high-trustors naïve and credulous as suggested by Butler and his 
coauthors? Conversely, as argued by Yamagishi, are high-trustors more sensitive than 
low-trustors to information that predicts whether those with whom they interact are 
trustworthy, which in turn supports them to maintain high default expectations of 
others’ trustworthiness? We conduct experiments to test these two competing theories 
and further to identify the underlying mechanism that generates the behavioral 
difference between high- and low-trustors.   
 
  We first elicit subjects’ generalized trust by means of a set of non-incentivized 
attitudinal questions, and on the basis of their answers we classify them as 
high-trustors and low-trustors. Then we let subjects play a binary-choice trust game 
repeatedly (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Bohnet, et al. 2010). For each session, 
initially, all of 20 subjects are asked to play the role of trustee and their decisions are 
elicited using the strategy method42. Inspired by Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012), 
unbeknown to subjects, we let a computer randomly divide these trustees into two 
groups. Specifically, in one of the groups (group A) at least 50% of subjects choose to 
reciprocate if trusted by their partners while in the other group (group B) the 
percentage of trustworthy trustees is less than 50%. Then, all of 20 subjects are asked 
to play the game in the role of trustor for 20 periods and for each period, each trustor 
is matched with one trustee randomly picked, either from group A or B. The 
innovation in our experiment is that we vary the feedback subjects receive on their 
partner’s behavior across treatments. In the Baseline treatment, after having decided 
whether to trust or not, subjects always receive information on the action taken by 
                                                        
42 In experimental studies, there are two different methods of eliciting decisions: one is the 
direct-response method, in which subjects make decisions whenever it is their time to do so; the other 
is the strategy method, in which subjects make contingent decisions for all nodes at which they may 
have to play. For a survey of these two experimental methods, see Brandts and Charness (2011). 
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their partner, i.e. regardless of their own choice, they always know ex post whether 
trusting would have been profitable. In the Free Endogenous Feedback treatment, 
subjects are allowed to decide whether to acquire feedback about their partner’s 
action after they decide whether to trust. In the Contingent Feedback treatment, 
subjects get to know their partner’ choice only if they decide to trust him. In all these 
three treatments, before choosing whether to trust or not, subjects are told whether 
their current opponent belongs to group A or B, but they don’t know which of the 
groups contains a higher proportion of trustworthy people. In the Ex-ante Feedback 
treatment, instead, trustors are told whether their partner belongs to the high or low 
trustworthiness group, before making their choice.       
 
  This setup allows us to test Butler et al.’s (forthcoming) hypothesis, that subjects’ 
trusting behavior is persistently influenced by their own trustworthiness and is 
insensitive to feedback revealing the distribution of the trustworthiness of trustees. In 
addition, our experimental design also allows us to consider Yamagishi’s theory and 
examine three possible reasons why high-trustors are better than low-trustors at 
predicting others’ trustworthiness. First, according to Yamagishi’s first hypothesis, 
since high-trustors are more socially intelligent than low-trustors, even if receiving 
the same type of information as in the Baseline or in the Ex-ante Feedback treatments, 
they may be better at processing information about the reliability of their partners. As 
a result, high-trustors are more likely than low-trustors to recognize reliable partners 
in the transactions. Second, a growing body of research indicates that the decision to 
trust is deeply influenced by betrayal aversion, that is, the anticipated aversive 
emotions connected to possible betrayal or exploitation of one’s own trust by another 
person (Aimone and Houser, 2012, 2013; Aimone et al., forthcoming; Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008). People with higher levels of emotional 
intelligence – one type of social intelligence (Grewal and Salovey, 2005) – are shown 
to manage their emotions more successfully and adapt their behavior in response to 
others’ cooperativeness more quickly in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
(Fernandez-Berrocal et al., 2014). We expect that high-trustors may be better than 
low-trustors at regulating the anticipated aversive emotions and thereby be more 
willing to acquire feedback about their partners when information acquisition must be 
intentional. As a result, they should be better at judging the trustworthiness of others 
in the Free Endogenous Feedback treatment. Third, according to Yamagishi’s 
cognitive investments hypothesis, in order to develop skills to distinguish trustworthy 
from untrustworthy partners, high-trustors engage in collecting more differentiating 
social data and learning more relative to low-trustors. Consequently, more trusting 
behavior will be observed among high-trustors when subjects are allowed to obtain 
feedback only if they chose to trust (i.e. Contingent Feedback treatment). 
 
  We report three main findings. First, in line with Butler et al.’s (forthcoming) 
theory, we show that when no ex-ante feedback is provided, subjects’ initial trusting 
behavior in the game is significantly correlated with their trustworthiness level. When 
decomposing data based on subject-types, we find that the consensus effect is only 
 91 
observed among those who are classified as low-trustors on the basis of their 
questionnaire answers to the trust questions. Second, the consensus effect disappears 
very quickly, as evident by that fact that both high- and low-trustors are able to 
identify the low- and high-trustworthiness groups and to condition their behavior on 
the group of their current opponent. Finally, compared to their counterparts, 
high-trustors are better at predicting others’ trustworthiness only because they are less 
susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and 
thereby are keener to acquire information about others’ actions.    
         
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 lays out the related 
literature; Section 3.3 describes our experimental design and procedures; Section 3.4 
reports the main results of the experiment; Section 3.5 concludes with legal policy 
implications.  
 
 
3.2  Related Literature 
 
  Economic life is dominated by encounters with strangers, and market participants 
need to distinguish trustworthy from opportunistic partners in their transactions. To 
secure the mutually advantageous transactions, people may be capable of reading 
their partner’s nonverbal cues of reciprocating intentions, which is highly related to 
the literature on “green beard effect” (Dawkins, 1976; Frank, 1988, 2005; West and 
Gardner, 2010). According to the perspective of the “green beard effect”, altruists 
typically have observable characteristics (e.g., a green beard) that distinguish them 
from non-altruists, and other altruists, who also have this unique feature, can 
recognize them and treat them preferentially. In recent behavioral studies, target 
subjects are usually allowed to play a computer-mediated one-shot Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game for real money, and their pictures are taken at the very moment of 
decision-making. Among these pictures, the “standard” pictures that are equated for 
background, brilliance and luminance, and more or less equal in size are randomly 
selected and presented to observers (Yamagishi, et al. 2003; Verplaetse, et al. 2007). 
These studies reveal that observers can accurately discriminate non-cooperative 
pictures from cooperative ones based on their quick nonverbal impressions.  
 
  Frank et al. (1993) and Brosig (2002) give subjects opportunities to communicate 
with their partners in a separate room for a certain time period ranging from 10 to 30 
minutes before playing a one-shot two-person prisoner’s dilemma game and ask them 
to predict their opponent’s decisions. As a result, they find that subjects are able to 
predict their partner’s play with an accuracy rate above chance. Stated differentially, 
Frank et al. (1993) find an accuracy of 11 percentage points above chance and Brosig 
(2002) 8 percentage points above chance. Moreover, a similar study has also revealed 
that, after watching a TV show on prisoner’s dilemma games, female subjects who are 
substantially more cooperative are better at identifying cooperators in the real games 
(Belot, et al. 2012). 
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  The most common paradigm to test the readability of nonverbal cues on 
trustworthiness is the standard trust game (Berg, et al. 1995). Using the trust game 
experiments, several studies have demonstrated a causal effect of facial cues (male 
facial width, for instance) on trusting behavior, with subjects investing significantly 
more real money in partners with trustworthy-looking faces who, normally, are less 
likely to abuse trust (van’t Wout and Sanfey, 2008; Stirrat and Perrett, 2010).  
 
  In the real world, in order to predict trustworthiness correctly, people rely not only 
on physical cues from their partners, but also on prior social experience of social 
interactions, including positive or negative experience. Previous studies have shown 
that initial social knowledge of moral character (Delgado, et al. 2005; Mikolajczak, et 
al. 2010), prior direct experience with partners (Fareri, et al. 2012), or a behavioral 
history of partners (Rezlescu, et al. 2012) can influence subjects’ capability of 
predicting trustworthiness. In our study we exclusively focus on the role of the 
feedback that subjects receive about their partner’s behavior, which varies across 
treatments, and examine how subjects with different degrees of generalized trust learn, 
trial by trail, through positive or negative feedback about their partner’s 
trustworthiness. Therefore, our paper complements the studies of the “green beard 
effect” that mainly concentrate on the effect of physical cues on predicting 
trustworthiness.  
 
  The second literature branch to which our paper contributes is the study of dynamic 
trust learning. To examine whether subjects can correctly recognize trustworthy 
partners over time, Phan and his colleagues (Sripada et al. 2009, 2013; Phan et al., 
2010) randomly assign three types of opponent (20 trials with each type) to subjects 
and ask them to play repeated trust games with their opponents. Specifically, all 
active subjects in the lab are assigned to play the role of trustor, and told that they will 
be playing with other players who have previously participated in the same game as 
counterparts (i.e. trustees) and whose responses were previously recorded and now 
serve as counterparts’ “reactions” to their decisions - this particular setting leaves no 
space for trustors to manipulate the beliefs of their partner by strategic actions. In 
addition, subjects are also told that they will play with three types of counterparts who 
were classified based on their previously recorded actions as: (1) type 1: “tend to split 
the money more than 50% of the time”; (2) type 2: “tend to split the money about 
50%”; and (3) type 3: “tend to split the money less than 50% of the time”. 
Unbeknown to the subjects, however, they actually play with the computer-simulated 
agent with different preprogrammed strategies. Once subjects choose their decision, 
regardless of their choosing to invest or keep the money, feedback about their 
partner’s pre-recorded choice is provided immediately to the subjects. The authors 
find that subjects are able to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy partners, and 
that learning occurs rapidly, with differential investing based on partner type observed 
on average by the fifth trial, and stabilizing thereafter.  
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  Van den Bos et al. (2011) take a further step to examine who are the subjects who 
are able to learn whom to trust or distrust more rapidly. They employ a similar 
experimental design used by Phan et al. (2010),43 where three age groups, namely 
late childhood, mid-adolescence and young adulthood, are recruited to play repeated 
trust games with predetermined three-type trustees. It is revealed that subjects of all 
age groups perceive the three types of partners differing significantly in their 
trustworthiness, and increasingly trust the most trustworthy partner the most and the 
least trustworthy the least, suggesting that subjects of all ages are able to learn to trust 
and distrust their partner based on the feedback they received. In addition, it also finds 
that adults and adolescents adapt their levels of trust in response to others’ 
trustworthiness more quickly than children do.44  
 
  Our paper complements these studies of dynamic trust learning and mainly 
examines the capability differences in predicting trustworthiness between high- and 
low-trustors. However, in contrast to the previous studies, particularly to the studies 
based on the framework of Phan et al. (2010), our experimental design allows us to 
achieve progress in two methodological issues. Firstly, in previous studies, in order to 
obtain three different types of trustees - a particular situation that may not arise 
naturally with high probability, researchers deliberately deceive the participant with 
regards to the partner with whom he or she is matched. While some kinds of 
deception are acceptable in psychological studies especially when the experiment 
itself really requires that subjects’ behavior in the lab situation to resemble the 
behavior they might display in the real-world situation, experimental economists 
believe that researchers should not employ deception in the design of experiments, 
because deception could evoke suspicion and mistrust among participants, which may 
dramatically change their behavior in experiments, and even in future experiments 
(Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Jamison, et al. 2008; for a thorough review, see 
Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002). Instead, in our repeated trust game setting described 
above, we successfully create two types of trustees (i.e. low- and high-trustworthiness 
groups) without deceiving the subjects. 
 
  Secondly, in the framework of Phan et al. (2010), trustors are always informed 
about the decision of their partner immediately after they have to decide whether or 
not to trust that person. Based on this artificial non-contingent feedback, all types of 
trustors (different age groups, for example) are able to learn quickly about their 
partner’s trustworthiness, and adapt their behavior accordingly. We extend the 
previous setting to cover another situation where trustors receive their partner’s 
                                                        
43 There are two main differences in experimental design between these two studies: contrary to Phan 
et al. (2010), the subjects in Van den Bos et al. (2011) are told that the other player makes his or her 
decision through an Internet connection in real time but in reality the choice is made by the computer 
program and is displayed after a variable delay 2-4 seconds; secondly, photographs of partners of the 
same age and gender are presented to the subjects.     
44 A series of experiments conducted by Fett and her coauthors show that subjects with low capability 
of metalizing such as children, or people with psychosis, are less sensitive to signals that reveal others’ 
trustworthiness or untrustworthiness (Fett et al., 2014a, 2014b; Gromann et al., 2013).     
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feedback only when they decide to trust their partners, a more realistic phenomenon 
that better matches real world situations (Fetchenhauer and Dunning, 2010), and 
examine whether this new condition induces more significant behavioral differences 
in trust learning between high- and low-trustors. Since the informative feedback 
facilitates trustors to adapt their behavior, it is important to note that trustors have an 
incentive to make more trusting decisions in the initial periods of the game to 
maximize the informativeness of the feedback. Recently, a neuroimaging study 
(Krueger, et al. 2007) has revealed that a high activation in the paracingulate cortex 
(PcC), a brain region frequently implicated in conflict monitoring and cognitive 
control in social interactions (Baumgartner, et al. 2008), is observed among 
sophisticated trustors when exploiting trusting strategies more often in the initial 
stages of the trust game, then it gradually diminishes with experience, reflecting the 
behavior of the sophisticated trustors who stabilize their trusting strategies in later 
stages while the opposite pattern is observed among unsophisticated trustors. 
Therefore, we expect that, in our contingent feedback condition, more trusting 
behavior will be observed among high-trustors in the initial periods, which makes 
them learn to trust or distrust their partners more quickly.  
 
 
3.3  Experimental Design 
 
  Our experiment consists of four main parts, which are depicted in Figure 3.1. We 
will first describe the trust game (part III), which represents the core of our 
experiment. Then we will illustrate the other three parts, in detail. 
3.3.1 Trust Game 
  The trust game involved a trustor who had to decide whether to trust the trustee. If 
the trustor chose not to trust the trustee, both got 10 Yuan. If the trustor chose to trust, 
the trustee had to decide whether to reciprocate. When the trustee reciprocated, both 
got 15 Yuan; otherwise, the trustor got 8 Yuan while the trustee got 22 Yuan (see 
Figure 3.2).45 
 
 
 Fig. 3.1 The main experimental parts 
                                                        
45 In our paper, the payoff structure of the trust game replicates Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and 
Bohnet et al. (2008, 2010). The instructions use neutral framing. 
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Fig. 3.2 The binary choice trust game 
  We implemented the trust game in two stages. In the first stage, all subjects played 
in the role of trustee, and were asked to decide whether to reciprocate or not, in case 
their opponent chose to trust (i.e. the strategy method).46,47 After all the trustees had 
made their decisions, unbeknownst to them, the computer randomly formed two 
groups, according to the pre-programmed assignment rule (see Appendix 3). In group 
A, more than 50% of subjects chose to reciprocate, while in group B much less than 
50% chose to reciprocate.48 
  In the second stage, subjects were asked to play the trust game in the role of trustor 
for 20 periods. Before making their decisions, they were told that the computer had 
randomly formed two groups of trustees based on the choices made in the previous 
stage: in one of the groups, at least 50% of the people chose to honor trust, while in 
the other group, much less than 50% of the people behaved trustworthily. For each 
period, each trustor was randomly matched with one trustee picked from one of the 
groups above. Subjects were also told that a period would be randomly selected. This 
would be used to determine the payments for themselves at this stage and for their 
partner in the previous stage. At the beginning of the period, subjects were told 
whether their opponent belonged to group A or to group B, and in all but the Ex-ante 
                                                        
46 Although the strategy method has been shown to decrease the trustees’ trustworthiness in the trust 
game, it produces similar trusting behavior compared to the direct-response method (Casari and Cason, 
2009). In our paper, we mainly focus on the trustors’ behavior, therefore, using the strategy method 
will not weaken our results.     
47 Similarly to Guillen and Ji (2011), subjects in our non-standard ordering setting were neither given 
information about their partners nor told that all subjects would act as trustor in the next part of the 
experiment. Our results on the levels of trustworthiness do not qualitatively differ from previous 
studies using the strategy method in a standard ordering.  
48 Note that it would have been impossible to form two groups of equal size. For each session, the final 
assignment of trustees is presented in Appendix 4. 
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Feedback treatment they did not know which of the two groups was characterized by 
higher frequency of trustworthy people.  
  In order to identify which factor exactly makes high-trustors adapt their behavior in 
response to others’ trustworthiness (or untrustworthiness) more quickly than do 
low-trustors, four different treatments were implemented at this stage (see Table 3.1).  
 
 
   Table 3.1 
   Treatments and sessions 
Treatment  Baseline Ex-ante  
Feedback 
Contingent 
Feedback 
Free 
Endogenous 
Feedback 
Feedback 
acquisition 
Unconditional Unconditional Conditional Intentional 
Ex-ante 
information 
No Yes No No 
Session 01/05/2013; 
01/06/2013 
01/05/2013; 
01/06/2013 
01/05/2013; 
01/06/2013 
01/05/2013; 
01/06/2013 
Subjects 40 40 40 40 
Independent  
observations 
40 40 40 40 
Notes: Sessions conducted in January 2013. In the table, “Feedback acquisition” indicates 
that, for each period, subjects are unconditionally (or conditionally) informed of the 
feedback from their partners; “Ex-ante information” indicates whether subjects are exposed 
to ex-ante information about the trustee groups before making their decision.  
 
 
  In the Baseline treatment, for each period, subjects were allowed to observe the 
actual decision of their opponent immediately after they decided whether or not to 
trust, i.e. they received the feedback from their opponent regardless of their own 
choice. This treatment allows us to test one possible reason high-trustors are better 
than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness, i.e. they process the 
trustworthiness-related information more quickly and effectively when receiving the 
same type of information.  
Hypothesis 1: even if they receive the same type of information, high-trustors learn to 
trust or distrust their partners more quickly than do low-trustors.  
  In the Baseline condition, as subjects did not have any information about the 
trustworthiness of their potential partners at the beginning, they had to learn by trial 
and error. In many instances, however, people may have had prior social experience 
with potential partners who may have been colleagues, relatives, or business partners. 
 97 
These experiences coded by initial social knowledge (Delgado et al., 2005), or prior 
direct experience (Fareri et al., 2012) can influence decisions about whether to trust. 
In the Ex-ante Feedback treatment, for each period, besides receiving feedback about 
their opponent’s choice unconditionally, trustors were also told whether their 
opponent belonged to the high or to low trustworthiness group, before making their 
first decision. Previous experimental studies have shown that subjects are very 
sensitive to the feedback that is consistent with their prior social impressions (Fareri 
et al., 2012; Li et al., 2011). It implies that unbiased aggregate information could 
speed up the subjects’ abilities to learn how to identify people who are trustworthy 
and thereby weaken high-trustors possibly relative advantage in processing the 
decentralized information on others’ trustworthiness. 
Hypothesis 2: when they receive aggregate information on the degree of reliability of 
the trustee, high-trustors and low-trustors behave similarly. 
 
  In the Contingent Feedback treatment, the setting was the same in the Baseline 
except that, for each period, subjects were informed of the choice made by their 
partner only when they had decided to trust that person. This condition allows us to 
test Yamagishi’s cognitive investments hypothesis, i.e. high-trustors are better at 
detecting reliable partners because they deliberately trust more in the initial periods 
and thus collect more information about their partners. If no significant difference in 
trusting behavior between high- and low-trustors emerges in the Baseline condition 
but a difference emerges here, a possible conclusion is that high-trustors are better at 
predicting trustworthiness because they acquire more information through more 
trusting, but not because they are better at processing this information.  
 
Hypothesis 3: when feedback is contingent on trusting, high-trustors trust more than 
low-trustors do. 
  
  In the Free Endogenous Feedback treatment, the setting was the same in the 
Baseline except that, for each period, subjects could always receive feedback on their 
partner’s choice regardless of their trusting behavior, but the information acquisition 
had to be intentional. The design of this condition is motivated by a series of recent 
behavioral studies suggesting that subtle psychological factors, such as betrayal or 
regret aversion, may modulate people’s trusting behavior (Aimone and Houser, 2012? 
Behnet et al. 2008; Fetchenhauer and Dunning, 2010).49 Moreover, in order to elicit 
the maximal possibility of betrayal or regret aversion, we adopted the “opt-in” rather 
than “opt-out” as a default option (Dana et al. 2007; Larson and Capra, 2009; 
Grossman, 2010). This condition allows us to test another possible reason 
high-trustors are better than low-trustors at detecting reliable partners, i.e. they are 
                                                        
49 Normally, when people trust another person and that person betrays their trust, they become 
painfully aware of that betrayal, and this “betrayal aversion” leads many trustors to avoid risk more 
when a person, rather than nature, determines the outcome of uncertainty; and at the same time, if 
people distrust another person and that person is actually a trustworthy person, trustors expect to feel 
regret and avoid knowing that person’s choice. 
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keener to acquire information about others’ behavior. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: when feedback is endogenous, high-trustors ask for feedback more 
often than low-trustors.  
 
  At the very end of the trust game, in all but the Ex-ante Feedback treatment, we 
invited all subjects in the session to guess which of the two groups contained the 
higher proportion of trustworthy people. Subjects who answered correctly would be 
paid 10 Yuan as a monetary reward. This task helps us examine whether subjects 
could correctly recognize the high-trustworthiness group after several learning 
periods.   
3.3.2 Questionnaire 
  At the beginning of each session, subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire 
detailing individual characteristics (gender, age, background, etc.) and measuring 
individual risk attitudes, time preferences, social preferences, and trust beliefs (see 
Appendix 1). In this study, we followed the literature to classify subjects into two 
categories (i.e. high- and low-trustors) based on their questionnaire answers to the 
trust questions (Carter and Weber, 2010; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). If 
subjects played the trust game before the questionnaire, their answers to the trust 
questions may be highly susceptible to the experience in the game, which weakened 
the reliability of the subject classification. Therefore, we chose to have the 
questionnaire before the trust game. In addition, to avoid demand effect and to obtain 
reliable trust beliefs, we introduced many questions into the questionnaire to 
deemphasize the questions on trust.  
 
   
  The most frequently used measure of trust beliefs is taken from the General Social 
Survey (GSS) /World Values Survey (WVS). Both surveys assess trust using the 
following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The survey 
respondents can answer in a binary way to this question by agreeing either with “Most 
people can be trusted” or with “Can’t be too careful.” This trust measure has been 
widely criticized by many social science scholars pointing out that a risk-averse 
person may share the view that “Most people can be trusted”, while at the same time 
risk aversion may induce this person to say “Can’t be too careful” because this person 
engages in avoiding small probability risks that have large payoff consequences 
(Miller and Mitamura, 2003; Fehr, 2009). To avoid the possible ambiguity, in our 
study we adopted “one-dimensional” questions on trust (i.e. from question 25 to 
question 30 in the questionnaire) developed by Yamagishi and his colleagues 
(Yamagishi et al. 1998; Yamagishi and Kosugi, 1999; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 
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1994),50 because this new questionnaire has been demonstrated as a more reliable 
instrument for the measurement of trust beliefs and has achieved highly predictive 
validity in several contexts (Carter and Weber, 2010).  
 
3.3.3 Lottery Game 
  After the questionnaire, subjects were asked to play a lottery game, which helps us 
measure subjects’ risk attitudes. Clearly, the decision to trust a stranger entails a risk. 
Uncertainty regarding a potential trustee’s prosocial preference is the source of risk. 
This raises the important concern over whether the decision to trust a social partner is 
influenced by one’s general attitude toward risk (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Houser 
et al., 2010; Schechter, 2007). In order to control for differences in risk attitudes 
between high- and low-trustors, we therefore implement this lottery game. 
  The game is similar to Holt and Laury’s (2002), which offers subjects a series of 
pair-wise lotteries of both safe and risky options presented in Figure 3.3. Take 
Decision 1 for example: if subjects choose Option A, they receive 10 Yuan; if they 
choose Option B, the risky option, they have a 10% chance of winning 25 Yuan and a 
90% chance of winning nothing. In this lottery game, the safe option does not change, 
but the expected payoff for the risky option increases as we move down the table. 
 
Fig. 3.3: Lottery game 
                                                        
50 The 6-item questionnaire with general statements to measure subjects’ beliefs about honesty and 
trustworthiness of others (see Appendix 1) is the English translation of Yamagishi and Kosugi’s (1999) 
Trust Belief Scale, which we copy from Carter and Weber (2010). 
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  Subjects were asked to choose either Option A or Option B for each decision. After 
they made all of their decisions, the computer would randomly choose one of the 
decisions. For this selected decision, if subjects chose Option A, they got 10 Yuan; if 
subjects chose Option B, another random draw by the computer determined the payoff 
of the subjects in this part.    
3.3.4 Bayesian Updating Game 
  At the end of the trust game, all subjects were asked to play a Bayesian updating 
game (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995). Since subjects in the trust game encountered 
different opponents, as they observed new feedback, they would update their beliefs 
about others’ trustworthiness. The heterogeneity in Bayesian updating abilities may 
induce subjects to perform differently in judging others’ trustworthiness. The 
Bayesian updating game allows us to take into account the possibility that 
high-trustors are better than low-trustors at processing the statistical information in 
general, which in turn makes them predict others’ trustworthiness more accurately.   
 
  Subjects were asked to play the game for 20 periods. Before playing the game, they 
saw two “bingo cages”, labeled as cage A and cage B. They were informed that both 
cages contained six balls, but that the composition was different. In cage A, there 
were four Red balls (R) and two Green balls (G) while in cage B, there were three 
Red balls (R) and three Green balls (G). 
 
  At the beginning of each period, the computer randomly drew two integer numbers 
to determine which of the cages was selected for the following task. The computer 
first randomly drew an integer number from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, then drew 
another number that could be 2, 3, or 4, with equal probability. The first drawn 
number was not revealed to subjects while the second drawn number was announced 
publicly. If the first drawn number was smaller or equal to the second drawn number, 
cage A was selected, otherwise cage B was selected.  
 
  Once cage A (or cage B) was selected, six draws from this cage were performed 
(the ball being replaced each time), and the result (GGRRGG, for instance) was 
displayed on the subjects’ computer screen. Subjects were then asked to guess which 
cage was used to generate the observed result. They did not receive any feedback 
about the correctness of each guess until the end of the last period. The subject who 
achieved the highest score was paid 200 Yuan at the end of the experiment. If more 
than one subjects got the same highest score, they shared 200 Yuan.  
 
Hypothesis 5: high-trustors are better at Bayesian learning than low-trustors.  
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3.3.5 Experimental Procedure 
  The experiment involved 160 subjects, divided in 8 sessions and was conducted at 
the Social Science Experimental Center (SSEC) of Zhejiang University, China. 
Subjects were mostly undergraduate students at Zhejiang University, and were 
recruited through posters on university campus noticeboards. About 48 percent of the 
subjects were male; nobody took part in more than one session. The experiment was 
programmed and implemented using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For 
each session, after showing up at the lab at the pre-scheduled session time, the 20 
subjects were randomly assigned to a cubicle to avoid eye contact, and no 
communication was allowed during the experiment. The instructions were distributed 
separately before each part of the experiment and were read aloud by the 
experimenter. Subjects’ questions, if any, were answered by the experimenter in 
private. To make sure that all subjects understood the instructions correctly, they had 
to complete a comprehension quiz with calculations and questions before making 
decisions in each part. The average session lasted about 1.5 hours. Subjects were paid 
privately in cash at the end of the session and earned on average 60 Yuan (i.e. nearly 
7 Euros), including the show-up fee of 10 Yuan.51 
 
3.4  Experimental Results 
 
  This section reports the main results. In Section 4.1 we provide aggregate data to 
gain a general description of the experiment, and then examine the reliability of the 
data. In Section 4.2 we mainly focus on individuals’ trusting behavior in repeated 
trust games to test the competing theories in our setting: first, we examine whether 
subjects’ trusting behavior is persistently influenced by their own trustworthiness and 
is immune to feedback about their partners, which is the main implication of Butler et 
al.’s (2012, forth.) hypothesis; then we study whether and under which conditions 
high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness 
(Hypothesis 1-4). In Section 4.3 we juxtapose data from the questionnaire, the lottery 
game, the trust game and the Bayesian updating game to study whether there is a 
difference between high-trustors and low-trustors in terms of individual 
characteristics, and in particular, whether high-trustors are better than low-trustors at 
Bayesian updating (Hypothesis 5). 
 
3.4.1 General Information 
 
  We begin by giving an overview of findings about the distributions of subject types 
across treatments. Following Yamagishi’s approach, we first construct a trust score by 
averaging each subject’s questionnaire answers to the trust questions, and then divide 
                                                        
51To take into account possible no-show-ups, we recruited more than 20 students for each session. Only 
20 students were randomly selected to participate in the experiment, and supernumerary students were 
paid 20 Yuan and had to leave before the session started.  
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our subjects into two categories at the median trust score: those whose score is equal 
or above the median are labeled “H-types” (i.e. high-trustors), while the remaining 
subjects are labeled “L-types” (i.e. low-trustors). As shown in Table 3.2, the 
percentage of H-types ranges between 45% (in the Contingent Feedback treatment) 
and 65% (in the Ex-ante or Free-endogenous Feedback treatment), and no significant 
differences emerge across treatments (p=0.22, chi-square test with three degrees of 
freedom). On average 58.8% of subjects are categorized as H-types in our whole 
dataset. 
 
  We then analyze the data from the trust game and report the findings about the 
average trustworthiness across the treatments. The percentage of trustworthiness 
ranges between 22.5% (in Baseline treatment) and 37.5% (in Free-endogenous 
Feedback treatment) and no significant differences emerge across treatments (p=0.53, 
chi-square test with three degrees of freedom). On average, nearly 30% of the subjects 
in our sessions are willing to honor trust if trusted by their partners. Our results 
regarding our subjects’ trustworthiness levels are similar to those reported by Bohnet 
et al. (2010) who use the same payoff structure for the trust game. There is also no 
significant difference in trustworthiness between H-types and L-types (p=0.14, 
chi-square test with one degree of freedom), with 24.24% of H-types and 35.11% of 
L-types reciprocating trust.  
 
  In the trust game, when assigned the role of trustor, subjects trust their partner with 
about 41% frequency in the Baseline treatment, while more trusting behavior is found 
in the other three treatments. Especially in the Contingent Feedback treatment, 74% 
trust is observed, which seems to imply that trustors are engaging in learning their 
partners’ types through trusting more. Decomposing the trusting behavior based on 
the partner groups, we find that more than 50% trust is given to the “good” group (i.e. 
group A) for all treatments. Particularly in the Contingent Feedback treatment, when 
facing the opponent from the “good” group, subjects choose to trust about 96% 
chance. Similar trust levels are also observed in the Ex-ante Feedback treatment 
where subjects already knew which group was the “good” group. When analyzing the 
trust towards the “bad” group (i.e. group B), different behavior patterns are found 
between unconditional and conditional feedback treatments. In the Baseline and 
Ex-ante Feedback treatments, less than 30% trust is shown towards the “bad” group. 
However, in the Contingent Feedback and Free Endogenous Feedback treatments 
where obtaining feedback depends on subjects’ further steps, nearly twice as much 
trusting behavior is observed. 
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     Table 3.2  
     Average level of main variables     
 
Baseline 
 
Ex-ante  
Feedback  
Contingent 
Feedback  
Free 
Endogenous 
Feedback  
H-type (%) 60% 45% 65% 65% 
Trustworthiness 
(%) 
22.5% 32.5% 30% 37.5% 
Trust (%) 40.9% 52.4% 74% 63.8% 
Trust towards 
“good” group 
(%) 
75.3% 90.8% 95.8% 86.5% 
Trust towards 
“bad” group (%) 
26.5% 22.6% 58% 43.3% 
Notes: The percentage of H-type subjects is calculated using the data from the 
questionnaire while the percentage of the other four variables is calculated 
using the data from the trust game. 
 
 
  To ensure the reliability of the data, we check whether subjects acquired the 
information about the composition of the two groups from others who had played the 
game in the previous sessions. More specifically, we test whether the level of trust 
towards group A is significantly higher than towards group B in the first period, when 
they have no information on the levels of trustworthiness of the two groups’ 
members.  
 
   Table 3.3  
   Testing the possibility of information exchange 
Session Treatment 
# 
Observations 
in group A 
#Observations   
in group B 
Statistical 
Significance  
1 Baseline Ng=4 Nb=16 p=0.025** 
2 
Contingent 
Feedback 
Ng=8 Nb=12  p=0.209 
3 Ex-ante Feedback Ng =10 Nb=10  p=0.068* 
4 
Endogenous 
Feedback 
Ng =10 Nb=10  p=0.531 
5 Ex-ante Feedback Ng =8 Nb=12  p=0.001*** 
6 
Endogenous 
Feedback 
Ng =9 Nb=11  p=0.413 
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7 Baseline Ng =9 Nb=11  p=0.095* 
8 
Contingent 
Feedback 
Ng =9 Nb=11  p=0.881 
Notes: Our null hypothesis is that subjects cannot distinguish group A from group 
B in the first period of the trust game. Ng indicates the observations in group A 
while Nb indicates the observations in group B. p-values reported in the last 
column are from a two-tailed chi-square test. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  As shown in Table 3.3, only in session 1 and session 5, the p-values indicate a 
significant relationship between trust and the type of partner group, and in session 3 
and session 7, this relationship is weakly significant. Since subjects in session 3 and 5 
(i.e. the Ex-ante Feedback treatment) have been told that in group A at least 50% of 
the trustees chose to reciprocate trust while in group B less than 50% did, it is not 
surprising to find that subjects can distinguish these two groups even in the first 
period. We can also rule out that subjects in session 1 had any information about the 
composition of the two groups because they are the first participants who attended 
this experiment.52 Although a weakly significant difference in the levels of trust 
towards the two groups in the first period is observed in session 7, it vanishes 
dramatically in the next period (p=0.888, chi-square test with one degree of freedom), 
suggesting that the significant difference must have emerged by chance. 
 
 
3.4.2  Testing the Competing Theories 
 
3.4.2.1 Consensus Effect 
 
  According to Butler et al. (forth.), the consensus effect is so strong that it could 
remain even after several rounds of game play. As shown in the Section 4.1, when no 
aggregate information about trustees’ groups had been offered to subjects, subjects 
could not distinguish high- from low-trustworthiness groups in the first period. We 
first examine whether subjects’ trusting behavior in the first period is highly 
correlated to their own trustworthiness.  
 
Finding 1. When no ex-ante information is provided before making their decision, 
subjects’ initial trusting behavior is highly correlated with their own trustworthiness; 
and the consensus effect is mainly contributed by L-types. 
 
                                                        
52 In the first session of the experiment, subjects do not always trust more towards group A, as evident 
by the fact that the significant difference disappears in period 3 (p=0.648, chi-square test with one 
degree of freedom). 
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Table 3.4a 
  
Table 3.4b 
Consensus effect among L-types  Consensus effect among H-types 
 Trustworthiness Untrustworthiness  Trustworthiness Untrustworthiness 
Trust 100% 71.8% Trust 87% 75.6% 
Distrust 0% 28.2% Distrust 13% 24.4% 
Notes: “Trust” (or “Distrust”) indicates that 
subjects in the role of trustor decide to trust (or to 
distrust) their partner in the first period; 
“Trustworthiness” (or “Untrustworthiness”) 
denotes that subjects honor (or abuse) the trust as a 
trustee. 
Notes: “Trust” (or “Distrust”) indicates that 
subjects in the role of trustor decide to trust (or to 
distrust) their partner in the first period; 
“Trustworthiness” (or “Untrustworthiness”) 
denotes that subjects honor (or abuse) the trust as a 
trustee. 
  
 
 
  In order to examine the existence of the consensus effect, researchers normally 
elicit subjects’ trust beliefs about their partners before playing the first period of the 
trust game. However, many economists criticize the reliability of the belief elicitation 
method with or without monetary incentives (Blanco et al., 2010). To avoid the 
possible bias produced by the elicitation method, we analyze the correlation between 
subjects’ trusting behavior in the first period and their own trustworthiness using the 
data from all but the Ex-ante Feedback treatment. We find a significantly positive 
correlation between these two behavioral variables (p=0.027, chi-square test with one 
degree of freedom). When decomposing the data based on subject-types, as shown in 
Table 3.4a-3.4b, we find that L-types are more likely to trust if they previously 
honored their partner’s trust as a trustee (p=0.03, chi-square test with one degree of 
freedom) while H-types’ trust in the first period is not significantly correlated with 
their previous trustworthiness (p=0.27, chi-square test with one degree of freedom). It 
implies that, in our experiment, only L-type subjects are susceptible to the consensus 
effect, generating their initial trusting behavior based on their own trustworthiness.53  
 
  Although subjects (more precisely, L-types) make their first decision from their 
own trustworthiness, this phenomenon disappears very quickly. We then examine 
whether trustors could correctly decode each partner type’s inclination to reciprocate 
over time (i.e. trust learning), thereby hindering the effect of false consensus. 
 
Finding 2. Both H- and L-types show increasing trust for the trustworthy type 
partners and decreasing trust for the untrustworthy type partners over time. 
 
                                                        
53 When using Fisher’s exact test, we also find similar results (p=0.029 for pooled data; p=0.047 for 
L-type subjects; and p=0.35 for H-type subjects). 
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Fig. 3.4 Trust learning54   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.5 
 Trust Learning 
 Baseline Treatment Contingent Feedback 
Treatment 
Free Endogenous 
Feedback Treatment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Period -0.100 
(0.020)*** 
-0.100 
(0.020)*** 
-0.152 
(0.019)*** 
-0.159 
(0.020)*** 
-0.114 
(0.020)*** 
-0.119 
(0.020)*** 
H-type 0.305 
(0.226) 
0.297 
(0.228) 
-0.502 
(0.209) ** 
-0.370 
(0.219) * 
-1.303 
(0.232)*** 
-1.374 
(0.236)*** 
High-group 0.659 
(0.436) 
0.675 
(0.439) 
0.381 
(0.611) 
0.304 
(0.617) 
0.265 
(0.503) 
0.205 
(0.507) 
                                                        
54 Based on the data from all but the Ex-ante Feedback treatment, the line in the figure represents the 
frequency of trustful choices towards group A for each period, while the connected line represents the 
frequency of trustful choices towards group B for each period.  
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H-type ! 
High-group 
-0.107 
(0.388) 
-0.112 
(0.391) 
1.224 
(0.638) * 
1.280 
(0.642) ** 
0.127 
(0.454) 
0.161 
(0.458) 
Period ! 
High-group 
0.166 
(0.034)*** 
0.166 
(0.034)*** 
0.182 
(0.051)*** 
0.192 
(0.052)*** 
0.185 
(0.034)*** 
0.194 
(0.035)*** 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating trust. ! 
denotes interaction terms. H-type equals 1 for subjects who are H-types; High-group equals 1 for 
groups that have higher proportion of trustworthy subjects; Controls includes a dummy variable 
session, and three controls for individual characteristics, i.e. Cognitive ability55, Altruism corresponding 
to our questionnaire-based measure of altruism, and Risk aversion indicating subject’s risk attitude in 
the lottery game. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
  After removing the data from the Ex-ante Feedback treatment, in the remaining 
treatments, as shown in Figure 3.4, we find that both H- and L-types are more 
successful at distinguishing the high trustworthiness group from the low one after 
obtaining more experience, and this finding is also supported by the result of the 
non-parametric test (p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). 56 To provide additional 
evidence, we further implement a mixed effects logistic (MEL) regression per 
treatment. As revealed in Table 3.5, the coefficient of the interaction term “Period ! 
High-group” is strongly significant, implying that subjects successfully achieve trust 
learning and recognize the good type partners quickly. Our results are not consistent 
with Butler et al.’s main findings. One possible reason is that, in Butler et al.’s 
(forthcoming) paradigm, subjects’ roles for each period are randomly reassigned, 
which makes it more difficult for subjects to estimate the stable distribution of their 
partner’s types, as a result, the false consensus effect is naturally and repeatedly 
observed in their study.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
55 To measure cognitive ability, we use a three-item cognitive reflection test (CRT) introduced by 
Frederick (2005). Following Oechssler et al. (2009) and Hoppe and Kusterer (2011), we classify the 
subjects into two types based on their CRT score: those who correctly answered zero or one of the 
questions are classified as low cognitive able subjects while the rest are classified as high cognitive 
able subjects. 
56 First, we focus on trustors in general, finding that trustors can successfully distinguish the high 
trustworthiness group from the low one (p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Then, we separate 
H-type from L-type subjects, finding similar results (for L-types, p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test; 
for H-types, p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). 
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3.4.2.2 Difference in predicting trustworthiness 
 
  To interpret their counterintuitive finding that high-trustors are better than 
low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness, Yamagishi (2001; 2011) proposes 
two hypotheses. First, he argues that people in society have different levels of social 
intelligence, and that high-trustors who are more socially intelligent are more 
sensitive than low-trustors to information that reveals others’ trustworthiness. Second, 
he theorizes that high-trustors are more willing than low-trustors to invest cognitive 
resources in cultivating social intelligence for detecting others’ trustworthiness, 
consequently, they engage in collecting more differentiating social data through 
trusting their potential partners more. In order to test Yamagishi’s theory, in this part 
we first examine whether H-types are better than L-types at processing information 
about the reliability of their partners when exogenously exposed to the same type of 
information (i.e. decentralized or aggregate information), and then study whether 
H-types are more willing to endogenously acquire more feedback about their partners, 
which facilitates them to predict others’ trustworthiness more accurately relative to 
L-types.  
  
Finding 3. H- and L-types perform similarly on predicting others’ trustworthiness 
both in the Baseline treatment and in the Ex-ante Feedback treatment.  
   
 
 
  Table 3.6 
  Trusting behavior and performance 
 
Baseline 
 
Ex-ante  
Feedback  
Contingent 
Feedback  
Free 
Endogenous 
Feedback  
Trust (%) of 
H-type  
42.5% 56.5% 71.9% 57.1% 
Trust (%) of 
L-type  
38.4% 44.6% 75.7% 76.1% 
Trust group A (%) 
of H-type 
78.2% 93.6% 97.4% 82.5% 
Trust group A (%) 
of L-type 
75% 81.5% 94.7% 93.3% 
Trust group B (%) 
of H-type 
25.3% 25.7% 53.1% 34.3% 
Trust group B (%) 
of L-type 
20.8% 15.4% 61.7% 40.6% 
Guess Correctness 
(%) of H-type 
91.7% - 100% 96.2% 
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Guess Correctness 
(%) of L-type 
100% - 100% 85.7% 
Notes: “Trust (%)” stands for the frequency of subjects’ trustful actions in trust games; ?Trust 
group A (or B)” stands for the frequency of subjects’ trustful actions towards group A (or B) 
in trust games; “Guess Correctness (%)” stands for the percentage of correctness in the 
guessing task at the end of the trust game. 
 
  First, we analyze the data from the Baseline treatment to examine whether H-types 
perform better in the guessing task after finishing 20 decisions in the trust game. 
Unexpectedly, as shown in Table 3.6, H-types achieve about 92% correctness while 
L-types achieve 100% correctness, but the performance difference is not significant 
(p=0.236, chi-square test with one degree of freedom). This implies that at the very 
end of the trust game both types of subjects are able to detect the high trustworthiness 
group. We then test whether H-types learn to trust or distrust faster than L-types do, 
finding that H-types do not trust the high-trustworthiness-group members more 
(p=0.9, two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N1=16 and N2=24) and the 
low-trustworthiness-group members less (p=0.42, two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
N1=16 and N2=24). To provide additional evidence, we further implement mixed 
effects logistic (MEL) regressions. As reported in Table 3.7a -3.7b, compared to 
L-types, H-types do not trust the “good” group more and the “bad” group less, over 
time. 
 
  Next, we focus on the data from the Ex-ante Feedback treatment and examine 
whether H-types are more adaptive than L-types to this specific game task when 
informed of the general distribution information about the trustworthy players in each 
trustee-group at the very beginning of the trust game. We could not find that H-types 
trust the “good” group more (p=0.32, two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N1=14 and 
N2=26) and the “bad” one less (p=0.47, two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N1=14 
and NH=26). These results are also confirmed by MEL regressions shown in Table 
3.7a-3.7b. In summary, the findings revealed in the Baseline and Ex-ante Feedback 
treatments imply that both H- and L-types can efficiently take advantage of 
information about their partners, as a consequence, exposure to the same type of 
exogenous information (i.e. decentralized or aggregate feedback) makes them perform 
similarly.   
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   Table 3.7a    
   Trust towards the high trustworthiness group (Exogenous feedback) 
 
Variable 
Baseline Ex-ante Feedback  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Period 
0.048 
(0.041) 
0.047 
(0.042) 
-0.047 
(0.044) 
-0.084 
(0.052) 
H-type 
-0.019 
(0.592) 
-0.052 
(0.609) 
1.219 
(0.806) 
-0.891 
(1.051)  
H-type ! Period 
0.022 
(0.054) 
0.027 
(0.055) 
0.035 
(0.065) 
0.068 
(0.072) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 260 260 360 360 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating trust. Controls includes a dummy variable session, and three controls for 
individual characteristics, i.e. Cognitive ability, Altruism and Risk aversion. The symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
    
 
   Table 3.7b   
   Trust towards the low trustworthiness group (Exogenous feedback) 
 
Variable 
Baseline Ex-ante Feedback  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Period 
-0.088 
(0.033)*** 
-0.088 
(0.033)*** 
-0.069 
(0.042) 
-0.062 
(0.044) 
H-type 
0.619 
(0.451) 
0.634 
(0.454) 
0.446 
(0.516) 
-0.253 
(0.569)  
H-type ! Period 
-0.031 
(0.042) 
-0.033 
(0.042) 
0.030 
(0.048) 
0.024 
(0.050) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 540 540 440 440 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating trust. Controls includes a dummy variable session, and three controls for 
individual characteristics, i.e. Cognitive ability, Altruism and Risk aversion. The symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
   
Finding 4. In the Contingent Feedback treatment, H- and L-types acquire a similar 
amount of information about their partner’s actions, therefore, they perform similarly 
on predicting others’ trustworthiness. 
 
  According to Yamagishi’s cognitive investments hypothesis, we expect to see that 
H-types are more likely to deliberately collect information about their partners by 
trusting more than L-types. However, as shown in Table 3.6, both H- and L-types 
choose to trust more than 70% of the time in the Contingent Feedback treatment, 
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implying that they acquire a similar amount of feedback from their partners (p=0.16, 
two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N1=22 and N2=18).57 Consequently, as shown in 
the Table 3.6, at the end of the trust game both H- and L-types guess the high 
trustworthiness group with 100% correctness. To investigate the development of trust 
over interactions with two trustee-groups, we analyze the change in trust across 20 
periods. As shown in Figure 3.5, the behavioral trend of H- and L-types is similar, 
which is supported by a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test revealing that H-types do 
not trust more the “good” group (p=0.83, N1=22 and N2=18) and less the “bad” group 
(p=0.28, N1=22 and N2=18).  
 
  We then conduct MEL regressions to examine whether H-types’ trusting behavior 
is more adaptive than L-types. As shown in Table 3.8a, while the coefficient for 
H-types is negative and weakly, the interaction term “H-type ! Period” is 
significantly positive. It implies that H-types initially trust less than L-types but, after 
accumulating experience, they recognize the high trustworthiness group and increase 
their trust in it dramatically, which is consistent with the trend shown in Figure 3.5.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5 Learning in the Contingent Feedback58 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
57 Even in the first period of the trust game, the frequency of trustful choices is similar between H- and 
L-types (L-types: 74.2%; H-types: 73.4%). 
58 Based on the data from the Contingent Feedback treatment, the line in the figure represents the 
frequency of trustful choices towards group A by period, while the connected line represents the 
frequency of trustful choices towards group B by period.  
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   Table 3.8a    
   Trust towards the high trustworthiness group (Endogenous feedback) 
 
Variable 
Contingent Feedback Free-endogenous Feedback  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Period 
-0.040 
(0.056) 
-0.034 
(0.059) 
-0.017 
(0.059) 
-0.012 
(0.058) 
H-type 
-1.841 
(1.115)* 
-1.905 
(1.223) 
-2.176 
(0.761)*** 
-2.201 
(0.766) *** 
H-type ! Period 
0.344 
(0.162)** 
0.397 
(0.172)** 
0.109 
(0.066)* 
0.116 
(0.067)* 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 340 340 380 380 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating trust. Controls includes a dummy variable session, and three controls for 
individual characteristics, i.e. Cognitive ability, Altruism and Risk aversion. The symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
   Table 3.8b  
   Trust towards the low trustworthiness group (Endogenous feedback) 
 
Variable 
Contingent Feedback Free-endogenous Feedback  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Period 
-0.133 
(0.026)*** 
-0.137 
(0.026)*** 
-0.044 
(0.032) 
-0.046 
(0.032) 
H-type 
-0.038 
(0.477) 
0.105 
(0.484) 
-0.024 
(0.491) 
-0.075 
(0.500)  
H-type ! Period 
-0.042 
(0.039) 
-0.042 
(0.039) 
-0.119 
(0.042)*** 
-0.123 
(0.043)*** 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 460 460 420 420 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating trust. Controls includes a dummy variable session, and three controls for 
individual characteristics, i.e. Cognitive ability, Altruism and Risk aversion. The symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Finding 5. In the Free Endogenous Feedback treatment, H-types show less trust 
towards the low trustworthiness group, and this main effect is qualified by a 
significant time trend. 
  In the Contingent Feedback treatment, subjects face two groups with different 
distributions of trustworthy trustees, and their main task is essentially to identify 
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which one of the two groups has a higher frequency of trustworthy members. This 
specific setting easily encourages subjects to trust much more often. In the real world, 
besides the motivation of learning (i.e. curiosity), other psychological factors, such as 
betrayal or regret aversion, may also influence subjects’ trusting behavior. We want to 
examine whether H-types are better than L-types at regulating the aversive emotions 
aroused by betrayal or regret, and thereby are more likely to acquire feedback about 
their partners, which makes them learn to trust or distrust faster. 
  As shown in Table 3.6, when information acquisition is intentional in the Free 
Endogenous Feedback treatment, H-types perform slightly better in the guessing task 
relative to L-types, but the difference is not significant (p=0.232, chi-square test with 
one degree of freedom). When we turn to observe subjects’ trusting behavior in detail, 
as shown in Figure 3.6, we find that H-types learn faster to distrust the 
low-trustworthiness-group members (p=0.01, two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
N1=14 and N2=26), while both types of subjects perform similarly in predicting the 
trustworthiness of those from the high-trustworthiness-group (p=0.21, two tailed 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N1=19 and N2=29). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6 Learning in the Free Endogenous Feedback59 
 
  In order to study whether the time trend emerging in the Free Endogenous 
Feedback treatment is statistically significant, here we introduce MEL regressions to 
examine whether H-types adapt their strategies towards different trustee-groups more 
quickly than do L-types. We first focus on subjects’ trusting behavior towards the 
                                                        
59 Based on the data from the Free Endogenous Feedback treatment, the line in the figure represents 
the frequency of trustful choices towards group A for each period, while the connected line represents 
the frequency of trustful choices towards group B for each period.  
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“good” group. As shown in Table 3.8a, while the interaction term “H-type ! Period” 
is positive and weakly significant in MEL regressions, the coefficient for H-types is 
negative and highly significant. It implies that H-types catch up with L-types who 
start at higher levels of trust, which is also confirmed by the evidence shown in 
Figure 3.6. We then examine how subjects learn to distrust the trustees from the “bad” 
group. As revealed in Table 3.8b, the interaction term “H-type ! Period” is 
significantly negative, implying that H-types are quicker at adapting their behavior in 
response to the cues of untrustworthiness. 
 
Finding 6. When information acquisition has to be intentional, H-types have a higher 
willingness to acquire information about their partners’ actions as compared to 
L-types. The underlying reason for this phenomenon is not because H-types are less 
regret averse but because they are less betrayal averse than L-types. 
 
As shown in Table 3.9, H-types ask for feedback more than 90% of the time after 
they decide whether or not to trust while only 80% of L-types ask for feedback, and 
this difference is weakly significant (p=0.06, two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
N1=14 and N2=26), suggesting that H-types are more likely to acquire information 
about their partners, which may help them learn faster to trust or distrust others than 
do L-types. 
 
         Table 3.9 
           Asking for information 
 H-type  L-type  
Asking for feedback 
(%) 
94.4% 80% 
Asking for feedback 
(%) if Not Trust 
91.9% 91% 
Asking for feedback 
(%) if Trust 
96.3% 76.5% 
 Note: “Asking for feedback (%)” stands for the frequency of asking  
for information about partners’ actions by subjects. 
 
 
  We further examine which psychological factors actually drive this phenomenon. 
One possibility is that when subjects choose to distrust their partner but their partner 
may actually behave trustworthily, they expect to feel regretful and engage in 
avoiding discovering their partner’s choice (i.e. regret aversion); another possibility is 
that when subjects choose to trust their partner but their partner may abuse that trust, 
they choose not to know about their partner’s action in order to reduce this potentially 
painful psychological cost (i.e. betrayal aversion). As revealed in Table 3.9, when 
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choosing to distrust their partner, L-types ask for feedback slightly more frequently 
than do H-types but this difference is not significant (p=0.53, two tailed Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, N1=10 and N2=26), which is consistent with recent experimental 
evidence showing that choosing to distrust does not activate aversive emotions 
(Aimone et al., forthcoming). However, when subjects choose to trust their partner, 
H-types have a higher willingness to acquire feedback and the difference is significant 
(p=0.03, two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N1=14 and N2=25). This suggests that 
H-types may be better than L-types at regulating the anticipated negative emotions 
aroused by betrayal aversion and thereby are more keen to acquire the useful 
information about their partner’s action, consequently, they learn to trust or distrust 
their partner more quickly.  
 
3.4.3  Individual characteristics 
 
  As discussed in the Section of Experimental design, we follow Yamagishi’s 
approach to classify subjects into two categories on the basis of their questionnaire 
answers (i.e. H- and L-types). Our main results could be seriously weakened if these 
two types of subjects are highly different in the terms of individual characteristics. To 
secure the robustness of the results, in this part, we analyze the data about individual 
characteristics.    
   
  Firstly, we focus on the questionnaire data and find that there is no significant 
difference between H- and L-types in terms of the general individual characteristics 
except that the individual’s social status and the experience on obtaining financial aid. 
H-types are more likely to be student leaders and to receive financial aid from the 
university (for the details, see Appendix 5).  
 
  Secondly, we use the data from the lottery game and the Bayesian updating game, 
and try to examine whether H- and L-types behave differently in these two games.  
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   Table 3.10 
   Risk attitudes and Bayesian learning abilities 
 
Baseline 
 
Ex-ante  
Feedback  
Contingent 
Feedback  
Free 
Endogenous 
Feedback  
Risk aversion 
index of H-type 
5.1 5.1 4.8 5.2 
Risk aversion 
index of L-type 
5.1 5.4 5.8 5.2 
Correctness (%) 
of H-type 
81.7% 85.4% 86.1% 86.4% 
Correctness (%) 
of L-type 
84.7% 83.2% 84.6% 86.4% 
Notes: “Risk aversion index” is calculated using the data from the lottery game, which 
measures the degree of a subject’s risk aversion; “Correctness (%)” indicates the percentage 
of guess correctness in the Bayesian updating game by subjects.  
 
Finding 7. There is no significant difference between H- and L-types in terms of risk 
attitudes. 
  In previous studies, there is a heated debate about whether risk attitudes can be 
used to predict trusting behavior in the trust game: running two experiments with a 
diverse set of subjects in fifteen villages of rural Paraguay, Schechter (2007) reveals 
that risk attitudes are highly predictive of play in the trust game while Eckel and 
Grossman (1996) and Houser et al. (2010) could not replicate this finding using other 
subject samples. In our study, we use the lottery game to measure subjects’ risk 
attitudes60, and try to test whether H- and L-types hold significantly different risk 
attitudes. As shown in Table 3.10, on average subjects choose the first five safe 
options and then switch to select the risky options. H- and L-types are similar in terms 
of risk attitudes (p=0.16, two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N1=64 and N2=88).      
 
Finding 8. H- and L-types are equally able to process statistical information in the 
Bayesian updating task. 
  As shown in Table 3.10, we observe that on average both H- and L-types achieve 
more than 80% correctness in the Bayesian updating game, and that there is almost no 
difference in the performance between them. This result is also supported by a 
two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p=0.85, N1=66 and N2=94), suggesting that H- 
and L-types have similar Bayesian learning abilities. 
 
 
                                                        
60 In our study, before analyzing the data of risk attitudes, we removed 8 subjects because of their 
inconsistent choices in the lottery task. In our measurements higher values mean more risk aversion (i.e. 
the value for the extreme risk aversion is 10).  
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3.5  Conclusions 
  People seem to believe that high-trustors are gullible and tend to trust others 
indiscriminately, thereby performing worse than low-trustors. However, many 
experimental studies reveal that the reverse is true: compared to their counterparts, 
high-trustors are better at lie detection (Carter and Weber, 2010), and are significantly 
more accurate in their predictions of others’ trustworthiness (Yamagishi, 2011). In 
this study we take a further step to identify which factors make high-trustors adapt 
their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more 
quickly. Our main findings are that both high- and low-trustors can learn whom to 
trust over time, and that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ 
trustworthiness not because they are better at processing the trustworthiness-related 
information, or that they deliberately collect differentiating social data through 
trusting more, but only because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive 
emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to 
acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions. 
 
  These findings have important implications for empirical research and legal policy. 
Firstly, in Butler et al. (forthcoming), subjects are shown to form their trust beliefs 
about other people based on their own trustworthiness and this false consensus effect 
has a strongly persistent impact on their trusting behavior even after several periods of 
learning. Consequently, high-trustors who hold overly optimistic default expectations 
of others’ trustworthiness have to suffer the substantial cost of forming biased trust 
beliefs. Contrary to their studies, our experiment allows subjects to learn their 
partner’s types under a stable distribution of trustees, which helps them utilize past 
useful experience. Consequently, even though no ex-ante aggregate information is 
provided, both high- and low-trustors are able to learn whom to trust or distrust over 
time. It implies that when investors are involved in a stable commercial environment, 
they could correctly recognize their partners’ types by learning. However, when the 
environment becomes highly undetermined, they may have great difficulty evaluating 
their partners’ trustworthiness and tend to make their decisions mainly based on their 
own trustworthiness, which causes them consequently to suffer because of this. 
Therefore, in future work it is appropriate to manipulate the degree of uncertainty in 
the experimental environment in order to investigate whether the effectiveness of trust 
learning is dependent on this. 
 
  Secondly, in all treatments trustors could correctly trust trustworthy type partners 
more and trust untrustworthy type partners less over time; however, different trusting 
behavior between unconditional and conditional feedback treatments is still observed. 
When facing the low trustworthiness group, subjects trust much more in the 
Contingent Feedback and Free Endogenous Feedback treatments than in the other 
two treatments. It implies that if necessary information about their potential partners 
is unconditionally provided, much unprofitable trusting behavior can be avoided.  
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Thirdly, in terms of other legal policy implications, the results raise important 
questions for interventions designed to improve market efficiency, which typically 
focus on incentive mechanisms, such as pricing or monetary rewarding systems. Our 
study provides experimental evidence, suggesting that with higher degrees of 
generalized trust, high-trustors seem to manage the aversive emotions aroused by 
betrayal more successfully, which causes them to have a higher willingness to be 
involved in market participation. Consequently, they learn more about distinguishing 
trustworthy from untrustworthy partners. In order to overcome the problems 
generated by betrayal aversion, the decision-maker of public policy should 
mandatorily disclose the necessary information on the outcome of transactions and 
make the commercial environment transparent. Consequently, the scope of market 
transactions would expand, and more investors be attracted to participate in market 
transactions and recognize trustworthy partners quickly, thereby sustaining a higher 
level of market efficiency.   
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Supporting Information 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
1. Gender  
(1) Female     (2) Male 
 
2. How old are you? 
  ___ years 
 
3. Race  
(1) Minority ethnic group    (2) Han 
 
4. Citizen                             
(1) Rural     (2) Urban 
 
5. At which year do you live in the campus?            
(1) 1st year  (2) 2nd year  (3) 3rd year  (4) 4th year  (5) 5th year  (6) others 
 
6. Field of studies                                  
(1) Economics-related   (2) Noneconomics-related 
 
7. Your highest degree goal 
(1) Bachelor  (2) Master  (3) Ph.D. 
 
8. Are you a member of Communist Party of China (CPC)? 
(1) No    (2) Yes 
 
9. Are you a student leader (i.e. Ganbu)? 
(1) No    (2) Yes 
 
10. Your father’s education 
(1) Primary school   (2) Middle school  (3) High school  (4) Junior college  (5) 
College  (6) Graduate school  
 
11. Your Mother’s education 
(1) Primary school   (2) Middle school  (3) High school  (4) Junior college  (5) 
College  (6) Graduate school 
 
12. Mother’s occupation 
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(1) Government employee  (2) Company employee  (3) Self-employed worker 
(4) Retired               (5) Jobless            (6) Others                         
 
13. Father’s occupation                                 
(1) Government employee  (2) Company employee  (3) Self-employed worker 
(4) Retired               (5) Jobless            (6) Others 
 
14. The size of your family members (including your grandfather/mother, 
father/mother) 
   _____ persons 
 
15. Do you have siblings?                            
(1) No       (2) Yes 
 
16. Do you grow from a single-parent family? 
(1) No       (2) Yes 
 
17. Family economics situation                        
(1) Very low  (2) Average  (4) Above average  (5) Well      (6) Very well 
 
18. In order to finish your education, did you apply for any financial aid? 
(1) No       (2) Yes 
 
19. Do you have some work experience? 
(1) No       (2) Yes 
 
20. Did you participant the similar economic decision making experiments in the 
past? 
(1) No       (2) Yes 
 
21. Did you participant the psychological experiments in the past? 
(1) No       (2) Yes 
 
22. Suppose your earning is the only source of your family income, which the 
following option will you choose: 
(1) Option A: your earning is constant and is equal to the sum of the current incomes 
of your parents; Option B: your earning is uncertain, with 50% you earn two times of 
the sum, with 50% you earn 66.7% of the sum.  
Which option will you choose? 
 
(2) Option A: your earning is constant and is equal to the sum of the current incomes 
of your parents; Option B: your earning is uncertain, with 50% you earn two times of 
the sum, with 50% you earn 50% of the sum.  
Which option will you choose? 
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(3) Option A: your earning is constant and is equal to the sum of the current incomes 
of your parents; Option B: your earning is uncertain, with 50% you earn two times of 
the sum, with 50% you earn 80% of the sum.  
Which option will you choose? 
 
(4) Option A: your earning is constant and is equal to the sum of the current incomes 
of your parents; Option B: your earning is uncertain, with 50% you earn two times of 
the sum, with 50% you earn 90% of the sum.  
Which option will you choose? 
 
23. Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to 
avoid taking risk? 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “unwilling to take risks” and 
the value 10 means: “fully prepared to take risk” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
24. Suppose you face 7 following options in the real world, which option will you 
choose? 
(1) with 0.1% you could obtain 100,000 Yuan otherwise obtain zero Yuan 
(2) with 1% you could obtain 10,000 Yuan otherwise obtain zero Yuan 
(3) with 10% you could obtain 1,000 Yuan otherwise obtain zero Yuan 
(4) with 25% you could obtain 400 Yuan otherwise obtain zero Yuan 
(5) with 50% you could obtain 300 Yuan otherwise obtain zero Yuan 
(6) with 75% you could obtain 133 Yuan otherwise obtain zero Yuan 
(7) you could certainly obtain 100 Yuan 
 
25. Do you agree that “most people are basically honest”? 
(1) Strongly disagree  (2) Disagree  (3) Neutral  (4) Agree  (5) Strongly Agree 
 
26. Do you agree that “most people are trustworthy”? 
(1) Strongly disagree  (2) Disagree  (3) Neutral  (4) Agree  (5) Strongly Agree 
 
27. Do you agree that “most people trust a person if the person trusts them”? 
(1) Strongly disagree  (2) Disagree  (3) Neutral  (4) Agree  (5) Strongly Agree 
 
28. Do you agree that “most people are basically good-natured and kind”? 
(1) Strongly disagree  (2) Disagree  (3) Neutral  (4) Agree  (5) Strongly Agree 
 
29. Do you agree that “most people are trustful of others”? 
(1) Strongly disagree  (2) Disagree  (3) Neutral  (4) Agree  (5) Strongly Agree 
 
30. Do you agree that “generally, I am trustful”? 
(1) Strongly disagree  (2) Disagree  (3) Neutral  (4) Agree  (5) Strongly Agree 
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31. Do you agree that “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as 
possible, no matter what the costs”?  
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “strongly disagree” and the 
value 7 means: “strongly agree” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
32. Do you agree that “If someone offends me, I will also offend him/her”? 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “strongly disagree” and the 
value 7 means: “strongly agree” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
 
32. Are you generally a person who fully controls herself for temptation issues, e.g. 
quitting smoking, finishing homework in time, keeping fit, saving money for 
long-term plan, etc.? 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “very poor in self-control” 
and the value 10 means: “very good at self-control” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
33. Are you generally a person who cares about others’ feelings and benefits? 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “strong do not care about” 
and the value 10 means: “strongly care about” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
34. A bat and a ball cost $ 1.10 in total. The bat costs $ 1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost?    ____ cents 
 
35. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets?    _____ minutes 
 
36. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half of the lake?  _____ days  
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Appendix 2 
Instructions (baseline) 
 
Welcome to this study on economic decision-making!                              
 
Please, turn off your mobile phone. From this moment on, no form of communication 
among participants is allowed. In case you have a question, please rise your hand and 
the instructor will come to your desk to answer it. 
 
This study includes two parts. In Part 1, a questionnaire will appear on your computer 
screen. Then followed by Part 2, which includes four experiments, and you can earn 
money from this part (Note that you are given the instructions for a new experiment 
just after the previous experiment is finished). The money you earn in the different 
four experiments will be paid to you in cash, and in private, at the end of experiment.  
 
Now, we will read instructions for Part 1. At the beginning of experiments 1, 2, 3 and 
4 in Part 2, we will distribute and read the corresponding instructions. 
 
Instructions for Part 1 
 
We now kindly ask you to fill in a questionnaire that will appear soon on your 
computer screen. Some of the questions concern personal information that will help 
us for our study. Your identity will never be revealed when results are presented. 
Please, answer carefully: you will not be able to change your answer, once you 
confirm it.  
 
Instructions for Experiment 1 
 
In Experiment 1, you can earn up to 25 Yuan, depending on the decisions you make 
and on the outcome of two random draws. 
 
Your computer screen (Figure 1) will show ten decisions listed on the left. Each 
decision is a paired choice between "Option A" and "Option B." You will make ten 
choices and record these in the final column, but only one of them will be used in the 
end to determine your earnings.    
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?Fig. 1? 
 
Before you start making your ten choices, please let us explain how these choices will 
affect your earnings for this experiment. After you have made all of your choices, the 
computer will randomly draw a number between 1 and 10, to determine which of your 
decisions will be actually used. Another random draw will determine what your 
payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even 
though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your 
earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, 
each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays 10 Yuan, no matter what the 
outcome of the second draw is. Option B yields 25 Yuan if the outcome of the second 
draw is 1, and it pays 0 Yuan if the throw is 2-10. The other Decisions are similar, 
except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for option B 
increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed since 
option B pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 10 Yuan or 
25 Yuan. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to 
choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows 
and B for other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order. 
When you are finished, please click the “Confirm” button at the bottom right of the 
screen. 
 
Earnings for this experiment will be added to your earnings for the next three 
experiments of the study, and you will be paid all earnings in cash when we finish. 
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So now please look at the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You will 
have to select an option, A or B in each of these boxes, and then the random draw will 
determine which one is going to count. We will look at the decision that you made for 
the choice that counts, before throwing the die again to determine your earnings for 
this experiment. You will be informed about the outcome of these draws only at 
the end of Part 2 of this study. 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Please answer following questions. Raise your hand if you need help. The instructor 
will come to help you and will check your answers when you are done. 
1), Please read carefully the above table (Figure 1) which will appear on your screen. 
What is the probability of each decision (from Decision 1 to 10) that will be selected 
by computer? 
(A) 1/2    (B) 1/10    (C) We cannot know it 
2), Do you think that, for each decision (from Decision 1 to 10), you will always earn 
more money from option A than from option B? 
 (A) Yes   (B) No, we cannot know it before the selection made by computer 
 
Now you may begin making your choices!     
 
Instructions for Experiment 2 
                                   
In Experiment 2, you can earn money depending on the decisions that you and other 
participants will take. At the end of this study, your earnings for this experiment will 
be summed with the earnings from other experiments, and you will be privately paid 
in cash. 
 
Please, follow the instructions carefully. 
 
How the study is conducted. The study is conducted anonymously. Participants will 
be unidentified by other participants and experimenter, and no one will be able to 
associate any decisions with specific people. Participants will be randomly matched 
into pairs consisting of two roles: person “1” and person “2”. There is no 
communication between you and your counterparts, and your counterpart will never 
know your true identity, nor will you know theirs.  
 
What the study is about. The study seeks to understand how people decide. You and 
your counterpart form a pair, and your decisions will determine how much money you 
earn. Person 1 is confronted with two alternatives, X and Y. X gives person 1 and 
person 2 a payoff for sure, and person 2 does not need take action. If person 1 chooses 
option Y, person 2 has to choose one of two options, A or B. 
 
You are informed the payoff structure as follows: 
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(1). If person 1’s decision results in X, person 1 and person 2 will each get 10 Yuan. 
(2). If person 1’s decision results in Y and person 2 chooses A, person 1 and person 2 
will each get 15 Yuan. 
(3). If person 1’s decision results in Y, and person 2 chooses B, person 2 will get 22 
Yuan and person 1 will get 8 Yuan. 
 
 
(Fig. 2) 
 
In this experiment, all of you who participate in today’s experiments will act as 
Person 2, and you will have to make one decision. Each of your counterparts will be 
randomly selected from the next experiment among today’s participants, and you 
have no idea about the true identity of your counterparts. On your computer screen 
(Figure 2) you will see the payoff table, and will be asked to answer the following 
question: 
“ Which Option A or B, do you choose in case Person 1 chooses Y? ” 
 
To enter your decision, press the button corresponding to your choice (Option A or 
Option B). Later, we will randomly match your decision with the decision made by 
Person 1 in the next experiment, ultimately determining both payoffs. You will be 
informed of the results only at the end of Part 2 of this study.   
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Please answer following questions. Raise your hand if you need help. The instructor 
will come to help you and will check your answers when you are done. 
1) If your counterpart chooses X, and you choose A, how much are you paid? 
______ your counterpart?_______ 
2) If your counterpart chooses X, and you choose B, how much are you paid? 
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______ your counterpart?_______ 
3) If your counterpart chooses Y, and you choose A, how much are you paid? 
______ your counterpart?_______ 
4) If your counterpart chooses Y, and you choose B, how much are you paid? 
______ your counterpart?_______ 
Now you may make your choice! 
 
 
Instructions for Experiment 3 
(Baseline Treatment) 
 
How the study is conducted. In Experiment 3, you can earn money depending on the 
decisions that you and other participants will take. Your earning for this experiment 
will be summed with the earnings from the other experiments, and will be privately 
paid to you in cash. 
 
 
(Fig.3) 
 
What the task is about. In Experiment 3, you will face the same situation as in 
Experiment 2, but this time you act as Person 1, and play the game for 20 periods. 
For each period, on your computer screen (Figure 3), you will see the payoff table, 
and will be asked to answer the following question:  
“Your partner belongs to Group 1 (or 2), so which Option, X or Y, will you choose? ” 
 
To enter your decision, press the button corresponding to your choice (Option X or 
Option Y). 1), if you choose Option X, then the actual outcome of this period is 
complete (e.g. you will receive 10 Yuan, and person 2 will receive 10 Yuan);  
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2), if you choose Y, then the actual outcome of the period depends on the decision 
made by person 2: if person 2 chooses Option A, you will receive 15 Yuan, and 
person 2 will receive 15 Yuan; if person 2 chooses option B, you will receive 8 Yuan, 
and person 2 will receive 22 Yuan. Please check the details from the above payoff 
table.  
 
For each period, you will be randomly matched with a counterpart (Person 2). Your 
counterpart will be one of the 20 participants in the today’s experiments. You can also 
be possibly matched with yourself. The decision of Person 2 corresponds to the 
choice made by your counterpart in Experiment 2 of this study. After this experiment, 
one period will be randomly selected by computer to determine the real payoffs for 
you and your counterpart in the previous experiment.  
 
Please remember, for each period you are informed about the actual decision of 
your counterpart (i.e. person 2) immediately after you decide whether or not to 
choose option X (or Y), i.e. you will receive the “feedback” from your 
counterpart regardless of your own choice.  
 
How your counterpart (i.e. person 2) is selected. We have randomly formed two 
groups of Person 2s based on the decisions made in Experiment 2. In one of the 
groups, at least 50% of the people chose Option A, while in the other group, less than 
50% of the people chose Option A. We labeled these two groups “Group 1” and 
“Group 2”. However, you do not know which is the group where at least 50% of the 
people chose Option A, and which is the group where less than 50% of people chose 
Option A. 
 
For each period, you will be randomly matched with a person 2 picked from the 
Group 1 or Group 2. Before making your decision, you only know whether the 
current counterpart belongs to the Group 1 or the Group 2. 
 
At the very end of this experiment, you will be asked the following question: 
“Remember that there are two groups of person 2: in one of the groups, at least 50% 
of the people choose Option A, other choose Option B; in the other, less than 50% 
choose Option A. So, which group is the one where at least 50% choose Option A: 
Group 1 or Group 2?” 
Once your guess is correct, you will win 10 Yuan and be informed this result at the 
very end of this study. 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Please answer following questions. Raise your hand if you need help. The instructor 
will come to help you and will check your answers when you are done. 
1), As Person 1 in this experiment, you would read the similar above table (Figure 3) 
in your screen. In this table, do you know which group your partner comes from? 
        (A) from Group 1               (B) from Group 2 
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2), How many people in Group 1 chose Option A? 
 (A) at least 50%    (B) less than 50%     (C) We cannot know it till now 
3), If your partner chose A, and you chose X, how much are you paid? ______ your 
partner?_____ 
 
Now you may make your choice for the first period! 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions for Experiment 4 
 
In Experiment 4, you will play for 20 periods, and will earn money depending on the 
decisions you make in each period. On your screen, you will see two “bingo cages”, 
labeled cage A, and cage B (Figure 4).  
 
 
?Fig. 4? 
 
At the beginning of each period, the computer will randomly draw an integer number 
which can be equal to 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, with equal probability, to determine whether 
cage A or cage B will be used for the task: if 1 through m (here m would be 2, 3, or 4 
and announced later) is drawn, we use cage A for the task; otherwise we use cage B. 
Please remember, cage A contains six balls, four Red balls (R) and two Green balls 
(G) (i.e. 4R & 2G); cage B also contains six balls, three Red balls (R) and three 
Green balls (G) (i.e. 3R & 3G). 
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What the task is about. For each period, the computer first randomly selects an integer 
number (from 1 to 6), and then a specific value of m (m=2, 3, or 4) is randomly 
selected and announced, thus determining which cage (A or B) will be used. The 
result of this draw is not revealed to you. If cage A (or B) is selected, six draws (with 
replacement) from this cage are performed, and the results (e.g. GGRRGG) are 
displayed on your screen. You can record the outcomes of the draws on your record 
sheet if you wish.  
 
Your decision for each period: which is the cage (A or B) that you believe used to 
generate the observations on your screen? You will not receive any feedback 
about the correctness of your responses until the end of the last period. 
 
What the payment is about. After Experiment 4, we will count the number of periods 
in which your guess is right, and then rank the participants based on their scores. The 
participant with the highest score will be awarded 200 Yuan at the end of this study 
(if there are more than one participants who get the same highest score, the 200 Yuan 
prize will be shared equally among the winners.) 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Please answer following questions. Raise your hand if you need help. The instructor 
will come to help you and will check your answers when you are done. 
1), Please read carefully the above table (Figure 4) which may appear on your screen. 
Suppose m=4, what is the probability that cage A is selected? 
       (A) 2/6         (B) 3/6         (C) 4/6 
2), If cage A is selected, what is the probability that a Red is drawn? 
        (A) 3/6             (B) 4/6 
3), If cage B is selected, what is the probability that a Red ball is drawn? 
        (A) 3/6             (B) 4/6 
 
Please make your decision seriously for each period, thank you! 
 
END! 
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Appendix 3  
 
The Pre-programmed Assignment Rule 
Possible Groups 
Possible number of 
trustworthy 
subjects in the 
session 
The number of 
trustworthy subjects 
assigned to group A 
The number of 
untrustworthy 
subjects assigned 
to group A 
Groups 0 0 0 
Groups 1 1 1 
Groups 2 2 2 
Groups 3 2 2 
Groups 4 3 3 
Groups 5 4 4 
Groups 6 5 4 
Groups 7 5 4 
Groups 8 6 4 
Groups 9 7 3 
Groups 10 7 3 
Groups 11 7 3 
Groups 12 8 2 
Groups 13 9 2 
Groups 14 10 1 
Groups 15 12 1 
Groups 16 14 1 
Groups 17 16 1 
Groups 18 17 0 
Groups 19 10 0 
Groups 20 20 0 
 
Notes: In each session, the number of trustworthy subjects could appear unexpectedly. For each 
possible number, we randomly assign certain number of trustworthy subjects into group A (or B), and 
in the meanwhile, we also randomly select certain number of untrustworthy subjects to supplement 
group A (or B) to make sure that at least 50% of trustees in group A honored trust while in group B 
strictly less than 50% did it.  
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Appendix 4 
 
 
Final allocation of trustees across sessions 
 
 
 
Session 1: 
Trustee type High Group Low Group 
Untrustworthy trustee 2 15 
Trustworthy trustee 2 1 
 
Session 2: 
Trustee type High Group Low Group 
Untrustworthy trustee  4 11 
Trustworthy trustee  4 1 
 
 Session 3: 
Trustee type High Group Low Group 
Untrustworthy trustee 4 8 
Trustworthy trustee 6 2 
 
 Session 4: 
Trustee type High Group Low Group 
Untrustworthy trustee 4 8 
Trustworthy trustee 6 2 
 
Session 5: 
Trustee type High Group Low Group 
Untrustworthy trustee 4 11 
Trustworthy trustee 4 1 
 
Session 6: 
Trustee type High Group Low Group 
Untrustworthy trustee 4 9 
Trustworthy trustee 5 2 
 
Session 7: 
Trustee type High Group Low Group 
Untrustworthy trustee 4 10 
Trustworthy trustee 5 1 
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Session 8: 
Trustee type High Group Low Group 
Untrustworthy trustee 4 9 
Trustworthy trustee 5 2 
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Appendix 5 
 
Individual characteristics 
 
Individual 
characteristics 
H-type subjects 
(N=94) 
L-type subjects 
(N=66) 
Nonparametric test 
Male 50% 45.5% p>0.5711 
Age 20.4 20.3 p=0.6022 
Han  92.6 98.5% p=0.090*1 
Student leader 47.9% 31.8% p=0.042**1 
CPC member 25.5% 18.2% p=0.2731 
Financial aid 21.3% 9.1% p=0.040**1 
Urban citizen 43.6% 48.5% p=0.5431 
Single-child 53.2% 63.6% p=0.1881 
Working experience 63.8% 62.1% p=0.8251 
Economic 
experimental 
experience 
63.8% 50% p=0.1711 
Psychological 
experimental 
experience 
64.9% 63.6% p=0.8701 
Home income index 2.9 2.8 p=0.5822 
Economics 
background 
9.6% 9.1% p=0.9181 
High 
cognitive-ability 
84% 77.3% p=0.2801 
Self control index 6.4 5.9 p=0.1462 
Altruism index 7.9 7.4 p=0.059*2 
Notes: “Male” equals 1 for those who are male subject; “Age” indicates subjects’ age; “Han” equals 1 
for those who are from Han ethnicity; “Student leader” indicates whether subjects are student leader in 
the university; “CPC member” indicates whether subjects are the member of Communist Party of 
China; “Financial aid” indicates that subjects get financial aid from the university; “Urban citizen” 
indicates that subjects are urban citizens; “Single-child” indicates whether subjects are the single child 
in their family; “Working experience” indicates whether subjects have part-time working experience; 
“Economic experimental experience” indicates whether subjects have some experience on economic 
experiments; “Psychological experimental experience” indicates whether subjects have some 
experience on psychological experiments; “Home income index” indicates the level of subjects’ 
household income (the highest level is 5); “Economics background” indicates whether subjects are 
from the economics-related department; “High cognitive-ability” indicates whether subjects are high 
cognitive able; “Self control index” indicates subjects’ answer to the Question 32 in Appendix 1; 
“Altruism index” indicates subjects’ answer to the Question 33 in Appendix 1. 1A two-tailed chi-square 
test, 2A two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
  Not many transactions are carried out simultaneously. Absent repeated interaction 
or binding contracts, the standard law and economic models predict that transacting 
parties would not be able to trade. To facilitate mutually advantageous exchanges, 
formal legal institutions and social norms are two common approaches to mitigate 
commitment problems. Besides legal and non-legal mechanisms aiming to restrain 
promisors’ temptation to renege on their promises, individual characteristics, 
particularly psychological states, are also crucial for establishing trust, because they 
can affect promisees’ reliance investments that have specific value in contractual 
relationships. This dissertation investigates how law, informal institutions and 
psychological factors affect transacting behavior. In particular, it first examines the 
question of how legal and non-legal mechanisms interact to sustain economics 
exchanges. It then investigates how social norms emerge in commercial communities 
where contracting parties lack the protection of formal legal institutions, and whether 
the endogenous adoption of an informal institution can achieve economic governance 
and social order. It finally studies how subtle psychological factors influence 
individuals’ transacting behavior in a commercial environment where parties cannot 
rely on either long-term relationships or legal mechanisms to deter opportunism. I 
have tackled these pressing subquestions of the research agenda in three separate 
Chapters.          
 
  The first Chapter has addressed the question of how formal contract enforcement 
affects norms of good conduct, such as trust and trustworthiness. Based on a review 
of relevant empirical studies in the literature on macroeconomics, inter-firm 
cooperation and laboratory experiments, it can be concluded that formal legal 
mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally 
work as substitutes for trust, rather than complements, except when they are perceived 
as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population 
in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which 
repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. 
 
  These insights are very relevant to real-life legal issues. In order to encourage more 
welfare enhancing transactions, most legislators engage in designing the optimal legal 
remedies for contract breach. Their attention usually focuses on economic 
considerations, particularly cost-and benefit analysis. In contract cases where 
performance is non-verifiable by judges or unobservable by the contracting parties, 
trust-based commercial relationships become highly important, and legislators have to 
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take into account the possible effects of non-legal mechanisms when they enforce the 
sanctions for contract breach. In line with this argument, Cooter (1996) finds that 
when Judge Posner decided to make legal judgments, he also concerned himself with 
the prevailing norms widely shared by the contracting parties. 
 
  Another field where legislators have currently a concern for trust, is in online 
e-commerce. A common idea both in Europe and in the U.S. is that, due to a lack of 
trust by consumers, e-transactions are inhibited and inefficient. To enhance 
consumers’ trust in distance sales, right-to-withdraw clauses are widely adopted by 
firms. Borges and Irlenbusch (2007) show experimentally that the adoption of 
withdrawal rights by firms signals their trustworthiness to potential consumers, and 
thereby increases trust in distance sales. Other pro-consumer mechanisms, such as 
impartial third-party payment systems, are also established to enhance the levels of 
trust in online transactions.                      
 
  The second Chapter has examined whether people are willing to endogenously 
adopt a collective punishment institution when they lack the protection of an effective 
legal system, and whether the endogenous adoption of collective punishment 
mechanism can help a society coordinate an efficient outcome, characterized by high 
levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results suggest that the 
introduction of collective punishment induces a significant increase in the levels of 
trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also of trust. The endogenous introduction of 
the mechanism by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve 
coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all participants seem to be able to 
anticipate the effectiveness of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. 
In addition, this chapter also shows that participants with higher cognitive abilities 
and with a background in statistics are more likely to vote in favor of the mechanism. 
 
  Most law-and-norm scholars usually focus on the “close-knit” group, “a social 
network whose members have credible and reciprocal prospects for the application of 
power against one another and a good supply of information on past and present 
internal events” (Ellickson, 1991, p.181), when they study how informal norms or 
institutions govern individual behavior. Similarly, this chapter uses a small-size group 
where the information about cheating is publicly disclosed by the experimenter to 
group members and the severity of collective punishment depends on average 
behavior in the group. An obvious next step would be to explore whether social 
sanction institutions are still effective in large groups where group members’ 
individual characteristics and beliefs are much more diverse.  
 
  The chapter has also shown that highly intelligent subjects who are able to 
anticipate the effectiveness of the collective punishment mechanism are more likely to 
vote in favor of the mechanism, which is consistent with the Ellickson’s theory on 
“the Market for Social Norms”: norm entrepreneurs (i.e. opinion leaders or activists) 
with an extraordinary level of social intelligence are “particularly suited to providing 
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the new rule and eager to have it adopted” (Ellickson, 2001, p.2); appreciative 
observers follow the norm after they learn the potential profitability of it. Therefore, 
the recommendation for lawmakers is to provide legal support to norm entrepreneurs 
when they are struggling to establish an effective norm or transform an inefficient 
norm. The enactment of the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s in the U.S. provides a 
good example, showing that a good law can help norm entrepreneurs to change 
inefficient norms.                      
 
  The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in 
response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn 
supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness 
relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that both high- and 
low-trustors are able to learn whom to trust over time, and that high-trustors are better 
than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness not because they are better at 
processing the trustworthiness-related information, or that they deliberately collect 
differentiating social data through trusting more, but only because they are less 
susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and 
thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their 
partner’s actions.  
 
  These findings have two main important implications. First, they clearly point to 
the relevance of betrayal aversion – a psychological factor that has recently received 
significant attention in the law and economics literature. Traditional legal scholars 
argue that contracting parties can use contract enforcement to encourage performance 
of contract obligation and to threaten contractually specified damages against the 
breaching party for non-performance, leaving no space for psychological factors. 
Besides the protection of formal contracts, this chapter shows that intrinsic 
psychological states – the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential 
betrayal – can also significantly influence individuals’ contracting behavior and the 
recovery of trust after a deliberate breach of contract.  
 
  Second, the chapter has shown that when the information about the potential 
partners is unconditionally provided to subjects, both high- and low-trustors are able 
to correctly differentiate their trusting behavior according to their partner’s 
trustworthiness, and they perform similarly in predicting others’ trustworthiness. It 
implies that psychological factors play a minor role in a competitive market where the 
information about cheating flows freely and is accessible to every market participant. 
Therefore, lawmakers should mandatorily disclose the necessary information on the 
outcome of transactions and make the commercial environment transparent in order to 
overcome the problems generated by betrayal aversion.              
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